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A B S T R A C T 
On a broad level it can be said that India had close 
relations with the USSR in the 1980s, but her relations with 
the U.S., during this decade, were marked by a lot of ups 
and downs. In this study an effort has been made to search 
for the main underlying reasons and factors which helped in 
shaping these relationships. 
Chapter I tries to look at the historical background 
of India's relations with the Superpowers. As regards the 
Soviet Union, it was "cold to the newly-independent India, 
but India tried hard to get close to it. It chose the USSR 
to be the first country with which it established diplomatic 
relations. A significant start in Indo-Soviet relations was 
made in February 1955, when the steel plant at Bhilai was 
set up. Later, Nehru was given a rousing reception in 
Moscow, in June 1955 and the USSR accepted 'Panchsheel' as a 
part of their policy of co-existence and denounced military 
alliances. The USSR supported Indian on Kashmir and Goa 
both inside and outside the United Nations. It also 
rendered a lot of help to India's public sector and became 
India's major arms supplier. 
As regards India's relations with the U.S. in the 
post-war period there were few if any areas of overlapping 
interests and scarcely any business, cultural or intellec-
tual contacts between the two countries. For the U.S. 
administration relations with India were not a major 
concern. However, by the mid 1970s, the U.S. administration 
had realised that they could not ignore India as an 
important factor in South Asia. 
In Chapter II India's political relations with the 
USSR in the decade of the eighties have been explored. 
When the USSR intervened in Afghanistan, India initially 
desisted from criticising the USSR, as it did not want to 
endanger the cordial relations between the two countries at 
a time when polarisation of power was taking place in South 
Asia. Later, India disapproved of this intervention in 
clear terms. Basically the Indian approach was that of 
restraint not blame and dialogue not confrontation. 
Although India had close political relations with the 
USSR, India's efforts at economic liberalisation and diver-
sification of arms procurement, alarmed the USSR. But, 
complementarity of perspectives, views and policies on vital 
items of regional and global concern, put at rest all the 
apprehensions. Nevertheless, India was quite protective 
about the independence of her foreign policy. Hence, 
Gorbachev's conc^ept of Asia-Pacific Security which was 
mooted during his visit to India in 1986 was not endorsed by 
Rajiv Gandhi, as it could have dragged India in the cold war 
politics. 
In the decade of the eighties, India and the USSR 
presented a successful model of mutually beneficial co-
existence. This relationship which was based on trust and 
goodwill was unaffected by the change of leadership in 
either of the two countries. 
In Chapter III, India's political relations with the 
U.S., in the eighties, have been analysed. Despite a lot of 
divergences in the political field, during this period, both 
India and the U.S. were fully aware of the importance of 
each other. India needed the U.S. support to forestall the 
formation of U.S.-Pak-China axis and to get the much needed 
high technology from the U.S. The U.S. needed friendship 
with India because it was an important country in South 
Asia. The conflictual nature of Indo-Pak relations had a 
significant bearing on this relationship. Because^ of U.S. 
proximity with Pakistan, India could never bring itself to 
trust the U.S. The U.S. tried hard to convince India that 
its close relationship with Pakistan did not preclude a 
close relationship with India, but the Indian policy makers 
were not satisfied. 
An important step towards closer Indo-U.S. relations 
was the MOU signed in 1984. It was an instrument contri-
buting towards greater future .interaction in specialized 
areas of dual-use high technology. The Festivals of India 
and America also helped in forging better people to people 
relations . 
By the end of the eighties there was a marked change 
in the nature of Indo-U.S. relations. The ability 
"to agree to disagree" was the essence of the change which 
had taken place. However, the pattern of this relationship 
was more characterized by misperceptions and misunderstand-
ings than understanding and consideration to the needs of 
the other. 
Chapter IV explores the economic dimension of Indo-
Soviet relationship. A basic reason for the close economic 
relations between India and the USSR was mutually beneficial 
rupee-trade and payments arrangement. The Indian side payed 
in rupees for Soviet goods and credits etc., the money was 
deposited in a special account in the Reserve Bank of India 
and was later used by Soviet organisations to pur chase 
Indian goods. Most of the Soviet loans were advanced on an 
yearly 2.5 percent interest and they extended upto 12 years. 
All of it was available in the form of credits. All 
through the eighties India maintained an advantageous 
balance of trade relationship with the USSR except for 
1983-84. 
Both the countries cooperated mainly in areas of 
ferrous metallurgy, oil explortion, coal mining and power 
generation. Most significantly, when Moscow had told the 
East European countries to turn to alternative supplies for 
their increasing oil requirements, it was prepared to forego 
hard currency in a seller's market by selling oil to India 
within the framework of the bilateral payments. This was an 
indicator of the high priority Moscow attached to its 
relations with India. 
In the second half of the eighties, the commodity 
composition of Indian exports changed slowly from primary 
goods to machines and manufactures . In Indian imports the 
share of Soviet machines and manufactures dropped steadily, 
reflecting a higher degree of self-sufficiency achieved by 
India in these products -
The Soviet Union was a big source of raw materials, 
capital and technology for India, but with its collapse 
uncertainity set in. 
Chapter V traces the pattern of Indo-U.S. economic 
relations. In the early eighties, there was much disagree-
ment between India and the U.S. on strategies of economic 
development. The U.S. insisted that India should open its 
market to unrestricted activity by private foreign capital. 
This was stoutly resisted by India. However, towards the 
close of the eighties, most of the American demands were 
slowly accommodated by India. 
The MOU of 1984 facilitated the transfer of high 
technology which tlie U.S. had hitherto refused to supply. 
In 1987, both sides agreed to establish the USIF which 
would ensure 10-year funding for some major agricultural 
research and technology. 
The two countries differed mainly on the issue of 
patents. Intellectual property rights and in the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA) over the issue of 
India's share in IDA Loans, available at highly conce-
ssional rates. The strict U.S. protectionist policies of 
countervailing duties and anti-dumping regulations consti-
tuted a major non-tariff barrier to India's exports to the 
U.S. Later, the Super 301 provision of the U.S. Trade and 
Competitiveness Act created problems asking for the removal 
of identified trade barriers. 
In Chapter VI, an effort has been made to study 
India's military relations with the USSR in the eighties. 
The Soviet Union was India's major arms supplier. Mainly 
because, it offered the best terms. The Soviet arms were 
available at long-term credits repayable within 17 years. 
The Soviets were also willing to disseminate defence 
technology and there was no problem of supply of spares. 
The Soviet Union supplied those weapon systems to India 
which were not made available even to its allies in the 
Warsaw pact. The case in point is the nuclear powered 
submarines acquired by the Indian Navy from USSR. 
However, this close relationship was not without its 
problems. The regional emphasis in India's defence outlook 
as compared to global Soviet perspectives was often a cause 
for concern. Gorbachav's concept of Asia-Pacific Security 
was brushed aside by Rajiv Gandhi and it was conveyed to the 
USSR that it should not try to draft India in its cold war 
with the U.S. 
The USSR was not comfortable with India's efforts at 
diversification of arms supplies whereas Soviet penchant for 
secrecy was quite irritating for India. Nevertheless, the 
USSR continued to be ±ndias major arms supplier. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union threw up some 
fresh issues. An immediate consequence was the disruption 
of production lines and deliveries to foreign buyers. 
In Chapter VII, a study of military relations between 
India and the U.S. has been made. The onset of the eighties 
did not see any convergence of perception between India and 
the U.S. in the field of defence cooperation. The Indian 
demand for licence to manufacture the supplied instrument 
and assurances for sustained supplies of ammunition and 
spares were incompatible with the U.S. approach. The U.S. 
was interested in outright sale and not know-how transfer. 
The U.S. could never trust India as a reliable 
recipient of dual-use technology. The MOU of 1984 cleared 
the way for such transfers. The transfer of sophisticated 
U.S. military technology was intended not only to reduce 
India's dependence on the Soviet Union but also to give 
India a position of leadership in determining world strate-
8 
gic goals compatible with those of the U.S. However, the 
U.S. had to face a lot of problems in its attempts to be 
friendly simultaneously with two antagonistic States- India 
and Pakistan. 
An unnecessary irritant was created by the U.S. in 
the path of this growing relationship, when the Senate 
Appropriations Sub-committee decided in 1987, to make an 
Indo-Pak agreement on nuclear non-proliferation a pre-
condition for continued U.S. aid and technology transfer to 
India. However, in the face of strong criticism from all 
sections of the Indian leadership and media, it was soon 
withdrawn. This was not an isolated incident but it was 
preceded by several similar actions which were intended to 
unduly pressurize India. 
By the close of eighties, India showed a willingness 
to be a partner in long-term cooperation rather than a 
surrogate which is dependent on U.S. defence aid, much as 
Pakistan was. India was not seeking military aid from the 
U.S., it wanted a strategic partnership in its own right as 
a regional partner. 
The conclusions sum up the findings of this work and 
tries to look for the future trends. 
With the break-up of the Soviet Union a situation of 
uncertainity arose which left the 'Indian policy makers in a 
stato of bewilderment and confusion. India could no more 
count on the support of Moscow in the Security Council, 
because the latter was too pre-occupied with its own 
concerns and it could no more afford to confront the U.S. on 
every isf<uf>. Moreover, India lost its ideological value to 
Moscow, as a significant example of a Third World country 
having cordial relations with a socialist state. 
In the economic field, Indian exports to the former 
Soviet Union (FSU) were down by 80 percent on protocol 
levels by 1992. Trade between India and Russia had virtua-
lly stopped. With Moscow owing Rs.32 billion in technical 
credits India closed trading accounts with the Soviet 
Union on 28 December 1991 and fresh accounts were opened in 
the name of new CIS republics. 
In the field of defence both countries had reached a 
high level of cooperation, but with the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union a lot of problems arose. Defence 
production and deliveries to foreign countries were 
disrupted . Moves by the FSU towards an open economy and 
currency convertibi]ity meant that the method of payment had 
to be re-negotiated with those countries which had conducted 
barter trade with the FSU. Moreover, it was significant to 
reach to an agreement as to how India's defence debt to the 
FSU was to be apportioned among the new republics. There 
was also a great amount of uncertainity about the republic's 
ability and willingness to continue supplying spares. 
10 
India's relations with the U.S. in the eighties, were 
marked by a clash of U.S. global strategic interests and 
concerns with India's regional security interests and 
concerns. Such a disharmony in their perceptions and 
interests led to a situation where India and the U.S. found 
themselves pitted against each other in most of the 
situations. 
In the economic field, there were certain areas of 
disagreement, like the U.S. demand for reduction in tariffs, 
greater IPR protection and opening up of banking and 
insurance sectors. The imposition of countervailing duties 
and quota restrictions on Indian goods to protect the 
domestic U.S. market, was another irritant. The U.S. 
continually threatened India for punitive action under 
Super-301. Most of these irritants were satisfactorily 
managed by the onset of the nineties. However, 
possibilities of friction remained. 
In the field of defence cooperation, slowly, there 
was an account not just on 'cooperation' but 'partnership'. 
However, disagreement and friction continued over the U.S. 
efforts to make India sign the NPT. 
For most of the eighties, India's relations with the 
FSU were quite cordial, but all was not well as regards her 
relations with the U.S. They disapproved of India's 
proximity with the FSU, but could not do much about it. 
u 
There did not appear any meeting ground for these three 
countries. But with the demise of the cold war the 
international situation has undergone a major change. 
Certain common areas of interest for Moscow, Washington and 
New Delhi could be identified. These include the promotion 
of pluralist democracy and market economy and opposition to 
religious fundamentalism. Hence, despite points of dis-
agreement, these issues provide broad areas of agreement in 
the near term. 
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P R E F A C E 
The world scene continued to be dominated by the two super-
powers - the United States and the Soviet Union, in the 
1980s. Against this backdrop, India's relations with each 
of them assurae'd" great importance for her. In this study an 
effort has been made to search for the main underlying 
factors which helped in shaping India's relations with the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union, in the eighties. 
Chapter I, reviews the historical background of 
India's relations with either of these two powers. India 
chose the USSR to be the first country with which it estab-
lished diplomtic relations. The USSR also reciprocated by 
helping India in its task of economic reconstruction and at 
the political level, both inside and outside the United 
Nations. As regards the US, in the post-war period, there 
were few if any areas of overlapping interests and scarcely 
any business, cultural or intellectual contacts between the 
two countries. 
In Chapter II, India's political relations with the 
USSR, in the decade of the eighties have been explored. 
Both these countries presented a model of mutually benefi-
cial co-existence., However, the USSR was alarmed when India 
moved towards economic liberalisation and diversification of 
(ii) 
arms supplies/ but complimentarily of views, perspectives 
and policies, on vital issues of regional and global 
concern, put at rest all such apprehensions. 
In Chapter III, a study of India's political reltions 
with the U.S., in the eighties, has been made. There were 
many areas of friction between the two countries, but both 
realised each other's importance. India needed the U.S. 
support to forestall the formation of U.S.- Pakistan-China 
axis and to get the much needed high technology from the 
U.S. The U.S. needed friendship with India because it was 
an important country in South Asia. 
Chapter IV explores the economic dimension of Indo-
Soviet reltionship. A basic reason for the close economic 
relations between India and the USSR was mutually benefi-
cial rupee-trade and payments arrangement. The Indian side 
payed in rupees for Soviet goods and credits etc., the money 
was deposited in a special account in the Reserve Bank of 
India and was later used by Soviet organisations to purchase 
Indian goods. Most of the Soviet loans were advanced on an 
yearly 2.5 percent interest and they extended upto 12 years. 
All of it was available in the form of credits. 
Chapter V traces the pattern of Indo-U.S. economic 
relations. In the early eighties there was much disagree-
ment between the two countries on strategies of economic 
(iii) 
development. The U.S. insisted that India should open its 
market for unrestricted activity by foreign capital. This 
was stoutly resisted by India. However, towards the close 
of the eighties most of the American demands were slowly 
accommodated by India. 
In Chapter VI an effort has been made to study the 
defence cooperation between India and the USSR. The USSR 
was India's major arms supplier, because it offered the best 
terms. The Soviet arms were available at long-term credits 
repayable within 17 years. They were also willing to 
disseminate defence technology and there was no problem of 
supply of spares. 
Chapter VII analyses the defence relations between 
India and the U.S. The eighties did not see any convergence 
of perception between these two countries. The Indian 
demand for licence to manufacture the supplied instrument 
and assurances for sustained supplies of ammunition and 
spares was incompatible with the U.S. approach. The U.S. 
was interested in outright sale and not know-how transfer. 
The Memorandum of understanding signed in 1984 cleared the 
way for the transfer of dual-use technology to India 
The Conclusions sura up the findings of this study and 
looksat the future trends. The break-up of the Soviet Union 
left the Indian policy makers confused. By 1992, Indian 
(iv) 
exports to the former Soviet Union were down by 80 percent, 
trade had virtually stopped. Defence production there and 
deliveries to foreign countries were disrupted. There was a 
lot of uncertainity about the Republic's ability to continue 
supplying spares. 
As regards the U.S. most of the major irritants which 
had bothered Indo- U.S. relations in the eighties were 
satisfactorily managed, by the onset of the nineties. 
However, points of friction like the NPT, remained. In the 
field of defence, there was an accent not just on 'coopera-
tion' but 'partnership'. 
With the demise of the cold war, the international 
situation has undergone a major change. In this scenario 
certain common areas of interest for New Delhi, Washington 
and Moscow may be identified. These include the promotion 
of pluralist democracy and market economy and opposition to 
religious fundamentalism. Hence, despite points of dis-
agreement, these areas provide points of convergence in the 
near future-
CHAPTER - I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Introduction: 
The world stage was dominated by the two superpowers-
the United States and the Soviet Union - till almost the end 
of the 1980s. Since the end of the World War II these two 
countries had enjoyed a decisive superiority over all the 
other countries as regards their power potential. 
Since, some scholars have objected to the use of the 
term 'superpower' in relation to the US and USSR, the use of 
this term in the present work needs to be justified at the 
very outset. The critics argue that these countries may as 
well be referred to as 'great powers' along with China, 
France and Britain. However, the term 'great powers' has 
been avoided here because of the following reasons. 
The concept of 'great powers' is a 19th century idea, 
which acquired shape at the congress of Vienna in 1815. 
Initially, both the USA and USSR were great powers like 
Great Britain, but after World Ward II, the USA and USSR 
have dramatically increased their power potential, whereas, 
the power status of other great powers has not increased at 
the same pace, resulting in a wide disparity between the 
might of the USA and USSR on one side and that of the 
remaining great powers on the other. The former have thus 
advanced to the next higher stage of power status which 
qualifies them to be called Superpowers. 
As regards the great powers, they could control small 
states in the 19th and early 20th century, but each great 
power was always apprehensive of the increasing influence of 
the other great power in relation to the weak states as it 
could affect their own 'great power' status. So, to pre-
serve it, each great power made efforts to check the undue 
growth of the power potential of the other. This process of 
checks and counter checks was based on the principle of 
balance of power. In addition the great power status of 
different countries was not much endurable and a single war 
could turn a great power into a small power. This is not 
true of a Superpower. There are several great powers in the 
world but a superpower belongs to a different category. It 
can impose its de cisions on a small power without any 
worthwhile interference from the gret powers. But the great 
powers can impose their will on small powers only with the 
permission and concurrence of the Superpowers. Great powers 
cannot compete with or challenge a Superpower. It is these 
factors which differentiate a Super Power from a great 
power, and therefore United States and Soviet Union fall in 
the former category. 
Another factor which differentiates the US and USSR 
as Superpowers from the other great powers is the composi-
tion of their respective military alliances. In the 
military alliances of the great powers under the balance of 
power system, there used to be an equality of powers among 
the .members. But this is not the case with the military 
alliances of Superpowers, in which they command a decisive 
dominance. It is because of these reasons that the term 
'Superpower' has been preferred to the term 'greatpower' in 
this study. 
India had a vital stake in maintaining cordial 
relations with both these powers for political strategic and 
economic considerations. An attempt is made in the 
following pages to examine India's relationship pattern with 
both these Superpowers. 
India and the USSR: 
India's contacts with the USSR started with the visit 
of Jawaharlal Nehru to that country on the 10th anniversary 
of the Great October Revolution in 1927. Nehru had fruitful 
discussions with several important Soviet leaders. After 
his return to India, he alongwith several leaders of the 
freedom movement showed a marked porpensity towards the 
Soviet Union. He once observed that, "Russia cannot be 
ignored by us, because she is our neighbourhood, a powerful 
neighbour, which may be a thorn in our side, ... The old 
political rivalry between England and Russia continues .... 
How far must India inherit this rivalry or be made to suffer 
from it." 
Formal diplomatic relations between India and the 
USSR were established only in 1947. The appointment of 
Mrs.Vijay Laxmi Pandit as India's ambassador to the USSR, 
was one of the first few actions of the new Government after 
India's independence. Even before this, India had made an 
important foreign policy move towards the USSR at the 1946 
UN General Assembly session. After his meeting with the 
Soviet Foreign Minister in 1946. Krishna Menon said in 
Paris that he "saw no reason why the strongest friendship 
should not form the permanent basis of relationship between 
2 
India and Russia." At the General Assembly session the 
Indian and Soviet delegations had similar views. On such 
problems as the unanimity of the great powers in the United 
Nations and the withdrawal of British troops from Greece 
etc. the head of the Indian delegation observed that "better 
co-operation materialised with the USSR . . . for the Soviet 
3 
approach to most problems had been somewhat liberal." 
1. Jawaharlal Nehru, Soviet Russia: Some Random Sketches and 
Impressions, 1929, p.3. 
2. The Hindu, October 1, 1946. 
3. V.V. Balabushevich, India and the Soviet Union, A Sympo-
sium, Peoples Publishing House, Delhi, 1969, p. 64. 
In India, the Communist Party of India (CPI) had 
started creating problems for the new government of indepen-
dent India. There was a common belief in India that the CPI 
was controlled by the CPSU. A series of communist inspired 
riots and strikes in India thus created negative image of 
the USSR. 
However, relations were stabilized when the USSR came 
to India's help during the acute food crisis before the 
first General Election. India first approached the US for a 
wheat loan, but the US senate was non-committal. It tried 
to influence the stance of Indian political parties by 
pressurizing them on this issue. The USSR, nevertheless 
came to India's help, agreeing to supply wheat uncondition-
ally. On May the 10th, 1951, Prime Minister Nehru announced 
in the Parliament, that "Russia was starting wheat 
deliveries without waiting for the conclusion of negotia-
4 
tions on the terms." 
India's diplomatic moves during the Korean Crisis 
elicited a favourable response from the Soviet Union. But 
there were still some psychological barriers which inhibited 
the immediate development of close economic, cultural and 
technical cooperation. "Some Indians", remarked K.P.S. 
Menon, "still suffered from the fear, a relic of Beritish 
days, that the USSR was out to turn the world red by hook or 
4. New York Times, May 13, 1951. 
crook; and many Russians thought that India was nominally 
free, she was economically bound hand and foot to the 
5 
chariot of western imperialism." 
Soviet support to India on Kashmir in the United 
Nations has been one of the major factors which brought both 
these countries together. The most crucial Soviet support 
came in January 1952, "in a manner which chagrined the West 
and surprised everyone." It again saved India's face in 
1957 by applying the veto power, against a Western sponsored 
resolution which asked for the introduction of a UN force 
for arranging a Plebiscite in Kashmir. 
Stalin, however, did not entertain a favourable 
impression about Indian leaders, especially Gandhi. In May 
1925, he unequivocally characterised Gandhi, a stooge of the 
British imperialists. A distinguished Indologist, writing 
about Gandhi, in 1948 stated: "Advocating non-violence in 
the struggle of the masses for liberation, Gandhi could not 
move forward against the oppression of the masses by 
imperialists but rather justified the forcible suppression 
of the mass movement by the people, when the working people 
7 
actively came forward against the imperialists." The death 
of Stalin in 1953 opened new doors for Soviet policy. 
5. K.P.S. Menon, Lenin Through Indian Eyes, Delhi, 1970, 
p. 67. 
6. Surendra Chopra (ed. ) Studies in India's Foreign 
PolicY, GNDU, Amritsar, p.TTT. 
7. Kyril Tidmarsh, "The Soviet Reassessment of Mahatma 
Gandhi", St.Anthony's papers No.8: South Asian 
Affairs No.l, London, 1960, p.105. 
Nehru visited the USSR in spring 1955 to a warm and 
grand welcome. After his talks with the Soviet leaders 
Nehru said at a press conference that the Soviet government 
had expressed its readiness to assist India in carrying out 
her development plans, and the Soviet aid was without any 
political strings- whatsoever." The joint declaration 
expressed the desire "to develop and strengthen relations 
between the two countries in economic and cultural fields 
9 
and in the field of scientific and technological research." 
The visit of Nehru was followed by the return visit 
of Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin in November 1955. 
This exchange of State visits ushered in an era of warm 
Indo-Soviet relations. During this visit the Russians 
unequivocally declared that Kashmir was an integral part of 
India. 
Hence these visits served the purpose of cementing 
the Indo-USSR relationship. Commenting on this, Khrushchev 
observed that "both we and our Indian friends would like to 
develop and strengthen our friendly relations in a way 
which would not change the friendly relations of India or 
of the Soviet Union with other States." 
a. Pravda, June 22, 1955. 
9. Ibid., June 23, 1955. 
10. Ibid., December 30, 1955, 
Since that time the USSR has consistently come to 
India's help on various international issues in the UN and 
outside. On the question of Goa the credit of saving 
India's prestige goes to the USSR. It was an issue over 
which the entire West was ranged against India, criticising 
and opposing it tooth and nail. But the Soviet veto in the 
Security Council in 1961 saved India from an embarrassing 
position. 
This Indo-USSR friendship was put to a severe test 
when China, an ally of the USSR, launched an unprovoked 
attack on India in October 1962. The USSR called for a 
peaceful resolution of this conflict, and an editorial in 
Pravda on November 5, almost amounted to ordering China to 
stop fighting India. There was some apprehension in India 
that Soviet military aid would be stopped, but the supplies 
of MIGs arrived without much delay. 
During the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the USSR did not 
favour any side. A commentary in Pravda on August 24, 
stated: "We would like Soviet Pakistani relations, like our 
traditional friendship with India, to be a stabilizing 
factor in the situation in Asia and to contribute to the 
normalization of relations between Pakistan and India." The 
USSR issued several calls for a ceasefire. An important 
landmark of Soviet concern for regional peace was the 
initiative of Soviet Premier Kosygin to convene a Peace 
Conference at Tashkent in 1966, to bring India and Pakistan 
together, after the cessation of hostilities. 
Subsequently, contacts between these two countries 
were balanced in such a manner that each learnt not to 
overreact to those actions of the other which did not harm 
its interests. Such as, Soviet efforts at Liberalisation in 
Czhchoslovakia in 1968 was only mildly commented upon by the 
Indian government. On the other hand, India's explosion of 
a nuclear device in 1974 was not condemned by the USSR. 
Meanwhile, India was quite concerned over the Soviet 
policy of limited arms supply to Pakistan as part of its 
efforts to wean the latter away from China. It led the 
Indian government to make an important move in August 1968 
and again in January 1969. Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi 
indicated India's willingness to discuss its border dispute 
with China, without requiring the latter to meet India's 
former preconditions. However, as China showed no interest, 
the Indian initiative did not yield positive results. But 
later the USSR came to realize that its efforts to move 
close to Pakistan would complicate its relations with India-
a time tested friend. Seeing reason, Moscow offered a 
treaty relationship to India in 1969, which was finally 
signed in 1971. The treaty sent a "message to the world, to 
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note the special bonds of bilateralism that have now been 
ratified in a treaty relationship." 
Some critics called the treaty an aspect of 
Brezhnev's plan for collective security which its author had 
proposed on 7 June 1969. In an exposition of the treay, it 
is said that "any attempt to call the treaty an integral 
part of the Brezhnev plan was a striving to turn the treaty, 
an act of peace, into a scarecrow and those who took that 
view only revealed their reactionary outlook and their 
aversion to peace and stability and progressive social 
12 
changes in India." 
In pursuance of the mutual consultation clauses of 
the Indo -Soviet treaty, a series of high level meetings 
were exchanged between India and the USSR, at the height of 
the Bangladesh crisis in 1971. The then Soviet Ambassador 
Pegor consistently called at the Prime Minister's office and 
residence. President Podgorny visited India in October. 
All this resulted in the emergence of "an identity of views 
between India and the Soviet Union on the question of 
Bangladesh which resulted in the principled stand taken by 
the Soviet Union in support of India, both inside and 
11. Rasheeduddin Khan, "Sovereignty: Crucial Support", 
World Focus, 8(4), April 1987, p.15. 
12. A.G. Noorani, "The Indo-Soviet Treaty aud EreHhnev 
Plan." Indian Express, June 27, 1972. 
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outside the United Nations, during the Indo-Pakistan 
13 
conflict." 
Despite the fact that India and the USSR had come to 
close to each other by this time, India was very protective 
about independence of foreign policy. The case in point is 
the Soviet effort to rope India into some form of collective 
security in Asia in 1969. This proposal was revived in 
1972. India's reaction was outwardly polite but inwardly 
guarded. Brezhnev during his first visit to India as chief 
executive again advocated the same proposal. Elaborate 
offers of economic assistance along with this proposal were 
not enough to cajole India into accepting it. Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi conveyed India's stand to the visiting leader in her 
own inimitable style. She said, "there are some people who 
try to confuse and misinterpret things. But the fact is 
that the Soviet Union has not, during so many years of 
friendship ever put pressure on us or told us what to do and 
14 
what not to do." 
This slight divergence in approach could not however 
shake the firm foundation of friendly relations and mutual 
understanding between India and the USSR, Even the 
imposition of emergency by Mrs.Gandhi, under which commu-
nists alongwith other opponents of the government, were at 
13. Ministry of External Affairs, Report 1971-72, New 
Delhi, p.69. 
14. Indira Gandhi, New Delhi, 27 November 1973 (Civic 
reception) Foreign Affairs Record, November 197 3. 
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the receiving end of repressive measures, did not elicit any 
criticism from the USSR. Soviet experts expressed their 
understanding of emergency measures as a means of tackling 
"diverse and complex problems." 
Addressing the CPSU Central Committee, General 
Secretary Brezhnev observed - "we attach special importance 
to friendship with that great country (India). In the past 
five years Soviet Indian relations have risen to a new level 
... close political and economic cooperation with the people 
of India is our constant policy." 
There was some apprehension in Moscow about the new 
government of Janata Party in India. But the Soviet Union 
continued its efforts to develop better understanding and 
cooperation between the two countries. The Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko visited India in April 1977, for 
the same purpose. He expressed the Soviet desire to see 
17 India as "a strong flourishing and peace loving power." 
The economic assistance to India continued as before, and 
the fear that the Indo Soviet Treaty would be abrogated, was 
belied. Morarji Desai visited the Soviet Union in November 
1977. He stressed in his speeches there, that Indo-Soviet 
relations were "not based on personalities or ideologies but 
15. M.Menshikov, My Years in India, Moscow News, 22 
November 1975. 
16. Twentififth CPSU Congress; Documents and Resolutions. 
Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1976, pp.12-13. 
17. Andrei Gromyko, New Delhi, 22 April 1977, The Times 
of India, 23, April, 1977. 
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on equality, national interest and cominon purposes. 
The Janata Party was initially not in favour of 
maintaining a special relationship with USSR at the expense 
of relations with the other superpower. But the new 
emerging power equation in Asia, and aggressive Chinese 
policies, manifesting itself in the entry of its forces in 
Vietnam, convinced the Indian leadership that a close rela-
tionship with Moscow was most productive. It is against 
this backdrop that the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr.Kosygin 
visited India in March 1979, and was accorded a warm 
welcome. The Janata leadership decided to come closer for 
developing the multifaceted cooperation between the two 
countries. Just a day before the departure of Kosygin and 
his 100 member entourage on 15th December, the 'Long-Tern 
Program of Economic, Trade, scientific and Technical 
cooperation' was finalised. Hence, Indo-USSR bilateral 
relations continued to grow in the spirit of the Treaty of 
Friendship signed in August 1971. 
Economic Relations: 
Immediately after attaining independence India was 
confronted with a major problem - the need to overcome 
colonial backwardness. We had serious shortage of produc-
18. Soviet Review, Vol.14, Nos.51-52, 3 November 1977, 
p.11. 
14 
tive capital, industrial machinery, spare parts and fuel 
etc. What was urgently required was foreign aid, to solve 
these problems. In the initial period India mainly depended 
on Western countries particularly Great Britain and United 
States for such assistance. 
However, full caution was exercised in accepting aid 
from these sources. Gandhiji had expressed his apprehen-
sions in the April 26, 1942 issue of the 'Harijan'- "We know 
what American aid means. It amounts in the end to American 
influence, if not American rule added to British rule." 
Slowly, to inject some diversification in its 
foredign economic relations, India looked towards the Soviet 
Union. The first trade agreement between these two 
countries was signed on December 2, 1953, for terra of five 
years. The turnover of trade between India and the USSR 
increased dramatically from about Rs.one and half crores in 
19 1951 to about 176 crores m 1965. However, the volume of 
business done by India with the USSR amounted in 1954 to no 
more than Rs.365 million which was an insignificant share of 
India's foreign trade. But the trade agreement made it 
possible for India to receive Soviet machinery and technical 
assistance for implementing her economic development plans. 
19. Ministry of Commerce Report 1981-82, p. 27. 
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The basic reason why India sought help from the 
Soviet Union for building her industrial and technological 
infrastructure was the unwillingness of the Western States 
to extend aid to the public sector. Soviet help in building 
up of India's steel industry is the case in point. Under 
India's second development plan (1956-60), it was decided to 
construct three metal making plants to boost steel 
production in India. The IBRD showed no interest in helping 
India in these projects. As the terms of agreement 
concluded with the West German companies of Krupp and Damag 
for the construction of one of the companies were unfavour-
able, the Indian government decided to consider the Soviet 
proposal made in 1954 for extending help towards the cons-
truction of a steel-making plant. Talks were initiated with 
the Soviet representatives and subsequently an agreement was 
signed on February 2, 1955. According to this agreement, 
the USSR was to help India in the construction of an 
integrated steel-making plant at Bhilai. This agreement had 
far better terms than the one concluded with the West German 
companies. The interest to be paid was only 2 per cent, and 
that was to be paid out of Indian exports. The Soviets made 
no claim for a share in the profits nor for a say in running 
the plant. The maximum possible use was to be made of 
Indian industry in the production of equipment required for 
the construction of the plant. The signing of this agree-
ment marked the first major step towards a breakthrough in 
16 
overcoming the West's monopoly over technical aid and 
credits for the industrial development of newly independent 
states. It marked a beginning of extensive and fruitful 
economic cooperation between India and the USSR. 
Several significant agreement were signed between 
India and the USSR from 1957 to 1964. The Soviet help 
enabled India to set up the heavy machine building plant at 
Durgapur. They helped in the setting up of Asia's largest 
antibiotics plant at Ranchi and a synthetic drugs plant at 
Hyderabad. The Bhakara right bank hydropower station, the 
largest of its kind in Asia was also set up with Soviet 
help. 
On the petroleum front the Indian government ''^•ad 
hitherto relied on the advice of Ango-American Oil companies 
which had reported that Indian oil was not worth commercial 
exploitation. However, when the Russian experts visited 
India in 1955 they reported the reverse. Thus started 
a period of close Indo-Soviet cooperation in this vital 
sector. The much talked-about ONGC was set up with Soviet 
Assistance in 1956. 
In the agricultural sector also, the USSR, by 1956 
had become the second largest contributor to India's deve-
lopment with an investment of 488.3 crore rupees upto 1966. 
17 
Certain factors which facilitated close Indo-USSR 
economic cooperation were as follows: 
Firstly, it was made repeatedly clear that the Soviet 
20 
aid was without any political strings whatsoever." 
Secondly, the Soviets were willing to invest in the public 
sector, which the Indian govenment was trying to promote as 
a matter of policy. The western countries on the other hand 
were unwilling to invest in this sector. Thirdly, the 
agreements concluded with the USSR were comprehensive, and 
included designing, supply of raw materials and equipment 
and training of Indian personnel. It showed a sensitivity 
as regards India's requirements of using progressively more 
and more of its men and materials. Lastly, Soviet loans 
carried a 2.5 per cent interest rate over a 12 year repay-
ment period starting one year after delivery, and most 
importantly they were repayable in rupees to be used for 
import of Indian goods. 
It is because of these factors that Indo-Soviet trade 
"rose from rupees one crore in 1953 to rupees 88 crores in 
1958 to rupees 176 crores in 1965 with a declared intention 
21 
of raising it to rupees 300 crores by 1970." 
1. Ibid., June 22, 1955. 
2. Indian Express, April 5, 1968. 
However, by the beginning of the 1970s, India was 
paying back to the Soviet Union more in interest charges and 
repayment of the past loans than it was receiving from it as 
aid. Mr.Y.B. Chavan, the then Finance Minister said that, 
"India paid back to the Soviet Union in 1970-71, 11.7 
22 
million pounds sterling, more than she obtained as aid." 
Nevertheless, the debt service payment were made in rupees, 
which was an advantage as compared to the aid from Western 
countries, which asked for debt service payments in foreign 
exchange. 
The USSR had become India's second largest trading 
partner by 1973, accounting for 13 per cent of the latter's 
exports. In the same year the two countries agreed to make 
their five year plans complementary. Slowly, there was a 
lessening of India's interest in steel and heavy industry 
plants in which the USSR was eager to help. The latter was 
found wanting in the supply of raw materials and extending 
the much needed food aid. 
The year 1975 proved to be important for econom.ic 
reltions because both sides agreed to try for production 
cooperation. A Planning Group was formed which exchanged 
information and documents on long term, medium term and 
annual planning, so that each may be benefitted by the 
22. Financial Times, July 9, 1971. 
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experience of the other. It was "the first occasion the 
Soviet Union had exchanged such information with a State 
23 that did not belong to camecon." 
However, India was concerned when Moscow unilaterally 
revalued the Rouble in 1975. ' The 1971 rate of 11.39 Roubles 
to Rupees 100 was changed to 8.66 Roubles to Rupees 100. It 
demanded protection from international alterations of the 
rupee value. But this irritant was not allowed to cloud the 
otherwise good economic relations between the two countries 
and finally in November 1978 an agreement was reached. A 
rate of 10 roubles to rupees 100 was decided upon and all 
past payments by India at the old rate were to be treated as 
final with no extra liability. 
There were some apprehension in Moscow about the 
continuance of good economic relations between the two 
countries when the Janata Party came to power in India. But 
these proved unfounded and a long-term protocol for 
increasing economic and technical cooperation for another 10 
to 15 years, was signed between the two countries in March 
1978, at the conclusion of the ministerial level meeting of 
the Indo-Soviet joint commission. Another long term 
economic agreement was signed in December, the same year. 
This close economic relationship was further consolidated in 
23. Financial Times, March 14, 1975 
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December 1979 when the two countries signed a trade protocol 
that envisaged a turnover of 1.1 billion pounds sterling in 
1980; a record for the two countries. This made the USSR 
the largest trading partner of India. 
Military Relations: 
Association between India and the USSR in this field 
started in the early sixties- Till then India received 
almost all its arms from the United Kingdom, but was now 
eager to shed this parasitic dependence. It also wanted to 
develop a public sector defence industry of its own. The 
USSR showed a positive interest for these Indian require-
ments . 
The beginning was made in 1955 when Nehru visited the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet government presented two Ilyushin-
14 transport aircrafts to India and offered to give the 
11-28 Bomber at about half the market price of the British 
Canberra. Subsequently, in October 1960, an Indian delega-
tion visited Moscow where agreements were concluded for the 
purchase of Russian Ilyushin-14 commercial aircrafts, 
Antonov An-12 heavy aircrafts and Mi-4 Hound helicopters. 
The Chinese aggressive designs towards India and the 
massive U.S. military assistance programme for Pakistan 
forced India into modernizing her airforce. Dialogues were 
initiated simultaneously with "U.K., USA, France and USSR for 
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supersonic aircraft to counter the Lockhead F-104 star-
fighter supplied by the U.S. to Pakistan. The U.S. and its 
Western allies did not show any interest in this Indian 
request and so India was forced to reach an agreement with 
the USSR for the purchase of two squadrons of MIG-21s to 
counter the F-104 starfighter. An "agreement to this effect 
was signed in August 1962. Six MIG-21s and eight An-12 
24 
aircrafts were subsequently delivered in 1963. 
The year 1963-64 saw a prompt follow up action on 
Soviet arms transfer commitments. In March 1963, a Sovint 
technical team came to India to do the groundwork for 
setting up the MIG factories here, and in July the same yoa^ 
a high powered military delegation from India visited Moscow 
at Soviet invitation. The Soviet military supplies to India 
continued apace in the following years, in 1964-75 India 
received 150 PT-76 armoured fighting vehicles. The USSR 
supplied 36 Mi-4 helicopters in 1965 on deferred payment and 
40 in 1966, as also 90 MIG-215 from 1965-67 on direct 
25 payment, and 14 in 1966. In addition to these aircrafts 
the USSR supplied 102, SA-2 missiles in 1965-66 and 540, 
K-13 "Atoll" missiles in 1966-67 to arm the MIG-21. Later 
India produced 1120 K-13 "Atoll" missiles under licence from 
USSR. According to a Western author, "the Soviet military 
24. Source: Arms Trade Register - SIPRI Publication. The 




aid to India now became almost comparable in size to the 
U.S. aid to Pakistan and the cumulative value of Soviet 
military aid by 1966 is said to have exceeded £ 300 
27 
million." The arms embargo of 1965 imposed by the West 
further served to shake the confidence in Western reliabi-
lity and reinforce the Indo-Soviet military ties. The 
Indian defence delegation to the USSR got "all they asked 
for and more." 
The period 1965-69 represents a peak in high Icvo] 
Indo-Soviet military exchanges. As a result of significant 
expansion in Russian arms aid to India, the former q'li c-k A 
became India's largest single source of military hardwaro. 
In 1967 India started producing the MIG-21, under liconro 
from the USSR; the indigenous content reaching upto GOI ;i\ 
1972. By 1974, 196 such aircrafts were manufactured in 
India. Moreover, from 1968 to 1971, 150 SU-7B aircrafts 
29 
were sold to India. 
In the modernization of the Indian navy also, India 
first approached the West, which instead of responding to 
India's requests, took upon itself to decide what was needed 
by India. This condescending attitude was not liked by the 
Indian administration which turned to the USSR, to get an 
27. Joshua, Qrbis, Fall, 1966, p.856. 
28. Chester Bowles, America and Russia in South Asia. 
Foreign Affairs, Vol.49, No.2, July 1971, p.642. 
29. Source: Arms Trade Register- SIPRI, n.24. 
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immediate positive response. From 1966 to 70, India bought 
from the USSR four "polnocny" class landing crafts, five 
"poluchat" class, fast patrol boats, four "F" class subma-
rines, five "Petya" class frigates and one modified "Ugra" 
type, submarine tender. 
The post 1971 period witnessed considerable expansion 
of the Indian navy mainly through orders placed with the 
USSR. The experience of the Bangladesh war, presence of the 
Super powers in the Indian Ocean and developments in the 
Persian Gulf - all pointed to the need of expansion of 
Indian navy. From 1971 to 1976 India received from the 
Soviet Union, one submarine tender, eight motor torpedo 
boats, three petya class frigates, eight Nanuchka class 
missile boats, three IL-38 Maritime patrol crafts, eight 
Osa-65 Missile patrol boats, three Kashin class destoyers 
and five Ka-25 Hormone helicopters for the Indian navy. 
However, unlike the airforce "there was no co-
production agreements with the Soviet Union for the manufac-
32 ture of naval equipment, where dependence is greatest." 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. P.R. Chari, Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A 
Review. Asian Survey, Vol.19, No.3. March'1979,p. 238 . 
24 
In the subsequent years India's military purchases 
from the USSR continued. But now it was being felt that 
India had gradually become too dependent on the USSR as 
regards her defence needs. So it was decided to diversify 
India's sources of military supply for injecting an element 
of independence in India's defence policy. It was this very 
logic which was initially employed to turn India towards the 
USSR for arms, and now it was reiterated to make India look 
towards the West for her defence needs. Hence, "the USSR's 70 
per cent share of India's defence imports in the early 1970s 
33 had dropped to 50 per cent by 1977." 
Nevertheless, this diversification in India's sources 
of military supply, did not lead to a major shift in India's 
defency policy. Although, India started to get more weapons 
from the U.S. but the USSR remained the reliable supplier as 
ever. The advantage which India got from military purchases 
from the USSR was that they were made in deferred payments 
in rupees, which was a form of military assistance. Another 
feature of this aid was that the USSR did not demand any 
military alliance with India, nor it asked for any guaran-




The Nuclear Issue; 
Despite the cold war, the USSR and US were unanimous 
in their support for nuclear non-proliferation, as their 
interests converged on this issue. India had signed the 
test ban treaty but it clearly stated that it would not sign 
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) as it was discri-
minatory. The USSR wanted India to sign the NPT, but India 
did not oblige. However, it continued to affirm its policy 
against developing nuclear weapons. On June 17, 1968, the 
USSR along with the U.S. and U.K. declared that any non-
nuclear country that signed the NPT and was then threatened 
with nuclear attack, would have the support of the three 
powers through the UN Security Council. Two days later they 
supported a Security Council resolution on this issue. But 
even then India did not sign the NPT, as it was not satis-
fied with this vague assurance which was intended to take 
away the initiative from the hands of non-nuclear states. 
The USSR however, did not press India too hard to 
sign the NPT, as its desire to maintain good relations with 
India seemed to have a higher priority than its opposition 
to India's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Hence, the 
nuclear issue never acquired the shape of an irritant in the 
path of Indo-USSR relations. 
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India and the United States; 
During the World War II, some of India's political 
leaders like Nehru tried to garner American support for 
India's freedom struggle. Some isolated incidents of U.S. 
support to India's cause buttressed the belief that the U.S. 
government and most of the people there were supportive of 
India's goal of attaining freedom. 
The U.S. government representative, William Phillips 
who came to India on a fact-finding mission in 1942, showed 
his sympathy for the Indian cause. The U.S. policy of anti-
colonialism was best summed up in the declaration of the 
Under Secretary of State, Summer Wells on Memorial Day in 
1942. "If this war is in fact a war for the liberation of 
people", he said, "it must assure the sovereign equality of 
people throughout the world . . . our victory must bring in 
its train the liberation of all people... The age of impe-
34 
rialism is ended." However, when the British government 
put all the big Indian leaders behind bars and ruthlessly 
crushed the Quit India Movement, the U.S. government did not 
go against its ally. The U.S. action came as a rude shock 
to Indian leaders. Nehru attacked the U.S. in an open 
session of the All India Congress Committee for its policies 
on Asia, and for its "machine age culture". 
34. L.S. Finkelstein, American Policy in South East Asia. 
Institute of Pacific Relations - New York, 1951, p.6. 
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Although some bitterness was created on this issue, 
the American standing in India was high by the end of the 
war, because of President Roosevelt's efforts to pursuade 
Churchill to be forthcoming in his dealings with India 
nationalists. Later, the two countries upgraded their 
official missions to embassies during the period of India's 
interim government in 1946. Another positive factor was the 
congratulatory message of President Truman on the occasion 
of India's independence. "We welcome India's new and 
enhanced status in the world community of sovereign indepen-
dent nations", he said, "I earnestly hope that our friend-
ship will in future as in the past continue to be expressed 
in close and fruitful cooperation in international under-
standing and cordiality in our relations one with the 
35 
other." 
The post was period did not see the two countries 
coming together- The U.S. policy on the Kashmir issue was a 
source of great disappointment to India. There were few if 
any areas of overlapping national interests and scarcely any 
business, cultural or intellectual contacts between the two 
states. 
35. Raymond Dennetts and Robert K. Turner,(ed.) Docu-
ments on American Foreign Relations, Princeton. 
Princeton University Press, Vol.IX, January 1, 
December 1, 1947, p. 581. 
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Since the two countries did not have any traditional 
mutual relationship, political opinions, public attitudes 
and personal assessments formed a significant part of most 
Indo-American contacts. Much importance was attached to the 
utterances of big leaders on both sides which helped shape 
the perception about the two countries. Undue attention was 
paid to what Nehru or Dulles said. Statements like that of 
Dulles that, "In India, Soviet communism exercises a strong 
influence through the interim Hindu Government" , created 
an unfavourable image of America in Indian minds. 
Nehru's visit to the U.S. in 1949 was important in 
the sense that he tried to explore avenues of possible Indo-
U.S. involvement but found them to be more or less closed. 
His request for economic assistance was not headed by 
Washington. The American desire to support or create a 
bastion of anti-communism in Asia found no response from the 
Indian side. India was unwilling to support the U.S. in the 
containment of communism, because of its policy of non-
alignment. But the U.S. administration was looking at the 
world through cold war glasses so they could not digest 
Nehru's advocacy of non-alignment, and called it "immoral". 
India's refusal to join the Western collective Security 
efforts was taken as a form of open hostility. Considering 
36. New York Herald Tribune, January 8, 1947. 
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itself the leader of the "free world" the U.S. expected all 
non-communist states to follow the lead offered by it, and 
if they refused, Washington considered them to be on the 
side of the communists. The relationship. Invariably, the 
•basis of U.S. strategy has been determined in the light with 
the interests of other countries termed largely expendable." 
However, the Communist victory in China left the U.S. 
with only one alternative of cultivating India as a major 
Asian power allied with the U.S. But India was not ready to 
become an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in South Asia. 
Disillusioned with India, the U.S. defence department held 
consultations with representatives of Pakistan as part of an 
effort to establish a military connection with it. Now the 
U.S. administration was concentrating on Pakistan as a 
possible bastion against communist expansionism. The 
subsequent sanction of military aid to Pakistan was greatly 
resented by the Indian government. The establishment of 
SEATO in 1954 and the joining of the Baghdad pact by 
Pakistan, an year later, created greater apprehension in 
India as her security interests were gravely threatened. It 
was a set back to India's efforts to keep the cold war out 
of this region. 
37. K.P. Misra, (ed.) Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi, 
1971), p. 276. 
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The U.S. and Pakistan came closer in 1958, when an 
American electronic intelligence gathering system was 
established in northern Pakistan to monitor signals from the 
Soviet Union. A new bilateral agreement was reached under 
the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East, which Pakistan 
interpreted as an American promise to assist in meeting any 
aggression i.e. Indian on Pakistan. Dulless tried to shed 
the resultant Indian fears. Speaking in New Delhi he said -
"I think there can be every confidence on the part of India 
that there will be no use of these armaments in any 
aggressive way against India. Certainly, Pakistan knows if 
that should happen there would be a quick end to its good 
, ^. • j.-i. J.I. rt f- 1.38 However, when Pakistan used 
relations with the U.S. ' 
American weapons against India, in 1965, the U.S. did not 
object. 
Nehru's visit to the U.S. in 1956 provided an 
opportunity to make amends for past mistakes in Indo-U.S. 
relations. He spoke about a "common faith in democratic 
institutions and the democratic way of life" between India 
and the U.S. The U.S. took the lead in 1958 by forming the 
Aid India consortium with the World Bank; Western Europe and 
Japan to provide non-project loans, exceeding well over $ 5 
bbillion annually. 
38. New York Times. March 31, 1956. 
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During that period India and the U.S. generally found 
themselves on the same side as regards colonial issues. 
However, India's occupation of Goa was overblown in the U.S. 
Mr. Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. said -
"what is at stake today is not colonialism; ... it is a 
lamentable departure not only from the charter but from 
^ ^ .,, „39 The Indian action was 
India's own professions of faich. 
severely condemned by the American Press, but mercifully for 
Indo - U.S. relations, the U.S. government did not over 
react to this issue. 
Indo - American relations improved in the 1960s with 
the election of Kennedy as President. There was greater 
understanding of each other's point of view on both sides. 
After the take over of Goa, the Kennedy Administration 
succeeded in reversing the U.S. Congress effort in 1962 to 
cut the appropriations for Indian aid, taking this issue as 
an excuse. Hence a major irritant was removed from this 
relationship. During the Chinese aggression also the U.S. 
extended military and economic assistance. This was a time 
when Indo - U.S. relations were characterized by 
unprecedented cordiality. But towards the mid 60s needless 
economic squeeze was applied on India. This surprised even 
Ambassador Chester Bowles, who remarked that, "on at least 
39. Arthur, M. Sehlesinger Jr. A Thousand Days : John F 
Kennedy in the White House. Boston, 1965, p. 527. 
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five occasions in the crucial years of 1965, 1966 and 1967, 
the President put the Indian government through a needless 
ordeal in regard to food supplies with no valid explanations 
40 . . . 
even to me and my associates." This irritant was 
uselessly created by the U.S. government probably to show to 
the Indians the extent of their dependence on U.S. aid, 
without which they could be in serious trouble. 
Such an irrational move annoyed the Indian 
government. It was understood that the U.S. was not taking 
India seriously as it was not of much importance for U.S. 
strategic designs in the region. In May 1964, the then 
Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan went to the U.S. to ask for 
some help for India's defence programme. But the U.S. 
officials adopted a negative attitude, to which Chavan 
angrily remarked that "instead of trying to find out what 
help they could give us, they found reasons for not giving 
41 
us the aid." 
Indira Gandhi's official visit to the U.S. gave an 
opportunity to both the countries to come closer. Before her 
arrival. President Johnson said, "I want to giver her the 
40. Pravda, May 18, 1970. 
41. T.V. Kunhikrishanan, The Unfriendly Friends: India 
and America. New Delhi, 1974, p. 107. 
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best visit ever." On her arrival Mrs. Gandhi was given a 
grand welcome and her talks with Johnson started on a 
cordial note. He pledged emergency food and economic 
assistance to India, with a view to elicit a more 
'reasonable' response from India on U.S. policies in 
South-East Asia. But the cordiality Was marred by the 
disdain which she had for the "poor judgement, the 
inaptitude and insensitivity and the racism and brutality 
43 displayed by the U.S. in Vietnam." She rejected the 
suggestion that India's long term security interests would 
be served by an American military presence in Vietnam. 
In 1967, the Johnson administration announced a new 
arms policy towards the sub-continent. It was based on the 
premise that making a distinction between India and Pakistan 
was not beneficial to U.S. South Asia policy. Hence grants 
of military equipment to both countries were stopped. But 
in 1970, Nixon asked for a 'one-time exception' for 
Pakistan. This greatly angered the Indian government. 
Later efforts were initiated to explore areas in 
which better cooperation was possible despite the continued 
political differences. In June 1974, a joint Indo - U.S. 
42. President's noting on State Department file 'Visit of 
Prime Minister of India' March 21, 1966. LBJ 
Library, Quoted in Surjit Mansingh, India's Search 
for Power; Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-82 
Sage, New Delhi, p. 78. 
43. Ibid., p. 79 
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commission was established. It had three sub-commissions -
culture and education, science and technology and economy 
and commerce. To this a sub-commission on agriculture was 
added in 1979. 
By the mid 70s the U.S. administration had realised 
that they could not ignore India as an important factor in 
South Asia. In 1977, the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi, Mr. 
R. Goheen, very aptly summed up the basic cause of Indo -
U.S. conflict. He said - "The events of the last decade 
have brought it about that whether you look at it in 
geographical terms, in military terms or in economic terms, 
India and Pakistan really are not competitors any more.India 
is clear and av;ay the pre-eminent nation in the 
sub-continent, so that game we played for many years of 
trying to balance one off against the other - that is a dead 
game. And that was a terific cause of friction between 
44 India and ourselves." 
In such a situation, the Janata Party came to power 
in India, and the new Prime Minister Morarji Desai was not 
so apprehensive of the U.S. as his predecessor Indira Gandhi, 
Within a short span of time he developed a good equation 
with President Carter. An atmosphere of cordiality was 
created between the two countries, which led Brzeienski, the 
44. New York Times. October 2, 1977, 
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National Security Adviser to comment, that the "Carter 
administration had developed new links with the newly 
influential countries and we have never had such a good 
45 
relationship with India as now." A bilateral economic aid 
programme to India was resumed and negotiations were 
initiated for the sale of "Two anti-tank missiles and light 
Howitzer guns to India. 
Economic Relations: 
India's economic relations with the U.S. were estab-
lished much before India became independent. Before the 
world war II bilateral trade between India and the U.S. led 
to a balance of payments advantage to the former. India 
shipped goods to the U.S. worth about $47 million in 1901, 
$47 million in 1911, $78 million in 1921, $58 million in 
1931, and $131 million in 1941. The corresponding figures 
of U.S. exports to India were $5 million, $11 million, $56 
million, $36 million and $98 million. During the war years 
because of emergency requirements on both sides Indo - U.S. 
trade increased. Consequently, imports from the U.S. 
exceeded those from Britain and the trade balance shifted in 
favour of the U.S. 
In 1951, the U.S. congress authorized for India the 
largest ever grain allocation. Under PL-480, $2 billion 
45. New York Times Magazine. December 31, 1978, p. 16. 
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were loaned to India for the purchase of 190 million tonnes 
of wheat. In 1952 India got $53 million through the 
American programme of technical and economic assistance 
under the Mutual Security Act. During the first five year 
plan, U.S. assistance helped India in dealing with its 
balance of payments difficulties. 
The bilateral tradce relationship between India and 
the U.S. could not be balanced evenly. It was so because 
India's exports to the U.S. could not expand owing to the 
former's dependence on U.S. goods for development. 
Secondly, American businessmen were unwilling to invest in 
India. However, trade between the two countries increased 
in large quantities, though aid was not readily available. 
Nehru's visit to the U.S. in later 1956 brought 
forward a better understanding between him and President 
Eisenhower, bringing in its wake a bigger U.S. aid 
programme, and a relative lessening of belligerence in 
Indian criticisms of U.S. policies round the globe. 
American aid was directed through the Development Loan Fund, 
established in 1957 to provide. Long - term, low - interest 
loans, repayable in rupees. By the end of the second plan 
the U.S. government aid authorization was $3006.7 million. 
Between 1950 to 1965, "the U.S. advanced 51.7 percent of the 
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total foreign assistance received by India." 
Eisenhower's visit to India in December 1959, which 
took place against the backdrop of China's provocative 
postures in the Himalayas, went a long way in solidifying 
relations. He emphatically reiterated the U.S. government's 
commitment to help in the economic development of India. In 
the same year, the two countries reached an agreement 
providing for guarantees against nonconvertibility into 
dollers of receipts of American business in India, and an 
expropriation guarantee was added afterwards. Investment in 
India was made attractive for foreigners by offering several 
concessions to domestic firms. U.S. investment in India 
which v.'as approximately 39,8 crore rupees in ]955, reached 
a level of 112.7 crores in 1960."'^ '^  
Despite, continued flow of U.S. assistance, India's 
economic performance continued to be dismal. It became even 
worse when India was hit by a severe drought in 1965. The 
U.S. responded to this crisis by an authorization of massive 
transfer of foodgrains to India. However, President Johnson 
took too much interest in India's food crisis and asked it to 
affect major changes in its economic policy in consonance 
46. P.J. Eldridge, The Politics of Foreign Aid in India. 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1969. p. 188. 
47. Reserve Bank of India. India's Balance of Payments. 
1948-49 to 1961-62, p. 61. 
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with U.S. interests. This made India move away from the U.S. 
and it began to buy the required grain from the interna-
tional market for hard currency. 
Though such divergence of perception existed, Indo-
U.S. trade continued to expand. By the start of the 1970s 
the U.S.A. was India's "number one trading partner with the 
48 
total trade amounting to about $1300 million." But U.S. 
imports of Indian goods were less than one percent of its 
total imports. India's share in total U.S. imports was only 
$312 million in a total of about $180 billion. 
After the Indo-Pak war of 1971, the U.S. suspended 
$100 million in economic aid to New Delhi on the ground that 
"it could not be used for the purpose for which it had been 
49 
appropriated." But the Indian government kept its cool. 
An Indian Finance Ministry official observed - "In the ;long 
run the economic relations between the two countries are 
inviolable. In view of India's industrial structure and 
technological and cultural base trade relations cannot be 
supposed overnight." 
48. The Hindu, January 11, 1970. 
49. New York Times, January 5, 1972. 
50. Financial Times, January 19, 1972. 
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However, dialogues between the two governments were 
initiated and consequently in March 1973, the U.S. announced 
the release of $88 million development loan to India, which 
was in abeyance since December 1971. This release was viewed 
suspiciously in New Delhi as a "consolation to soften its 
51 
antagonism towards the U.S. arms supply to Pakistant." 
Later a joint commission to improve Indo-U.S. 
cooperation was established in 1974 and an agreement was 
signed to explore the possibilities of starting mutually 
beneficial cooperation in specific areas. But between 1971 
and 1975 the U.S. did not extend any direct economic 
assistance. Nevertheless, the two way trade reached a record 
$1.9 million in 1975. 
An irritant arose in 1976 when Mrs. Gandhi accused 
the CIA of indulging in covert activities to destablize her 
government. The U.S. government responded to this allegation 
by stopping talks with India as regards resumption of 
economic assistance. However, when Carter became President, 
direct assistance to New Delhi was resumed by allocating $60 
million. It amounted to 0.23 per cent of G.N.P. in 1978. 
By 1980 India had become the second largest single 
receipient of U.S. official development assistance, after 
Israel. 
51. "The Times of India, March 16, 1973. 
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Military Relations; 
After the communist victory in China, the U.S. policy 
makers tried to cultivate India. But India was not ready to 
act as an instrument of U.S. policy in South Asia. 
Disillusioned with the Indian policy, the U.S. turned to 
Pakistan. Large amount of military equipment was pumped into 
Pakistan which created a great sense of insecurity in India. 
America entered into military alliance with Pakistan to 
contain communism and Pakistan entered this alliance to 
fight India, However, successive U.S. Presidents assured 
India that arms given to Pakistan would not be used against 
it. Krishna Menon rightly wondered if there were guns which 
would fire only in one direction. Despite the fact that 
Pakistan was America's military ally and India's sworn 
enemy, the U.S. supplied six Sikorsky S 55 aircrafts, twenty 
six Fairchild C 119 G Pakcet aircrafts, thirty NAT - 6 G 
Taxan aircrafts and a hundred and eighty M-4 Sherman 
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armoured fighting vehicles to India, between 1953 and 1960. 
Though this was Peanuts as compared to U.S. arms supplied to 
Pakistan in the said period. 
With the election of Kennedy as President, relations 
between the two countries improved. At the time of Chinese 
52. Source: Arms trade Register SIPRI, n. 24 
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aggression, he promptly reciprocated India's request for 
military assistance. On November 14, 1962, an Indo - U.S. 
military agreement was signed, replacing the mutual Security 
accord of 1951. In July 1963, the U.S. reached an agreement 
with Britain and India to strengthen the latter's defence 
against possible air raids from China. 
In December 1962, the United States and Britain 
decided to give to India military aid, on an emergency 
basis, worth $ 120 million. In 1963, the U.S. supplied 
twenty four Fairchild C-119G Packet aircrafts to India. In 
1964, India signed loan agreements with the U.S. for 
building and modernizing ordinance factories, the U.S. also 
offered unspecified military assistance grants. Hence, in 
the years following the Chinese attack Indo - U.S. military 
relations prospered, but this collaboration proved to be 
short lived in the absence of political understanding 
between the two countries. Military aid to India as well as 
Pakistant was cut off when the latter attacked India in 
1965. 
In 1967, the Johnson administration announced a new 
arras policy towards the subcontinent. It was based on the 
premise that a distinction between India and Pakistan was 
not beneficial to U.S. South Asia policy. Hence, grant of 
military equipments to both countrie°s ws stopped. But in 
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1970 Nixon asked for a 'one-time exception' for Pakistan. 
This greatly annoyed the Indian government. 
In the 1971 war, the dismemberment of Pakistan 
angered the U.S. administration and took it further away 
from India. However, some steps were taken to mend fences. 
In December 1973, the U.S. agreed to restart building a 
military communication system for India, which was cancelled 
during the 1971 war. This system called "Peace Indigo" was 
supposed to help India in better transmission of air defence 
information from the frontier to central headquarters. This 
was the "main military assistance agreement India had with 
53 the United States." With the peaceful nuclear test which 
India carried out in 1974, created much apprehension in the 
U.S. India was ignored as being of no utility in U.S. 
strategic designs and China came to an enhanced status 
because of a preseumed U.S. China strategic convergence 
against USSR in the late 1970s. 
In 1977, Janta Party came to power in India and it 
decided to diversify the sources of Indian weaponry to 
reduce India's over dependence on the USSR in this regard. 
Prime Minister Morarji Desai blamed the U.S. for this 
53. The Hindu, December 13, 1973. 
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situation. He told a west German Magazine - "During the war 
against Pakistan the Americans practically drove us into the 
arm of the Russians, by refusing to provide us with 
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weapons." Consequently, negotiations were initiated with 
the Carter administration for the purchase of TOW anti-tank 
missiles and Light Howitzer guns. But a deadlock was created 
when the Indian government was not ready to relent on its 
demand for licence to manufacture the concerned equipment 
and guarantees for continued supply of spare parts. This 
position was not acceptable to the Americans. Despite this 
basis disagreement a deal was struck for the sale of $32 
million worth of Tow Anti-tank missiles to India in June 
1980. 
Irritants: 
After India attained independence, she perceived for 
herself the role of an independent "power centre" in this 
region. On the other hand, the United States wanted to 
perpetuete its domination as the controller of world 
politics. Hence, the perceptions of both the countries 
differed on this basic issue creating a major obstacle in 
the path of cordial Indo - U.S. relations. 
54. Ibid, May 30, 1977. 
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Secondly/ the Indian policy of non-alignment was not 
acceptable to the Americans. Since they looked at the world 
through cold war glasses, they could not reconcileto the fact 
that any country could remain out of the bipolar system. 
Even when they started recognising India's policy of 
non-alignment, they often expressed their discomfiture and 
annoyance at India's pronounced 'tilt' towards the Soviet 
Union. What created much bitterness, was the fact that 
despite being a prominent member of the non-aligned 
movement, India was not that harsh in criticising and 
opposing Soviet acts of commission around the world as it 
was in the context of U.S.A. 
Thirdly, the U.S. stand on the Kashmir issue has been 
a cause of much embarrassment to India, in international 
fora. On January 17, 1948, the U.S. supported the Pakistani 
demand for the holding of Plebiscite in Kashmir after the 
withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops. Later the U.S. 
supported a resolution in the Security Council to withhold 
the enforcement of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir 
which was to come into force on 26 January 1957. A month 
later, the U.S. supported a proposal for the induction of 
U.N. armed contingents for the conduction of plebiscite in 
Kashmir. India was saved of great embarrassment because of 
the Soviet veto on this proposal. So, till the fall of the 
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1970s, the U.S. opened the Kashmir problem when it felt it 
necessary to reassure Pakistan of its sincere friendship and 
set this problem aside "when if felt that India had been 
sufficiently embarrassed for following an independent 
^ . T 55 foreign policy. 
Fourthly, the U.S. has consistently urged India to 
sign the NPT and to apply full-scope safeguards to its 
nuclear facilities. India has emphatically rejected both 
these suggestions, whenever they have been made, India con-
siders such proposals as discriminatory by nature. 
Fifthly, from 1954-71, the U.S. tried to contain 
India through Pakistan-India's archrival.Pakistan's military 
machine was strengthened, the rationale being that a strong 
Pakistan would threaten India's security and would not allow 
it to seek its foreign policy goal of becoming a big power 
in this region. After the Sino-U.S. rapprochraent in 1971, 
China started collaborating with the U.S. with the 
containment of India's power being a major consideration. 
Hence all these major factors and many other minor 
ones made the Indo-U.S. relationship, "frequently distant, 
occasionally awkward, if not downright hostile, and almost 
always frustrating for both sides. 
55. Thomas Perry Thornton, The Gandhi Visit;Expectations 
and Realities of the US-India Relationship(paper) 
Washington, D.C. SAIS. The Johns Hopkins University. 
56. Ibid. 
CHAPTER - II 
INDO-SOVIET POLITICAL RELATIONS 
Introduction 
Before the Afghanistan crisis, Indo-USSR RELATIONS 
were quite cordial. Conscious of each other's geopolitical 
significance and global diplimatic importance, both the 
countries were making efforts to strengthen their mutually 
beneficial ties. Speaking before the twentififth Congress of 
the CPSU, Brezhnev clearly outlined the place India occupied 
in the Soviet policy. He said, "we attach special importance 
to friendship with that great country (India). In the post 
five years, our relations have risen to a new level ... 
close political and economic cooperation with the people of 
India is our constant policy." 
The pattern of Indo-Soviet relations "can be 
described as a successful model of mutually beneficial 
coexistence between countries marked, on the one hand, by 
diversities in their social formations, economic processes, 
political systems, state structures and ideologicl 
Twentififth CPSU Congress ; Documents and Resolutions 
Allied Publishers, New Delhi 1976, pp. 12-13. 
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orientations and, on the other by complementarity of 
perspective, views and policies on vital items of regional 
2 
and global concern." 
Afghanistan problem: 
This positive nature of Indo-USSR relations was 
disturbed by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 27 
December, 1979, and its continued military presence there. 
In the wake of this intervention, the political parties in 
India avoided taking clear cut positions, because the 
elections were round the corner, and electoral 
considerations were primary. However, Indira Gandhi, hinted 
as to what would be her policy if elected. She said that 
Russians had acted in Afghanistan to counter act v/hat "they 
3 
regard as Western interference," It was on her instruc-
tions that India's envoy Brajesh C. Mishra made a statement 
in the U.N. General Assembly. He said: 
1. Moscow sent troops to Afghanistan at the request of 
the government in Kabul. 
2. But the Soviet Union had assured India that it would 
withdraw its troops when asked to do so by the Afghan 
2. Rasheeduddin Khan, Sovereignty : Crucial Support, 
World Focus. 8(4) April 1987, p. 13. 
3. The Times of India. January 8, 1980. 
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government and New Delhi had no reason to doubt 
assurances, particularly like a friendly country like 
the Soviet Union, with whom India had many close ties 
3. India hopes that the Soviet Union will not violate 
the independence of Afghanistan and that Soviet 
forces will not remain there a day longer than 
necessary. 
4. India disapproved of attempts made by outside powers 
in encouraging disturbances and subversion inside 
Afghanistan. 
5. Construction of military bases and, pumping of arms 
into countries of the region posed a threat to 
4 
India's own security. 
The possible reason why New Delhi desisted from 
criticising the soviet action was that India did not want to 
endanger her cordial relations with the USSR at a time when 
polarization of power was taking place in Asia. India at 
that time being dependent on Soviet Union for the supply of 
advanced weaponry required for its security. 
However, slowly India's stance became a bit more 
cautious. The External Affairs Minister, Mr. P.V. Narsimha 
Rao stated in the Lok Sabha on January 23, 1980, that "India 
4. UN Doc. A/ES-6/P.V. 3, pp. 13-16. 
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5 
had never endorsed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan." 
Hitherto, the word "intervention" had been avoided. 
When the Soviet Foreign Minister came to India in 
February, Mr. Narsimha Rao conveyed to him India's 
"inability to support .Soviet actions." Mr Gromyoko did not 
react to the Indian posture, but assured that Soviet action 
in Afghanistan was not directed against "any adjacent 
countries ... and surely does not constitute any danger for 
7 
the security and stability of this area of Asia." Mr. Rao 
visited the USSR in June and conveyed India's displeasure at 
Soviet actions in Afghanistan. 
The USSR, however, was not willing to strain its 
relations with India as a reaction to India's Afghan 
diplomacy. During his visit to India in December 1980, the 
Soviet President, Brezhnev expressed the hope that India 
would not become a source of embarrassment to the USSR. 
Later, India also came to realise the futility of 
openly criticising Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The 
options for India were limited and its policy makers 
realised that since the national interest of the USSR was at 
5. Asian Recorder. XXVI(8) February 19-25, 1980. p.15324 
6. The Times of India, February 13, 1980 
"7- Ibid. , February 12, 1980. 
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stake, it would not listen to India in this context. 
Nevertheless, India could not endorse the Soviet action. 
Hence India adopted an approach which called for restraint 
not blame, and dialogue not confrontation. At the UN India 
insisted upon avoiding counterproductive resolutions, 
unacceptable to the major parties concerned. 
The Indian policy objectives have "continued to 
stress the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan that 
would be facilitated by ending the USA's not so covert 
intervention." 
Mutually Advantageous Relationship: 
In the 1980s Indo USSR relations have evolved in an 
exceedingly positive manner. Though there have been 
disagreements on some issues but both sides have not allowed 
them to obscure their highly beneficial relationship. 
After Mr. Narsimha Rao's visit to the USSR in 1980, a 
joint press statement was issued on the 7th of June, it 
stated that, "relations between India and the Soviet Union 
contribute to peace and stability in Asia and throughout the 
world. They are based on friendship, equality and mutual 
trust and are developing in the spirit of the Treaty of 
9 
peace, friendship and cooperation." During President of 
8. I.K. Gujral, Political Economic Ties: Ever Widening 
Scope. World Focus. 8(4) April 1987, p. 24. 
9. Lok Sabha Debates,Seventh Series, IV(7) Thursday June 
17, 1980, col. 198. 
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India's visit to the USSR in October, the same year, both 
the countries "express(ed) the resolve to continue 
cooperating intensively and fruitfully " 
The importance which the USSR attached to its 
relations with India, can be gauged by the statement which 
Brezhnev made before the Central Committee of the CPSU. He 
said, "... a prominent place in Soviet Union's relations 
with newly free countries is, of course, held by our 
cooperation with India . . . Our ties with it are continuing 
to expand. In both our countries Soviet Indian friendship 
has become a deep rooted popular traditions." 
However, there were some disturbing trends in India's 
foreign policy at that time, which were causing concern to 
Soviet foreign policy makers. these trends related to 
India's efforts towards economic liberalisation, 
diversification of arms procurement, as well as efforts to 
improve relations with the U.S., Western Europe, Japan and 
China. 
These trends emerged at a time when the USSR needed 
India's support the most to further its political and 
10. Pravda, October 8, 1980. 
11. Documents and Resolutions ; Twentysixth Congress of 
the CPSU. Moscow. February 23 - March 3, 1981, p. 19 
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strategic interests. Because, during that time Bulgaria and 
East Germany - traditional allies of the USSR - were moving 
away from it. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had 
made it a pariah in the Third World. The U.S. had emerged as 
the major player in the Middle East and South East Asia. Its 
ties with Pakistan and manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean were 
highly disturbing to the USSR. 
Hence, it was just to woo India that Mr. Brezhnev, 
declared in Tashkent, in March 1982, that Indo-Soviet 
relations were a "priceless asset which strengthened in 
12 
considerable measure the felling of security on both sides." 
On the eve of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's visit to the 
Soviet Union in September 1982, Pravda carried a report 
emphasizing that on the international level, the government 
of Indira Gandhi abides by the policy of non alignment, it 
conducts the course aimed at strengthening peace and 
international security, enhancing India's role in the 
solution of current topical problems- This in itself was a 
tribute to India's foreign policy. 
The summit meeting between Mrs. Gandhi and President 
Brezhnev, helped to create greater understanding between the 
12. Soviet Review, New Delhi, April 1982. 
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two countries. Reporting about this summit, The Times of 
India wrote: "Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union has 
helped emphasize the obvious that the two countries continue 
to value greatly their friendly relations ... summit meeting 
13 help clear the way for greater understanding." 
For India, around that time, the external environment 
was quite unfavourable, there was great apprehension in New 
Delhi as regards the super power's response to developments 
in Afghanistan and Iran. In addition, Pakistan now was 
assigned the status of a Frontline State by the U.S.; large 
amount of economic and military aid was pumped into it. In 
such a scenario the "implicit security guarantees the 
relationship with Moscow offered tended to come to the 
^ -.14 
fore. 
Against such a backdrop India's foreign policy course 
for the 1980s was decided. It embarked upon the task of 
forging closer ties with the USSR. On the death of 
President Brezhnev on November 10, 1982, Mrs. Gandhi 
remarked - "Into-Soviet friendship and cooperation grew and 
13. The Times of India^ September 28, 1982. 
14. S.Wihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear : A Study of Indo 
Soviet Relations, New Delhi. 1986, p. 24. 
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achieved maturity during President Brezhnev's time. He 
showed a consistent understanding of our problems and stood 
15 by us in our moment of need." 
To forge closer people to people ties, the two 
countries signed in Moscow on May 17/ 1983, a cultural 
exchange programme for 1983-84, which covered a variety of 
activities. The main focus of the programme centred around 
the setting up of linkages between educational institutions 
and organisations in the two countries and the establishment 
of bilateral contacts and exchanges between university 
departments and other institutions of higher learning. 
With Soviet help, squadron leader Rakesh Sharma 
became the first Indian to go in space, when he was launched 
aboard Soyuz T-11, from the Baikanus cosmodrome USSR on 
April 3, 1984. "It was yet another outstanding example", 
said Mrs. Gandhi, "of the constructive cooperation for the 
good of our two peoples which our friendship has always 
fostered." 
The Soviet leaders, by this time, had come to have a 
good equation with Mrs. Gandhi, but Mrs. Gandhi's 
15. The Times of India, November 12, 1982. 
16. Asian Recorder, XXX(23) June 3-9, 1984, p. 17774. 
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assassination gave them a big jolt. Paying glowing tributes 
to her, General Secretary Chernenko said - "The name of 
Indira Gandhi will remain for ever in the grateful memory of 
17 the Soviet people." Prime Minister Tikhonov who came for 
the funeral met Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and expressed the 
satisfaction th^t he has a deep understanding of Indo-Soviet 
ties. Neverthelss, the Soviets had an apprehension that the 
young Rajiv Gandhi might have a pro-West learning. 
To send a positive signal to Rajive Gandhi, the 
Soviet Union gave full support to the Delhi Declaration of 
28 January 1985, the first major foreign policy initiative 
of the new leader on the question of nuclear disarmament. 
When Rajiv Gandhi went to attend the funeral of Mr. 
Chernenko, in Moscow, he met the new General Secretary 
Gorbachev. Their talks were described as "warm friendly and 
1 8 positive." Later, Rajiv Gandhi paid an official visit to 
the USSR from 21 to 26 May. The USSR was the first country 
to which Mr. Gandhi paid an official visit as the head of 
Indian government. This was regarded by many observers as 
"indicative of the great importance the new leadership 
17. The Telegraph. Calcutta, November 2, 1984. 
18. The Times of India, March 15, 1985. 
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attaches to maintaining and strengthening friendly relations 
1 g 
with the USSR." During Mr. Gandhi's stay there, two major 
agreements were signed on economic cooperation by the two 
leaders. In a speech at a dinner in honour of Mr. Gandhi, 
Mr. Gorbachev said - "our cooperation with India, 
cooperation which has today so many dimensions, is full of 
all pressures of imposition of any terms. The Soviet Union 
20 has consistently supported India at all stages." 
The Soviet attitude towards India was quite bluntly 
stated by a Deputy Minister, Mikhail Kapitsa. In an 
interview to the Muslim of Pakistan, he said, "we want to be 
friendly with the all countries of South Asia : Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh. We hope these countries are able to 
sort out their problems with India. Because if they do not 
and there is a problem between India and its neighbours, we 
21 
will side with India." 
19. V. Georgiev, Soviet Indian cooperation : Tangible 
Results and Broad Prospects. International Affairs. 
Moscow. 8 August 1985. p. 23. 
20. Pravda. May 22, 1985 in Darshan Singh, (ed. ) Soviet 
Foreign Policy Documents, 1985. Sterling, New Delhi, 
p. 130. 
21. v.P.Dutt Indo-Soviet Relations: Convergence of Interests 
p. 69, in V.D. Chopra, (ed.) Studies in Indo-Soviet 
Relations, Patriot, Nev; Delhi. 1986. 
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A significant aspect of this visit was that the 
Soviet leader mooted afresh the idea of joint action for 
Security in Asia, Rajiv Gandhi dismissed this idea as an 
"old concept" . He disapproved of nations interfering or 
intervening in areas outside their own, thus rejecting by 
implication the Soviet claim to be considered an Asian 
power. Instead Rajiv Gandhi spoke about efforts to promote 
South Asian Regional Cooperation. 
However, at the banquet speech, Mr. Gandhi told the 
Soviet leaders that he would continue the splended record of 
Indo-Soviet relations built in the last three decades. 
The importance attached to India by the Soviet 
leadership as a diplomatic anchor in Asia and its interest 
in halting whatever momentum might have been developing for 
improved relations between India and the United States was 
highlighted by the Gorbachev's choice of New Delhi as the 
22 
site of the first visit to Asia in November 1986. On the 
eve of his departure to India, in an interview with Indian 
22. Gail W. Lapidus, The USSR and Asia in 1986. 
Gorbachev's new Initiatives. Asian Survey. XXVII (1) 
January 1987. pp. 7-8. 
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journalists. Mr. Gorbachev said: "The Soviet people have a 
special sentiment for India. We consider the Indian people 
to be an old friend and reliable partner ... relations with 
23 
India are a priority in our foreign policy." 
Gorbachev came to India to elevate the Indo-Soviet 
friendship to a still higher level, informing it with global 
substance. The visit was successful in the sense that 
Gorbachev gave Gandhi more than the latter had expected; the 
status of the leader of a world power. Gandhi gave 
Gorbachev more than the latter had expected; endorsement of 
the Soviet position on arms control and disarmament at 
24 
Reykjavik Summit and the Vladivostak concept of broac 
based non-military security for the vast Asia-Pacific 
25 
region. 
However, the general understanding in the West and 
Japan was that Rajiv Gandhi did not endorse the concept of 
Asia Pacific security. The Indian policy makers were happy 
TT. Pravda, November 24, 1986. 
24. This concept was a key feature of Gorbachev's 
emerging strategy towards Asia. It was summarized in 
a major speech which he delivered at Vladivostak, on 
July 28, 1986. 
25. Bhabhani Sen Gupta, The Gorbachev Factor in World 
Affairs; An Indian Interpretation. New Delhi, 1989, 
p. 73. 
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that the Americans and Japanese read this part of the visit 
differently. As neither India nor the USSR wanted to sour 
their respective relations with the US and Japan. 
Speaking at a banquet in honor of Mr. Gorbachev, on 
November 25, 1986, Mr. Gandhi said that, "a major landmark 
in the evolution of our friendly relations was the signing 
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
cooperation in 1971. It remains a source of strength for our 
respective countries." Such a mention of the Treaty made 
the Soviets happy. It sent a clear message to Pakistan and 
its patrons that India would rely on its old friend in the 
event of a threat to its sovereignty and independence. 
Showing greater solidarity both countries "condemned 
the attempts to build up foreign military presence in the 
Indian Ocean. They called for speedy implementation of the 
27 
1971 UN Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace." 
During this visit the Protocol on cultural events was 
also signed under which cultural festivals were to be 
26. Foreign Affairs Record. XXXII(ll) November 1986. p. 
356. 
27. EXCERPT OF Soviet-Indian Joint Statement after the 
visit of Gorbachev to India in November 1986, in 
Darshan Singh, (ed.) Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, 
1986. Sterling. New Delhi, p. 499.. 
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organised in both the countries. The purpose being to 
provide the people in each country a good opportunity, for a 
better understanding of the culture, science and economy of 
the other country. For this it was decided to expose the 
culture and heritage of the people of the two countries to 
each other. Hence, this visit was quite productive as 
efforts were made to forge closer ties, both at the 
governmental level, as well as between people of both the 
countries. 
The Prime Minister of India, Mr. Gandhi went to the 
USSR on July 2, 1987, primarily to inaugurate the Festival 
of India there. An year later the closing ceremony was 
attended by the President of India, Mr. Venkataraman. 
Epitomizing the relevance of such festivals he said: "If 
festivals in either country succeeded in enriching 
understanding between our people at the human level, at the 
intellectual level and between the governments at the 
political level, we would have truly achieved the objective 
we set for ourselves when we launched on these splendid 
reciprocal initiatives." 
The Soviet President Mr. Gorbachev arrived in New 
Delhi on November 18, 1988, to a warm welcome. He met Mr, 
28. Asian Recorder, XXXIV(3) August 12-18, 1988. p.20153 
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Gandhi for the sixth time in the past four years. The two 
leaders expressed satisfaction at the qualitative 
upgradation of their bilateral relations in the past few 
years. The Soviet President deprecated speculations, if any, 
the "the Soviet Union was changing its priorities and even 
29 
becoming cool towards India." He added that, "Soviet-
Indian friendship rests on a firm foundation and has nothing 
..30 
to do with any transient consideration or scheme. 
India and the USSR also signed an agreement on 
cultural, scientific and educational exchanges for 1989-90. 
This programme was the 19th in the series betv/een the tvvo 
countries. It covered wide range of areas, like science and 
technology, art and culture films, television and sports 
etc. The Soviet President also attended the closing 
ceremony of the Festival of USSR in India on November 19. 
Speaking in Parliament, Mr. Gandhi emphasized the 
relevance of this visit. stated - "... our friendship with 
the Soviet Union has stood the test of time. President 
Gorbachev's visit to India is second in the last two years, 




this visit symbolises the desire of the Soviet leadership 
and people to further nurtures enrich deepen and widen the 
31 
firendship. This we greatly cherish and fully reciprocate." 
In the year 1989, a major event occurred in India, 
and that was the defeat of the Government of Rajiv Gandhi in 
the general elections and the coming into power of a new 
government led by V.P. singh. During 1989, "speculation 
grew however, that Indo-Soviet relations had cooled as a 
result of new directions in Soviet Foreign Policy, economic 
restructuring in the Soviet Union and the availability to 
32 India of superior technology from Japan and the USA." 
These speculations proved to be unfounded when the new Prime 
Minister chose the USSR as the destination of his first 
major foreign visit, in July 1990. It also reaffirmed that 
a change of leadership in India or the USSR, either due to 
the death or defeat of an individual has had little 
influence on Indo-Soviet relations. During his stay in the 
USSR Mr.Singh met President Gorbachev and P.M. Ryzhkov. The 
official Soviet news agency TASS reported on July 24, the 
Gorbachev had expressed "complete understanding and support for the 
31. Lok Sabha Debates, Eighth Series. XLII(8) MOnday 
November 21, 1988, col. 292. 
32. Ibid., 36 (7-8) 1990. p. 47611. 
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Indian Prime Minister, in connection with the exacerbation 
33 
of the situation in ... Kashmir." The two sides also 
agreed to begin drafting a large scale economic treaty to be 
signed during Gorbachev's next visit to India. 
Hence, Indo-Soviet relations were basically cordial 
and were based on a mutually beneficial reciprocity, 
throughout the 1980s. Though some divergences surfaced 
occasionally as regards their perceptions and strategies, 
but they were not allowed to mar the much deeper 
convergenc es. 
China as a factor in Indo-Soviet Relations: 
Since the late 1950s India and the USSR have had a 
strained relationship with China; faced with a common enemy 
both tended to come together. By the early seventies a 
sino-U.S. -Pak axis emerged which affected the balance of 
power situation for both India and the USSR. It contributed 
to the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
cooperation in 1971, establishing a 'Special' relationship 
between India and the USSR. 
33. Ibid., (367-8) 1990. p. 37611. 
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In the late 1970s the Chinese wanted to build a 
Chinese-American-Japanese anti-USSR front. They entered into 
a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan in 1978, with a 
clause emphasizing on their opposition to 'hegemonism' - an 
obvious reference to USSR. Vice Prisident Deng, in an 
interview with the Time on January 25, 1979 called for 
stronger U.S. China ties and stated that both countries 
'"share a common destiny and should unite with other 
34 
countries against the Soviet Union." To contain these 
manoeuvres on the part of China, the only country the USSR 
could bank upon was India. 
On the other hand, Chinese attack on Vietnam made 
India apprehensive of Chinese aggressive designs. The memory 
of the 1962 attack by China was still fresh in the minds of 
Indian foreign policy formulators. 
In such a situation, the common aim of countering 
Chinese aggressive designs brought both India and the USSR 
together. 
The Sino-Soviet differences have been an important 
reason for closer Indo-USSR ties. Towards the end of the 
34. The Time. February 5, 1979. p. 32. 
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1980s efforts towards improving Sino-Soviet differences led 
to a lot of speculations, Mr. Gorbachev during his visit to 
India in 1988, assured Mr. Gandhi that the "current 
Sino-Soviet rapproachment would not adversely affect Indo-
35 Soviet ties." 
However, the joint communique issued after the Summit 
meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Deng Xiopeng at 
Beijing in May 1989, was a cause of great concern for India. 
It stated that "Sino-Soviet high level meeting symbolized 
the normalization of relations between the two countries." It 
could then be argued that with the coming together of the 
USSR and China, India was not supposed to expect any 
response from the USSR in case of a conflict with China. The 
nuclear umbrella implicit under the Indo-Soviet Treaty was 
no longer available to India. 
Faced with such a situation, India was impelJed to 
improve relations with China. It was quite necessary for 
India now to go nuclear to face the new situation created 
after this Sino-Soviet Summit. The Summit had actually, 
changed India's position in Soviet priorities. Henceforth, 
India appeared to be important to the USSR only 
35. Keesings Contemporary Archives. XXXIV (12) 1988, p, 
36322. 
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in the bilateral context and not at the global level atleast 
for sometime to come. 
Relations at the UN: 
The close and friendly relations with the USSR had 
always been a cause of great concern to observers at the UN. 
The USSR had always come to India's rescue on the Kashmir 
issue, ever since the first time it used the Soviet veto on 
Kashmir in the U.N. Security Council in September, 1957." 
Indian justification of the Soviet intervention in 
37 
Afghanistan was too bitter a pill to swallow. Even though 
there were some practical considerations it gave a big 
setback to India's image in the non-alig ned world. 
In a discussion on Afghanistan at the UN in January 
1986, India's representative R.N. Mirdha said that "the 
efforts of a political settlement in Afganistan are 
continuing though progress has been slow . . . there is no 
doubt that the situation in South-West Asia can be resolved 
36. J.A. Naik, Soviet Policy Towards India; From Stalin 
to Brezhnev, New DelhirVikas, p. 123. 
37. Indian envoy Brajesh C. Mishra stated in the U.N. 
General Assembly that "Moscow had sent it troops to 
Afghanistan at the request of the government at Kabul", and 
it had "assured India that it would withdraw its troops when 
asked to do so by the government °in Kabul. Quoted in UN 
DOC.A/ES-6/P.V.31, pp. 13-16. 
67 
38 
only through our overall political settlement. Here he 
refrained from naming the aggressor, though it had never 
refrained from naming the USA when it had been the culprit. 
On the other hand the USSR had all along supported 
India on various issues at the U.N. As regards the Indian 
desire to make the Indian ocean a zone of peace, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyoko said on September 23, 1980 
- "the problem of lessening tensions in the Indian ocean was 
increasingly important. The USSR had invariably supported 
the initiative of the bilateral states to turn the Indian 
39 Ocean into a zone of peace." The USSR also condemened 
attempts to build-up foreign military bases in the Indian 
Ocean. 
Future Prospects; 
The reasons why India and the USSR have cordial relationship 
can be summarized in the following six points, which both 
countries accept as the basis of their relationsp. They 
are: 
(a) acceptance of international interdependence as an 
axial principle of contemporary diplomacy and 
statecraft; 
38. UN Monthly Chronicle, XXIII(l) January 1986. p.172. 
39. UN Monthly Chronicle, XVII(IO) December 1980. p.124. 
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(b) Toleration by both countries of political ideological 
diversity as a reality in world affairs; 
(c) Genuine concern for each other's vital interests; 
(d) strict adherence to the principle of mutual benefit 
in bilateral transations; 
(e) Senitivity to each other's traditions, customs, norms 
and national dignity; and 
(f) Periodic and regular exchanges of views at top 
leadership level in order to work out possible areas 
of convergence and also note areas of divergence. 
The Soviet academician Primokov has identified 
several circumstances that underpin the mutually beneficial 
relations between India and the USSR. Most importantly, he 
says that, "the USSR has proved more than once its 
reliability as India's partner". He adds that "We in the 
Soviet Union understand India's place and role in the modern 
world. On the political plane it is not merely an Asian 
country but a great world power whose impact on 
international events will continue to increase. Further 
cooperation with India is viewed in the Soviet Union as a 
41 
strategic task augmenting the peace potential." 
40. Rasheeduddin Khan, op.cit., n . ] . p. 13. 
41. Quoted in I.K. Gujral, Friendly Bonds with India. 
World Focus. October - November - December, 1988, 
9(10,11,12) p. 60. 
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Such understanding on the part of the Soviet Union 
showed that India occupied and would continue to occupy in 
future, a central position in Asia pacific region. It would 
continue to have an important position in Soviet priorities. 
Developments changing the relationship between the 
supper-powers/ leading to the disintegration of Eastern 
Europe and the Sino-Soviet rapproachment had a profound 
impact on Indo-Soviet relations. Now India needs to re-
structure its policies in consonanace with the transformed 
equations. However, India's capability is limited in this 
context, because a lot would also depend upon the reactions 
of Moscow to the changing realities and what policies it is 
going to pursue vis-a-vis India in the times to come. In any 
case, the political, strategic and economic benefits from 
Indo-Soviet cooperation are too substantial to be abandoned 
at least in the near future. This relationship does not 
operate at the governmental level only, but it finds a 
strong resonanace in the popular mind, in both the countries. 
The future of this straightforward relationship 
appears to be bright because it is "uncomplicated by any 
desire to convert each other to a different point of view. 
70 
Not every aspect of Soviet policy is acceptable to New 
Delhi, but Moscow's recognition of the fact that any 
complete identity of views is unnecessary is most 
,,42 
encouraging. 
42. The Times of India. December 20, 1961 
CHAPTER - III 
lUDO-U.S. POLITICAL RELATIONS 
Introduction: 
Indo-American relations in the last decade have been 
full of contradictory tendencies. They have been frequently 
distant, occassionally awkward if not downright hostile, and 
almost always frustrating for both sides." An uneven trend 
has characterized this relationship, because it happens to 
be between two countries with great disparity in power 
potential, often pursuing divergent goals. In fact, this 
power disparity places the onus of shaping the bilateral 
relationship on the U.S. However, India has often disagreed 
with U.S. perceptions, though it has never been in a 
position to hurt U.S. interests neither has this been 
India's intention. It has always tried to have a good, 
mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S. But it has 
jealously guarded the independence of its policy. Since 
India has never been ready to toe the U.S. line and has 
resisted all sorts of pressures when her interests and 
independence have been at stake, this has created tensions 
and rifts in the Indo-U.S. relationship. 
Thomas Perry Thornton, The Gandhi visit; Expectations and 
Realities of the US-India Relationship. (paper) 
Washington, D.C. SAIS. The Johns Hopkins University. 
1985. 
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Evolution of Relations: 
President Carter and Prime Minister Desai had managed 
to develop a good personal equation, towards the close of 
the 1970s. Both exchanged successful visits in 1978. 
Indo-U.S. relations were "an equal partnership", said 
Foreign Minister Vajpayee, "based on friendship and a common 
will to cooperate both in bilateral matters and on 
2 international issues." On the U.S. side, the National 
Security Adviser, Brzezinski said that the Carter adminis-
tration "developed new links with the newly influential 
countries and we have never had such a good relationship 
3 
with India as now." 
However, in 1979, when Carter reversed the course of 
his foreign policy back to national security concerns, U.S. 
and Indian perceptions confronted each other once again. A 
Major divergence of policy on the Afghanistan problem and 
several other minor irritants characterized the last years'of 
Carter administration. 
A conflictual situation was created by the U.S. 
Ambassador to India, Mr. Robert Goheen, when in the presence 
2. The Times of India, May 14, 1978. 
3. New York Times Magazine, December 31, 1978. p. 10. 
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of several Ambassadors and dignitaries he told the 
Ambassador of Saudi Arabia that he was guilty of an 
unforgivable sin by inviting Mrs. Indira Gandhi at a 
reception at the Saudia Embassy. He called her an 
"ambitions dictator, suppressor of democracy and one who had 
sold the country to the Russians." This was reported by the 
Sri Lanka Weekly issue of March 8, 1980. The reaction in 
India to this statement was strong. Speaking in the 
Parliament, Mr. G.C. Bhattacharya, M.P. said - "Mr. Robert 
Goheen ... has clearly violated all diplomatic norms, 
conventions and privileges and slandered our great country 
and its leader Mrs. Indira Gandhi... and has interfered with 
4 
the sovereignty and independence of India...." However, 
the US Embassy did not issue any contradiction of this news. 
During that time there was much concern in India over 
the announcement of the upgradation of U.S. military 
assistance to Pakistan and U.S. activities in the Indian 
Ocean. These actions created much apprehension as regards 
U.S. intentions and steered India close to the Soviet Union. 
What was the image of the U.S. as compared to the USSR in 
the eyes of the Indian leadership was nicely summed up by 
Mr. Samar Mukherjee, M.P. He stated: "some agencies in 
4. Rajya Sabha Official Report. CXIII(ll) March 26, 1980 
cols. 444 - 445. 
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India are very active to strengthen American game here in 
India. Soviet Union has stood firmly for making the Indian 
Ocean a zone of Peace, the Americans are developing nuclear 
base here. Are Soviet Union and America the same? A person 
who says that both are the same, is indirectly justifying 
USA "^ 
The situation was made worse in 1981, when a 
controversy arose over the posting of Mr, George Griffin as 
Political Counsellor at the US Embassy in New Delhi. As 
India had certain reservations about his past record it 
requested the U.S. to assign him somewhere else. Instead, of 
taking kindly to India's request the U.S. unnecessarily 
opted for a confrontationist course. It informed India, that 
in case it did not find it possible to reverse its decision 
on Mr. Griffin's case the US would also ask India to 
withdraw the proposed assignment of a Senior Foreign Service 
Officer Mr. Prabhakaran Menon in Washington. 
The Indian government was shocked at this unprovoked 
reaction by the U.S. In his statement before the Lok Sabha 
on September 8, the External Affairs Minister, Mr. P.V. 
Narsimha Rao said - "we informed the United States that we 
5. Lok Sabha Debates, XVI(50) Wednesday, Apri] 28, 1981 
Col. 314. 
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would consider this unprecedented retaliatory step on their 
part as unwarranted and unjustified." Reacting to this 
episode, Mr. S.M. Krishna, M.P. said - ".. the attitude, the 
tenor and the vehemence with which the United States 
Department of State has reacted or over reacted to their 
7 
entire attitude is a bit perplexing." 
When Mrs, Gandhi and President Reagan met at cancun 
in 1981, they made efforts to surmount the differences in 
Indo-U.S. relations. Both the leaders realised the 
importance of good relations with the other country though 
for different reasons; India needed the U.S. support to 
forestall the formation of U.S. -Pakistan-China axis and to 
get the much needed high technology from the U.S. The U.S. 
needed friendship with India because it was an important 
country in South Asia. It did not want to alienate India 
any further as this could lead to solidification of 
Indo-Soviet ties. 
Mrs. Gandhi on her arrival in the US in 1982 was 
given a warm welcome. Extending optimism about the future of 
Indo-U.S. relations. President Reagan said, "we recognize 
6. Foreign Affairs Record. XXVII(9)September 1981, p.243 
7. Lok Sabha Debates, Seventh Series. XIX(17) Tuesday, 
September 8, 1981, cols. 287-288. 
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there have been differences between our two countries/ but 
we should not ignore all that we have in common. We are both 
proud, independent and strong nations guided by our own 
perceptions of national interest." Reciproca ting the 
ideas of Mr. Reagan, Mrs. Gandhi said that, "there have been 
many ups and downs in the curve of Indo-U.S. relations. Two 
large, vibrant and plural societies cannot possibly agree on 
all matters and especially on details. But if we concentrate 
on a shared perception of global welfare and respect for the 
same human values. We have a base on which to build 
understanding and cooperation. I believe such an affinity 
9 
exists between our two countries." 
The result of this visit was that the U.S. recognised 
India's role as a factor of stability in the Asian region as 
also in the broader international content. Certain areas of 
agreement were identified which could form the basis of a 
more friendly and cooperative relationship. The press in 
both the countries hailed this visit as a turning point in 
U.S. policies towards South Asia. It was seen by some as 
8. Asian Recorder. XXVIII (35) August 27 September 2, 
1982, p. 16760. 
9. Except of Mrs. Gandhi's address at a Luncheon hosted 
by the Foreign Policy Association and the Asian 
Society in Cooperation with the Far East American 
Council of Commerce and Industry and the Indian 
Chamber of Commerce of America, 2 August, 1982, in 
Foreign Affairs Record, XXXVIII (7) July 1982,' 
pp. 198-203. 
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the start of a new era m Indo-U.S. relations."However, in 
concrete terms nothing substantial came out of this visit. 
Except for assurances of more sympathetic response to 
India's request for loans and credits from the World Bank 
and IMF and settlement of the dispute over fuel supply to 
Tarapur, on all other significant issues such as U.S. arms 
supply to Pakistan or U.S. manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean, 
the two countries could not reach to an agreement. Hence, 
it appears that the U.S. invited Mrs. Gandhi just to ease 
tension in the South Asian region, but did not intend to 
bring about any basic change in its strategic posture. 
Consequently, there was no let up in the U.S. 
military aid to Pakistan. It continued to be unconcerned 
about Indian interests, to the extent of jeopardising them 
in certain cases. The case in point is the US decision to 
reduce its contribution to Western dominated international 
credit institutions. It was done at a time and in a manner 
that it hit India. Reacting to this, Mrs. Gandhi said in an 
interview to Associated Press on January 22, that, the "US 
cultivated dictatorships around the world while displaying 
indifference and a double standard towards India." She 
added: "I don't want to be sounding as if I am anti-US 
because I am not at all; ... but you see the administration 
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talks of democracy but actually ... they help dictatorships 
of one kind or the other." - an obvious reference to 
Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. administration had by this 
time, at least vocally, started accepting the importance of 
India and efforts were made to create a congenial atmosphere 
for dialogue. Mr. Reagan stated the official U.S. position, 
on March 3, 1984. He said "the US viewed India as a key 
nation, the largest and the most powerful fo the South Asian 
Region, and one whose views carry great weight." "We 
support India's unity, territorial integrity and 
non-alignment", explained Ambassador Armacost, "and 
recognise its pivotal role and its special responsibilities 
12 for regional peace and stability." 
The U.S. Vice President Mr. George Bush, came to 
India in May 1984, he was given an extraordinarily warm 
welcome. "I count myslef among those", said Mr. Bush, "who 
believe there is no fundamental conflict between the foreign 
13 policy objectives of the U.S. and those of India." 
10. The Times of India, January 23, 1984. 
11. The Times of India, March 14, 1984. 
12. Department of State Bulletin. February 1985, p. 26. 
13. Foreign Affairs Record. XXX(5) May 1984. 
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In such a congenial atmosphere a positive event took 
place and that was the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding on transfer of technology to India. It was a 
reflection of high priority placed on trust and goodwill by 
the two governments and an instrument contributing to 
greater future interaction in sensitive specialised areas 
of dual use high technology. In the past the US had 
expressed reservations as regards supply of such technology 
to India, fearing that it would be put to military use or 
diverted to countries of the Soviet bloc. This change of 
stance by the US was welcomed in both the countries. 
Mr. Richard Armitage, Assistant Director of Defence 
for International Security Affairs, disclosed to the Indian 
press the change in Reagan Administration's basis approach 
to India. He said that the change in policy posture can be 
discerned in the signing of the MOU with India on transfer 
of 'hitherto jealously guarded dual-use technologies'. 
He however warned, that the entire arrangement was 
predicated on the 'health' of the political relationship 
between the two countries. Obviously, U.S. postures, 
perceptions and actions would have a greater bearing on the 
'health' of this relationship. 
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It was on April 18, 1985, that the Lok Sabha 
unanimously condemned the briefing on Sikhs in India, 
organised by a US congressional group in Washington as an 
attempt at direct interference in the internal affairs of 
this country, which no sovereign nation would ever tolerate. 
Speakers from all pafrties condemned this event. Khursheed 
Alam Khan, Minister of State for External Affairs assured 
members that "whatever may be its relationship with any 
country, India would not tolerate any attack on its dignity 
14 
and territorial integrity." He informed the House that 
the Indian Embassy in Washington had conveyed to the U.S. 
government its strong feelings over this issue. A protest 
had also been sent to the US Embassy in New Delhi. 
The US government in a statement issued in New Delhi 
on April 18, denied that any US congressional hearing on 
sikhs or the Punjab situation had taken place in Washington. 
This misunderstanding was sought to be removed by the 
U.S. when efforts towards rapproacheraent were made during 
Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the US in June 1985. "We put great 
value on India's friendship", Mr. Reagan said, "our sharing 
of democratic values serves as a bridge between us." 
Mr. Gandhi responded with equal warmth but accepted that, 
14. Asian Recorder. XXXI (24) June 11-17, 1985. p.18360. 
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15 
"we look at the world from different angles.^' But rising 
above them are "beliefs we share in common, in the supremacy 
of freedom, in the necessity of equality, in the sovereignty 
of the people's will." 
Mr. Gandhi also met secretaries of import 
departments. In his talks with Mr. Reagan, he asked him to 
"put greater pressure on Pakistan in regard to its nuclear 
programme." Mr. Reagan assured Mr. Gandhi that "we are 
doing all we can to discourage this programme as also 
17 
nuclear proliferation m the whole region." Mr. Gandhi 
also expressed concern over "the militarization of the 
Indian ocean and the inflow of increasing sophisticated 
1 8 
arms" into Pakistan. 
Meanwhile, the State Department in a background paper 
on Indo-American relations hailed India as an emerging world 
power with which the US is seeking to improve relations. The 
US supported India over the issue of Sikh's demand for 
15. Mr. Gandhi's address before the National Press Club, 
June 14, 1985. 
16. The Times of India, June 13, 1985. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Asian Recorder, (28) July 4-15, 1985. p. 18405. 
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Khalistan in India. Before India had often been accused of 
human rights violations in Punjab. Speaking before the Asia 
society on April 29, 1987, Ambassador Armacost stated that 
"the formations of an independent state of Khalistan as 
demanded by some Indian and foreign sikhs, would not only 
violate the principle of national integrity but would also 
create a vulnerable and indefensible entity lacking inter-
19 
national support." Hence, a clear signal was sent to 
secessionist elements trying to create Khalistan, that they 
would not get any help or support from the US. 
The US has also endorsed India's actions in Maldives 
and Sri Lanka, as well as the unpublicised steps which New 
Delhi took to guard the regimes in Mauritius and Seychelles 
against externally organised coups. 
As regards Kashmir also, the US has changed its 
stance since early 1990. It suggests that this problem has 
to be solved bilaterally between India and Pakistan and not 
by references to outdated UN resolutions. The US is also 
reported to have pressurized Pakistan from desisting to aid 
and abet terrorism in this region. 
19. Department of State Bulletin, July 1987. 
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At the international level also India tried to please 
the U.S. The case in point is the episode concerning the 
then External Affairs Minister Mr. B.R Bhagat. He was 
severely criticised by the US Ambassador to the UN, General 
Vernon Walters, for his statement against US bullying of 
Libya, ostensibly to fight terrorism but really to appease 
domestic US sentiment, in early 1986. Mr. Bhagat was 
immediately dropped from the Union Cabinet. It was 
confirmed that this was done to please the US, when the P.M. 
of India avoided the Libyan issue in his address to the NAM 
summit towards the end of 1986. 
During his visit to the US in October 1987, the 
Indian P.M. welcomed the INF treaty, reiterating India's 
call for nuclear disarmament, which was the main issue of 
conflict between the Superpowers at that time. 
All these concessions were being given probably 
because Rajiv Gandhi wanted to get high technology from the 
U.S. He also wanted US acceptance of India's claim to be 
considered a responsible regional power. 
All these factors point to the fact that by end of 
the 1980s, both India and U.S. had realised that despite 
84 
disagreements on certain issues they should build upon 
issues of agreement. In the words of Dilip Mukherjee, "the 
ability to agree to disagree" was the essence of the change 
that had taken place. 
The Pakistan Factor in Indo-O.S. Relations: 
The U.S. - Pakistan relationship which was at a 
low-ebb, because of Pakistan's nuclear efforts, received a 
boost with the fall of the Shah of Iran in the late 1970s. 
The Carter administration decided to sell fighter planes to 
Pakistan "to relieve the strains in relation to Pakistan 
^ ^ v - i_ ^ ^ • ^- c -r. • -jiiSO in August 
created by abrupt termination of American aid" ^ 
1979. Immediately afterwards, the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, resulted in the upgradation of Pakistan as a 
•frontline state' in U.S. strategy. This was a cause of 
great concern for India, as U.S. arms in Pakistan could have 
far reaching consequences on Indian security. 
However, the Carter administration did not probably 
want to supply weapons to Pakistan at the expence of its 
relations with India. It decided to carry India along, in 
its task of building Pakistan's military strength. Hence, 
20. Warren H. Donnelly, and Goldman Era. Nuclear Weapons: 
The Threat of Pakistan going nuclear. Congressional 
Research Service. June 16, 1981. 
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Carter's emissary personally explained to the Indian 
leaders the direction of US policy, taking care not to hurt 
India's security susceptibilities. 
Such an American policy was not liked by Pakistan. 
Hence, the US offer of $400 million aid package was rejected 
by the Pakistan President as "peanuts". For India, the 
restart of US aid to Pakistan carried with itself an 
implicit acquiescence of Pakistan's nuclear programme, which 
was quite disturbing for India. 
With the coming into power of Mr. Reagan in the US, 
India's worries were further compounded. He preferred a 
more aggressive and offensive strategy instead of the Carter 
administration's mild approach, to contain Soviet influence. 
In addition, the new administration wanted to project its 
power in the region. To "restore a relationship of trust" 
with Pakistan, so that "various forms of strategic 
21 
cooperation wxll prove possible in the near future" , it 
was offered an assistance package of $3.2 billion for 
1981-86. 
Reacting to this, Mr. Rupesh Gupta, M.P. said in the 
Parliament - "Now we are in a situation in which we are 
21 R.G. Sawhney, South Asia: A prop to Pakistan. World 
Eocus, -6. (II January 1985. p. 14. 
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22 being encircled by Americans." Indian apprehensions 
proved to be correct when Vice President Bush, during his 
visit to Pakistan in May 1984, said that the U.S. - Pakistan 
Security ties went beyond the Afghanistan issue. For India, 
another more disturbing statement was made by Mr. Dean 
Hinton, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, in his October speech 
to the Council on Security studies in Lahore. He did not 
rule out US support for Pakistan in a conflict with India. 
"If the contingency yo're talking about is from the east", 
he said, "then we will not be neutral, if there is an act 
committed by anybody of flagrant aggression. There is all 
23 kinds of things which we can and would do." 
However, some efforts were made to assuage India's 
concerns. Ambassador Armacost, speaking at the world Affairs 
Council at Philadelphia on 12 December 1984, said our 
Security ties with Pakistan complicate our relations with 
India. We recognize India's concerns about the level of 
armaments of its neighbors, but Pakistan has legitimate 
security requirements in the face of Soviet threat from 
22. Rajya Sabha Official Report, XCVII (24) March 24, 
1981. col. 40. 
23. Selig S. Harrison, India, the United States and 
Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, in Harrison and 
Subrahmanyam, (ed.) Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean. 
Oxford University Press. New York. 1989. p. 266. 
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Afghanistan ... We hope that over time our position and the 
interests of Pakistan will be better comprehended by our 
Indian friends." Nevertheless, U.S. military aid to 
Pakistan went far beyond its necessary defensive 
requirements, threatening India's security and strategic 
interest in the region. The U.S. aid, "although aimed at 
strengthening Pakistan against any future threat from the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan ... affected the relative 
balance between India and Pakistan. To limit the damage to 
Indo-American relations, the Reagan administration sought 
25 improved relations with two South Asian rivals." Efforts 
were made to convince India that a "close relationship with 
one (Pakistan) does not preclude a close relationship with 
the other (India)."^^ 
However, the Indian leaders continued to be 
apprehensive of close U.S. - Pakistan relations. Mr. Suresh 
Kurup, M.P. said in the Lok Sabha that, the "main role of 
U.S. in this area as everyone knows is to destablise India. 
The new friendship between the U.S. and Pakistan involves 
the sharing of military intelligence. We should take note of 
this factor very seriously. We know both these countries are 
24. Department of State Bulletin, February 1985. p. 27. 
25. Zalmay Khalilzad. The United States in South Asia. 
Current History. 88 (542) December 1989. p. 419. 
26. Stephen P. Cohen, in a Lecture at Allahabad 
University on February 20, 1987. 
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27 interested in encouraging secessionist forces in India." 
The U.S. wanted to improve its relations with India 
alongwith Pakistan, because India was an important state in 
this region. It wanted "to encourage Indian independence 
from Moscow and to discourage Indian hostility towards 
Pakistan" Efforts were made to improve relations with 
India mainly through initiatives in the economic sphere. 
However, offering economic sops for damaged security 
interests was no credible means to restore mutual 
understanding and cooperation on a long term basis in 
29 Indo-U.S. relations." 
Meanwhile, the first six year package of aid from the 
U.S. to Pakistan, was followed by a second package of $4.02 
billion for 1987-93. This created great friction in Indo 
American relations. But the U.S. took it as a "challenge ... 
to improve relations with both countries in a way that will 
help New Delhi and Islamabad reduce tensions between 
themselves. 
27. Lok Sabha Debates. Eight Series. XIV (20) Thursday 
March 20, 1986. col. 196. 
28. Zalmay Khalilzad, n. 25 
29. S.D. Muni, Indo-U.S. Relations : The Pak Factor. Man 
and Development. VIII (3) September 1986. pp. 26-27. 
30. Department of State Bulletin, July 1987. p. 79. 
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The U.S. efforts that its strategic cooperation V7ith 
Pakistan should not affect the formers relations with India 
proved to be a failure. In South Asia the basically 
conflictual nature of Indo-cak relations has always affected 
any other powers relations with either of them. Good 
relations of the outside power with either of them has 
adversely affected its relations with the other country in 
the sub-continent. This holds true as regards U.S. Pakistan 
relations also. 
However, with the receding of the cold war the 
importance of Pakistan has shrunk in U.S. scheme of things. 
Now the US would not go to the extent of jeopardising its 
interest with India to please Pakistan. Hence, it is hoped 
that the Pakistan factor would not be a major irritant in 
Indo-U.S. relations in the times to come. 
India and US at the UN; 
At the United Nations India and the U.S. have almost 
always found each other on opposite side, on important 
issues of concern. The basic reason was that the core 
principles of India's foreign policy came in conflict with 
U.S. interests, creating an atmosphere of distrust between 
the two countries. 
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At the UN India had always supported the cause of 
the Pakistan and had voted for UN measures aimed at 
pressurizing Israel to concede the former's due. Such a 
stance has not found favour with the U.S. for instance, on 5 
February, 1982, the General Assembly declared that Israel's 
decision of 14 February 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction 
and Administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights 
constituted an 'act of aggression' under the charter. 
Hence, by adopting resolution ES-9/1 it called on members 
states to refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons and 
related equipment and to suspend any military assistance to 
that country ... to suspend economic, financial and 
technological assistance to and cooperation trade and 
31 
cultural relations with Israel." India voted in favour of 
this resolution and the U.S. against it. The result was the 
same in case of other resolutions aimed at Israel. All this 
demonstrated the divergence in the approach of the two 
countries. 
The elimination of apartheid in South Africa was 
another cause dear to India at the international level. The 
32 General Assembly resolution 40/64A on comprehensive 
31. UN Monthly Chronicle. XIX (4) April 1982. p. 5. 
32. UN General Assembly Official Records. 40th session. 
111th meeting. 10 December 1985. 
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sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa saw 
India voting for and the U.S. against it. In the same way 
35 the General Assembly resolution 40/641 on concerted action 
for the elimination of apartheid led to the same result. 
Both the countries have found themselves ranged against each 
other whenever this issue came up for discussion at the 
U.N. 
The establishment of a new International economic 
order has been another issue of concern to India. 
Articulating India's concern at the General Assembly its 
representative Venkatramaiah said "the current economic 
crisis facing the developing countries brought into sharp 
focus the need to establish a new international economic 
order and made it possible to judge properly efforts made 
towards progressive development of principles and norms of 
34 international law on the subject." Reacting to this 
Rosenstock, the U.S. representative said that his delegation 
doubted the validity of the title of the item under 
consideration, which proposed the development of principles 
and norms of international law relating to a new 
International economic order, his delegation doubted that 
33. Ibid. 
34. A/C:6/41/SR.49. UN General Assembly Official Records. 
41st session. Sixth Committee. 49th meeting, 20 
November, 1986. 
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such principles existed ... to attempt to work out legal 
principles in the absence of political agreement was merely 
35 
to compound the confusion and to harden position." This 
was not an accidental remark but it articulated the 
consistent U.S. policy all through the years. 
The U.S. chose to torpedo the widely held consensses 
in the U.N. General Assembly on calling for a conference on 
the Indian Ocean with a view to working out modalities for 
establishing a zone of peace there. Dashing all hopes of 
progress, owing to the easing of cold war, the U.S., in 
cooperation with several other western countries was so 
determined to prevent holding of a conference on this issue, 
that it withdrew from the UN Ad hoc committee in April 1990. 
This development was another disappointment to India which 
was in the forefront of the efforts to demand a zone of 
peace in the Indian Ocean. 
Hence, Indo-U.S. contacts at the UN have been 
anything but cordial in the preceeding years. 
The Nuclear Issue; 
The passing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act 
(NNPA) by the US Congress in 1978 made it difficult for the 
35. A/C:6/41/SR.47. UN General Assembly Official Records. 
41st session. Sixth Committee. 49th meeting, 20 
November, 1986. 
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U.S. to honour the 1963 agreement for supplying fuel to the 
Tarapur plant- The Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC) 
refused to recommend the li cence issued by the State 
Department for supply of fuel for Tarapur. Carter's veto 
was overruled by the Senate and House Foreign Relations 
committees. India was asked to apply full-scope safeguards 
to its nuclear facilities within eighteen months. Thus was 
born an important irritant in Indo-U.S. relations which 
would affect this relationship throughout the 1980s. 
Reacting to the unilateral US decision, the External 
Affairs Minister, said in the Lok Sabha, "we have 
repreatedly expressed our grave concern to the government of 
the United States in the inordinate delay in approving final 
supplies for Tarapur. The terms of the agreement between 
India and the US, which came into force in 1963 ... cannot 
be changed unilaterally by either party. We have abided by 
this agreement in its letter and spirit and we expect the 
government of the United States to honour their obligation." 
Reflecting the general feeling in the country, Mr. 
Shiv Chandra Jha, M.P., said, "we are worried over the 
American pressure on India for the supply of nuclear fuel 
36. Lok Sabha Debates, Seventh series II (9) Thursday, 
March 20, 1980. col. 249. 
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for Tarapur Atomic Plant, the whole country is worried. We 
37 
oppose thi s policy." 
However, President Carter on June 19, 1980 signed an 
executive order approving the pending shipment of 38 tonne 
of highly enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant. Mr. 
Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State told the 
Foreign relations committee, that "beyond our 
non-proliferation concerns a refusal at this time to fulfil 
our obligation under the supply agreement would cast a long 
shadow on our overall relationship with India." He further 
added that "many in India saw the Tarapur issue as an 'index 
38 
of US interests in maintaining good relations" with India. 
But soon after wards, the Reagan administration 
notified India in April 1981 its decision to terminate the 
1963 agreement, with an inisistence on maintaining 
safeguards and also a say over India's reprocessing of spent 
fuel. 
In the wake of great indignation in India over such a 
harsh and unilateral step by the U.S., the Reagan adminis-
tration decided to settle the Tarapur controversy during 
37. Rajya Sabha Official Report, CXIII (3) March 3, 1980, 
col. 152. 
38. Asian Recorder, XXVI (3) July 29, August 4, 1980. 
p. 15571. 
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Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the U.S. in July 1982. On July 29, 
an arrangement was reached between the two countries, 
shifting the responsibilities to France for supplying 
enriched uranium for Tarapur. It was decided to continue 
the 1963 conditions and obligations and India retained the 
right to reprocess the Spent fuel. 
Reiterating India's position, Mrs. Gandhi stated at 
the National Press Club on July 30, that "India did not have 
any nuclear weapons and it was not opposed to international 
inspection of its nuclear facilities. We are willing to have 
whatever inspections other countries have." She added, 
39 
"India did not sign the NPT as it was discriminatory." 
Later, U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, 
conveyed to India's External Affairs Minister Mr. Narsimha 
Rao, that the "US was prepared to take necessary action to 
supply those safety related spare parts for the Tarapur 
40 Atomic Power Plant that were not available elsewhere." 
Analysing the US decision, Mr. Paul Leventhal of the 
Nuclear control Institute, stated that the Reagan adminis-
tration had "caved into Indian demands for the reactor 
39. Satish Kumar, (ed.) Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 
1982-83. Sage Publications, New Delhi 1985. p. 44. 
40. The Times of India, June 30, 1983. 
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parts, ostensibly for health and safety reasons, but 
actually to remove what it considers an irritant in U.S. -
41 India relations." 
However, the irritant over the nuclear issue 
persisted. India was opposed to full scope safeguards and 
rejected the US or IAEA imposition of restraints on its 
choices. On NPT, India's stand has been unequivocal and 
clear, that India would not sign it, as it is 
discriminatory. India has also opposed US suggestions to 
conclude a bilateral agreement with Pakistan to make South 
Asia nuclear-free. India has rejected this suggestion as 
the presence of China - a nuclear power - would make this 
agreement useless. During his visit to the US in June 1989, 
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi rejected the proposal of President Bush, to 
explore the possibility of a regional approach to the 
nuclear problem in South Asia. 
Such a defiant and uncompromising Indian stand has 
clashed with US interests, creating great acrimony between 
the two countries. India is not ready to sign the NPT. 
Even, if it does, it offers no insurance against present or 
future clandestine capabilities. Hence, in the present 
41. Asian Recorder, XXIX (33) August 13-19, 1983, p.17316 
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context, if "NPT can at best be a confidence building 
measure, the same purpose can be achieved equally well by a 
declaration against non-first use which the Soviet Union and 
China have already made. There is some hope that the US may 
42 find this an acceptable alternative." 
People to People Relations: 
The interactions between the people of both these 
societies, acts as a bridge between them. The growing Indian 
immigrant community in the US, estimated at some 6 00,0 00 is 
making notable contribution to American society and also 
provides a human link to India. 
Before the 1980s, the image of Indians had languished 
in the United States. But polls since 1983, have shown that 
India has started "to move up in the general esteem of most 
Americans. The successful film 'Gandhi' and positive 
reaction to 'A passage to India' and the television series 
'The Jewel in the Crown* seemed to have helped foster an 
43 increasing interest in India among Americans." 
42. Dilip Mukherjee, New Delhi and Washington : Rocky 
Road to Rapproachement. The Times of India. September 
3, 1991. 
43. Paul H. Kriesberg, India After Indira. Foreign 
Affairs. September 1985. p. 889. 
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The festival of India built on this base, and brought 
to the surface both real interest and sympathetic curiosity. 
India's excellent exhibits included, folk art, classical 
dance, films and even contemporary design and fashion. The 
Indians got an access through this festival to all sections 
of US society. The festival was reported and covered by the 
US press extensively generating much curiosity about India 
in the American mind. The contacts between the people of the 
two countries were further solidified when the Festival of 
America was organised in India. 
These festivals were highly instrumental in expanding 
personal ties between Indians and Americans. Slowly, the 
perception of Indian people about Americans is also under-
going a change. The American filsm, music, fast food and 
blue Jeans, in short the American way of life is fast 
gaining wide acce ptability in Indian society. The 
readership of US magazines 'Time' and 'Newsweek' etc. is 
fast increasing in India. The recent government decision to 
give access to US and other Western T.V. Channels to the 
Indian Television, would go a long way in moulding the 
perception of Indians about the U.S. 
Such an interaction between the people of India and 
the U.S. can be best described as "People's Diplomacy", if 
one were to use the words of Mikhail Gorbachev. Nations and 
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their policies are no longer objects of diplomat's and 
government's activities. They are now influenced by the 
actions and thoughts of their people. And rightly so, 
because "people's diplomacy" restores the original, direct 
meaning of the word "international" signifying relations 
among nations- and not merely among government 
44 
representatives." And -it is this type of policy which 
conditions the relationship between India and the U.S. in 
the international scenario. 
Reasons for Divergence; 
The Indian leaders have always had a perception that 
American policy has favoured India's adversaries. India's 
suspicion of China and Pakistan and the U.S. links with both 
these countries, as well as the U.S. manoeuvres in the 
Indian Ocean have led India to "look to the Soviets for 
45 tacit balancing support against the United States." 
The Americans have accused Indians of mostly being 
hostile to them in the UN. They have always asked India to 
follow the code of equidistance in its dealings with the two 
44. Gleb Ivashentsov, Nikolai Kottsov, The Soviet-Indian 
Phenomenon. Allied Publishers. New Delhi, 1989. p. 82 
45. Paul H. Kriesberg. n. 43. p. 884. 
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superpowers. India has, however, maintained that "equidis-
tances have genuine metaphorical reality only when the two 
points of reference are fixed; when they are themselves 
wildly oscillating .... we have to pick our way very 
carefully. It is not equidistance we are trying to achieve 
46 but fairness and justice on individual terms." 
Another reason for divergence of policies has been 
that changes in America take place at a fast pace, whereas, 
in India they come about too slowly, so we have not been 
able to keep pace with the fast changing US system. 
Further we have been lagging far behind other countries in 
lobbying at Capitol Hill. It is important because of 
deficiencies on this front that we have often failed to 
present and pursue our case strongly as regards numerous 
issues. 
There is also a difference as to how both these 
countries look at the world. The U.S. is a Super power 
trying to retain its power and influence whereas, India sees 
the world in multi-poolar terms. It has no interest in the 
present hierarchy in nations. So, the perception of both the 
countries are divergent as regards the present international 
order. 
46. Damodaran, Indo-US Relations : Perceptions and 
Dilemmas. Man and Development 8 (2) June 1986. p. 18. 
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Finally, thpre is a peculiar kind of communication 
gap between the two countries. It is so because the flow of 
information and ideas is mainly one way - from USA to India. 
The communication industry of USA has "an overwhelming 
impact on the relatively small and weak information 
communication system of India. American newspapers and 
periodicals have a large market here ... This imbalance has 
been to a degree, responsible for inadequate and uninformed 
views on and about India among various segments in America 
47 
which influence decision - making." As a result of this 
India's postures and initiatives have often been 
misunderstood in USA, resulting in bitterness and conflict. 
Conclusion; 
A review of Indo-US relations in the last decade 
makes it imperative for the US to devise an India policy. 
Through it, India should be treated as a separate case, 
different from the undifferentiated category of "third 
world", on the basis of India's growing political, economic 
and strategic importance. From an Indian perspective also it 
is "precisely the absence of such a policy designed to 
accommodate India's most important regional security 
47 K.P. Mishra, Indo-American Relations : Divergences 
outweigh Convergences. Man and Development. 7 (3) 
September 1985. p. 69. 
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concerns that prevents the desired improvement in Indo-US 
48 
relations." The US has failed to find for India a 
position in its global strategy which would satisfy India's 
national self esteem. 
For India, its strategy of talcing advantage of the 
conflicts between the super powers has collapsed with the 
sudden disappearance of the countervailing power to the U.S. 
The confrontationist attitude should be replaced by an 
approach of compromise - not subservience. As the U.S. now 
does not need to make allowances for non-capitalist, 
non-market political systems. 
Although the strategic perceptions of both the 
countries appear to be opposed to each other, yet, only when 
they are ready to have a frank and uninhibited dialogue can 
both the countries narrow their differences and identify 
areas of cooperation. 
48. Francine R. Frankel, The Times of India, May 11, 
1985. 
CHAPTER - IV 
INPO-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Introduction: 
December 2, 1987 marks the completion of thirty seven years 
of Indo-Soviet economic cooperation. It was on this day that 
the first five year trade agreement was signed between the 
two countries. India's economic relations with the Soviet 
Union over these years have grown faster than her relations 
with any other country. However, this relationship has 
encountered "a series of continuous adaptations and 
adjustments to meet the requirements created by structural 
problems inherent in certain contemporary developments." 
The rupee trade and payments arrangement has been 
chosen by India and the USSR to promote bilateral trade. The 
Indian side pays in rupees for Soviet goods and credits 
etc., the mony is deposited in a special account in the 
Reserve Bank of India, and is later used by Soviet 
organisations to purchase Indian goods. This pattern of 
trade policy is a "greatly maligned one in the theory of 
International trade... The use of this instrument is 
believed to result in economic loss to the weaker trading 
1. Sumitra Chisti, Indo-Soviet Economic Relations, in 
Satish Kumar (ed.) Year Book of India's Foreign 
Policy, 1987-88. Sage Publications. New Delhi, p.143. 
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partner distorting its international trade on the one hand 
and developing an inefficient domestic production structure 
2 
on the other." It has been argued that this arrangement 
enables the USSR to buy for rupees a number of goods for 
vhich India could otherwise receive convertible currency. 
The USSR, however, sells India for rupees many goods which 
are in steady demand on the world market. These are 
petroleum crude and products, non-ferrous metals and 
fertilizers. Rupee trade therefore serves the interests of 
both the USSR and India laying the foundation for a mutually 
beneficial exchange of goods. 
Main features of Indo-OSSR Trade: 
Indo-USSR trade had grown at a fast pace - in the 
eighties the USSR has become India's largest trading 
partner. This trade relationship has several important 
features. It is based on a mechanism of clearing account in 
rupees, with an inbuilt system for checking imbalances which 
occur continually. With the formulation of annual trade 
plans and long term trade plans, a clear idea about the 
trade turn-over in the immediate future is available. The 
USSR provides an expanding market for some important 
Ibid. 
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commodities. Indian exports comprise of 50 per cent 
manufactures. Due to over all balancing trade frictions are 
unheard of. 
Under the trade agreement both sides buy commodities 
at international prices. An agreement between India and the 
USSR provides that the "export and import of goods under the 
agreement shall be carried out at the prices competitive in 
relation to the world market prices for corresponding 
goods." Quite often a criticism is levelled that India's 
exports to the USSR is carried out at lesser prices. But it 
needs to be emphasized that in view of the above agreement 
it is for the exporter and importer to settle the price and 
ensure that the trade is carried out at international 
prices. 
Trade relations between India and the USSR are 
founded upon long-term bilateral trade agreements. India's 
exports to the USSR lead to equal quantity of exports from 
there to India and the mechanism of settling all accounts in 
rupees, helps India greatly. In additon, the lack of 
tariffs on goods imported into the USSR from developing 
countries guarantees for India "stable demand and stable 
3 
prices for its exports." 
3. B. Natarajan, Role of Soviet Aid in India's Growth. 
Quoted in V. Dagli, (ed.) Indo-Soviet Economic 
Relations; A Survey, Bombay Vora and Co., 1971. p.39. 
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Substantial diversification and expansion of two way 
trade relations between India and the USSR has been 
facilitated by the rupee trade arrangement. It has helped 
India to secure major capital goods in large amounts from 
the Soviet Union at times when her free foreign exchange 
resources were scarce. Moreover, under the bilateral trade 
agreement reached in 1959, Soviet credit to India is 
repayable through export of Indian goods, this form of trade 
has resulted in an automatic increase in the Indian exports 
to the USSR. 
Another significant aspect of the rupee payment 
arrangement is that in it the exports and imports counter 
balance each other, diminishing the requirement to obtain 
resources from outside, to ensure balance. Moreover, the 
pattern of trade is reviewed periodically to make the 
required adjustments. 
In addition, this trade relationship helps India save 
foreign exchange resources, including those on some of the 
commodities which it otherwise would have to buy in hard 
4 
currency. Such as crude oil and pertroleum products." 
4. V.D. Chopra, Economic Content:A Model of Cooperation. 
World Focus, 8 (4), April 1987, p. 21. 
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Advantages of Soviet Economic Assitance; 
A merit of Soviet aid is that it is of a long-term 
nature. Its strategy has been consistent with Indian hopes 
and targets and therefore its aid has been considered more 
desirable, as compared to U.S. aid, which is linked to 
immediate political pressure, several conditions and a 
demand for efficiency. 
The USSR was ready to extend aid to the public sector 
which was given the leading role in Indian economy. 
Washington's reluctance to help in the growth of Indian 
economy through the public sector, created a more favourably 
image of the USSR in India. Hence, a firm foundation of 
trust was laid on which a mutually advantageous trade 
relationship would evolve. 
The deferred payment protocol signed between the two 
countries makes credit available to India for the import of 
Soviet machinery. The machineries are available on down 
payment of 15 per cent with 20 monthly instalments and at 4 
per cent interest. Such a supply of the latest machineries 
on credit has helped Indian importers to develop and expand 
their manufacturing base. 
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An important characteristic of Soviet economic 
assistance to India is that whole of it is available in the 
form of credits at nominal rate of interst. Most of the 
Soviet loans carry 2.5 per cent interest and extend upto 12 
years. As the Soviet assistance wholly belongs to the state 
the question of repatriation of profits in hard currency on 
an yearly basis, does not occur. The repatriation of the 
Soviet credits starts after the competition of the 
deliveries of the required machinery for setting up a 
project. So, actually the repayment period is spread over 15 
to 20 years, including a grace period of 3 to 4 years. 
Moreover, the "grant element in the aid was less compared to 
that from multilateral funding agencies and some western 
.,5 
countries. 
Since India is industrialising fast, both the Indian 
and Soviet experts through regular contacts and coordination 
try to ensure that this development proceeds on propor-
tionate lines. The Soviet aided projects are economically 
linked together and they are so structured that they become 
mutually beneficial supplementary enterprises. Moreover, the 
ruggedress of Soviet equipment was an asset in Indian 
P. Chaudhari, East European Aid to India, in Deepak 
Nayar (ed.) Economic Relations between Socialist 
Countries and the Third World, London, Macmillan, 
1977. 
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conditions. Analysts have noted that the built-in margins of 
error are rso generous, with corresponding downward bias in 
capacity ratings, that utilization ratios of Soviet aided 
plants improve dramatically with enhanced work force skills 
and discipline." The rated capacities of the Baraunio, 
Koyali and Mathura oil refineries are used 90-100 per cent, 
7 
and of the Korba aluminum plant at nearly 100 per cent." 
Rupee-Rouble Parity and Indo-USSR Trade; 
The exchange rate dispute which arose in the 1970s 
was settled in 1978 when India and the USSR reached to an 
understanding on this issue. The rupee-rouble exchange rate 
was fixed. But this mechanism of fixing the exchange rate 
became irrelevant when the USSR in 1989 started revising the 
rouble rate vis-a-vis major world currencies, mainly the US 
dollar, resulting in a sharp devaluation of the rouble in 
relation to the dollar. Further , the 1978 agreement fixed 
the rupee rouble rate on the basis of a static rouble value, 
but a changing rupee value linked to a basket of 16 
currencies, consequently, a distortion came in the parity. 
while the rouble value declined sharply in relation to major 
world currencies, it gained strength vis-a-vis the rupee. 
6. Santosh Mehrotra and Lincoln Kaye, Soviet 'Handson' 
style Wins Friends', Far Eastern Economic Review. 
February 5, 1987, p. 52. 
7. Igor Khotsialov. 'USSR-IndianA New Stage in Trade and 
Economic Cooperation. Foreign Trade. USSR. No. 1, 
1988. p. 8. 
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However, with the rupee-trade and payments 
arrangement in vogue with the Soviet Union, the parity 
between the two currencies does not affect the trade 
transactions much. the rupee-rouble parity primarily 
concerns the flow of rouble credit and its repayment. For 
major items of India's imports, the prices are quoted in 
dollar and then converted into rupee for accrual into the 
USSR trade balance. 
Indo-USSR Trade and Economic Assistance in the 1980s: 
India's exports to the USSR have grown from being of 
the value of Rs. 1226 crores, in 1980-81 to Rs.4463 crores 
in 1989-90. In the corresponding period India's imports from 
the Soviet Union have risen from Rs.1014 crores to Rs.2038 
crores. In the 1980s, except for the year 1983-84, India 
had consistently maintained an advantageous balance of trade 
relationship with the USSR. The table given below, shows 
the trend of the growth of India's exports to and imports 
from the USSR in the last 30 years. 
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Hence, this is an ever-growing trade relationship 
which has endured various political crises in both the 
countries. In December 1979 India and the USSR signed a 
trade protocol that envisaged a turnover of 1.1 billion 
pounds sterling in 1980, a record for these two states. 
This made the Soviet Union the largest trading partner of 
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India and the second largest in the value of imports. the 
protocol provided for the supply of 1.5 million tonnes of 
crude oil and 1.7 million tonnes of petroleum products, thus 
relieving the pressure on supplies of a vital import. 
With the signing of the protocol which extended this 
system of balanced barter trade, the items exchanged were 
susbtantially diversified. Indian imports were shifted from 
capital goods and machinery to crude, fertilizers, 
non-ferrous metals and newsprint. Exports to the Soviet 
Union which comprised of mainly non-traditional items 
including shipment of capital goods from Soviet aided plants 
now confronted the possibility of surplus potential. 
The above agreement also contained a provision for 
production cooperation which would involve establishment of 
plants so structured as to fulfil the requirements of both 
states. The trade between India and the USSR was to continue 
on the basis of settlement in rupees, on arrangement that 
had then ended with most East European countries, which were 
close allies of the USSR. This in substance constituted 
"barter trade on a balanced basis, although it involved 
extension of 'technical credit' for any imbalance on either 
side."^ 
8. Financial Times, 2 January 1980. 
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On December 10, 1980, India and the Soviet Union, 
signed half a dozen documents including one providing for 
increasing the volume of trade to Rs.10,000 crores in 5 
years." In addition, the USSR also agreed to cooperate with 
India in the three very important sectors, power, coat mining 
and oil exploration, over and above the traditional 
cooperation in ferrous metallurgy, specially in the 
expansion of the Bokaro and Bhillai Steel plants and 
erection of a new intergrated steel plant at Vishakhapatnam. 
During Brezhnev's visit to India in the same month, 
an agreement was signed, which envisaged "cooperation in 
building the large Vindhyachal thermal power station, 
developing big colleries in Nighai and Mukunda, sinkind 
mines in the state of Jhanjhera, prospecting for oil and gas 
in the state of West Bengal and repairing the idle and 
low-out put oil well in the state of Gujrat." 
In this way Indo-Soviet cooperation was evolving at a 
fast pace. Referring to trade relations Mr. Akhipov said 
that "trade turnover is the aggregate indicator of economic 
relations between the two countries... The goal set before 
the foreign trade organisations of the two countries in the 
9. Asian Records, XXVII (2) January 8-14, 1981. p, 
15827. 
10. Gleb Ivashentsov Nikolai Kiltsov, The Soviet-Indian 
Phenomenon. Allied Publishers. New Delhi, 1989. p.85. 
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joint Soviet Indian declaration of November 29, 1974, i.e. 
to increase the volume of Soviet Indian trade by 1980 by 1.5 
- times can be said to have been achieved . . . Today India 
ranks first in the USSR's trade with developing countries. 
In September 1982, the trade protocol for 1983 was 
signed between the two countries, it provided for an 
increase of 11.2 per cent in the total turnover. During the 
same year Indira Gandhi visited the USSR and "both sides 
noted with satisfaction the large scale and high level of 
their cooperation in the field of economic trade, science 
and technology ... They agreed to examine possibilities for 
further expansion of cooperation in such areas as ferrous 
and non-ferrous metallurgy, coal and oil machine building 
..12 and power. 
On February 25, 1983, the two countries signed in 
Bangalore a Memorandum of Understanding on avenues of 
cooperation in space research in the next 10 years. The 
agreement covered different aspects of "cooperation in space 
11. Text of press release issued in New Delhi of I.V-
Akhipov's speech at Plenary session of Indo-Soviet 
Joint Commission in New Delhi on January 22, 1981. 
Quoted in Foreign Affairs Record. XXVII (1) January 
1981. p. 36. 
12. Indo-Soviet Joint Declaration at the Conclusion of 
P.M. Indira Gandh's visit to Moscow, 25 Sept. 1982. 
Quoted in Foreign Affairs Record". September 1982, 
p. 225. 
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research with particular reference to remote sensing, 
astronomy and astrophysics, metaphysics, mateorology and 
atmospheric sciences, tracking of the satellites and space 
13 technology." 
Scientific and technical collaboration between India 
and the Soviet Union in the field of computers and 
electronics was envisaged in another protocol signed in 
Moscow on April 10, 1983. This protocol "provided for India 
buying Soviet computers and Soviets buying Indian made 
computer peripherals and software besides electronic 
14 
consumer goods." The Indo-Soviet trade plan of 1983 also 
contained a provision for the supply of 2.5 million tonnes 
of crude and 2.3 million tonnes of petroleum products by the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union agreed to make this 
additional supply of crude oil in a bid to correct the trade 
imbalance which was presently in favour of India." 
Despite the fact that trade with India had increased 
sharply in the last few years, it faced a near crisis 
situation in 1983. Though there was abundant goodwill on the 
13. Satish Kumar (ed.) Year book on India's Foreign 





part of India, the soviet Union WJLS "unable to extend 
economic cooperation to any new major areas, i.e. to areas 
other than such traditional fields as metallurgy machine-
building, fuel and energy. Not only the scope for large 
scale imports in those fields was limited, but there was 
increasing competition from industrially advanced 
^ . „16 
countries. 
A further cause of concern in this trade relationship 
was that India's exports to the USSR valued at Rs. 1669 
crores in 1982-83 had sharply declined to Rs.l220 crores in 
1983-84, owing mainly to "a sudden decline in Soviet orders 
for Indian productions in 1983 to correct the large trade 
17 imbalance that had accumulated in favour of India." In 
addition, India had for some years been finding it difficult 
to utilize Soviet aid for its economic development, and this 
in conjuction with the above factors led to strained 
relations between the two countries. 
Mr. Y.P. Ryabov, chairperson of the USSR state 
committee for Foreign Economic Relations, visited India in 
January 1984. He gave expression to the Soviet desire to 
16. Jayshekhar. India's Trade with the Soviet Bloc: 
Growing Dependency and Commodity convertibility. 
Problems of Non-Alignement. 1(2) June-August 1983. 
17. Ibid. 
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"further strengthen cooperation with India in various energy 
sectors such as oil prospecting, coal mining and power 
..18 generation. 
The first meeting of the Working Group on Indo-Soviet 
Trade took place in Moscow from 4 to 10 July, 1984, it 
identified several new items to widen the range and scope of 
Indo-USSR bilateral trade. 
The Indo-Soviet trade protocol of 1985, signed in New 
Delhi, envisaged a dramatic increase in trade turnover to 
Rs,4620 crores with an increase of approximately 20 per cent 
over the targetted trade turn over of Rs.3840 crores for 
1984. The trade protocol of 1985 also had a provision for 
increase in the figure of exports to the USSR to Rs.2500 
crores "in comparision to Rs,2000 crores in 1984 marking an 
increase of 25 per cent over 1984. This rate of growth is 
much higher than the rate of growth of India's global 
exports." 
Similarly imports from the USSR were expected to be 
to the tune of Rs.2120 crores in 1985. The corresponding 
18. Foreign Affairs Reocrd. January 1984, pp. 27-28. 
19. Text of press release issued in New Delhi on 7 Dec. 
1984, on the signing of the Indo-USSR Inter-Govt. 
Trade Protocol. Foreign Affairs Record. Dec. 1984, 
pp. 368. 
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figure in 1984 was Rs. 1840 crores. the increase in 1985 
would thus be above 15 per cent over 1984. "The USSR could 
thus continue to be India's biggest and most important 
trading partner. The rate of growth of Soviet trade with 
India is considerably higher than the rate of growth of 
• 20 USSR's trade with any other country." However, the 
bilateral trade did not register the growth as was expected 
of it. the increase in India's exports to the USSR was quite 
marginal, whereas, the imports from the USSR registered a 
negative growth. Nevertheless, in this period "synthetic 
rubber and several chemicals were added to the list of 
imports for the first time. On the export side veterinary 
preparations, medical equipment and instruments were new 
21 items of export to the USSR." 
The Indo-Soviet working Group on oil Industry 
identified certain areas where it felt the two countries 
might profitably intensify their cooperation. A protocol was 
signed between the two countries "to give some mutually 
agreed area in a basin to the Soviets for intensive 
integrated exploration.... It was also decided to expand the 
20. Ibid. 
21. The Times of India, 8 December 1984 
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programme of training Indian specialists in advance techno-
22 logy in the Soviet Union." Oil was an important 
constituent of Indian imports from the USSR. This peaked at 
78 per cent of our requirements coming from there in 1982, 
but it later fell to 48 per cent by 1986, because of 
23 
plunging world prices of oil." The important fact was that 
when Moscow had told East European countries to turn to 
alternative supplies for their increasing oil requirements; 
yet it was prepared to forego hard currency in a sellers' 
market by selling oil to India within the framework of 
bilateral payments." Sometimes Moscow even bought oil from 
25 Iran at hard currency or barter repayment." This showed 
the extent to which Moscow could go to maintain its 
political ties with India. 
India and the USSR entered into a new five year 
agreement for cooperation in science and technology in 1985. 
It covered fields like computer application, surface science 
and applied mechanics as well as as new areas like biotech-
nology and electronic materials. Two major agreements on 
economic cooperation were signed during Rajiv Gandhi's 
22. Foreign Affairs Record, XXXI(3) March 1985, pp. 80-81 
23. Peter J.S.Duncan. The Soviet Union and India, London: 
Routledge, 1989. p. 74. 
24. Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations:Issues and 
Influence, New York Praegar. 1982. pp. 138-9. 
25. Peter J.S. Duncan, n- 3, p. 76. 
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official visit to the USSR in May 1985. One agreement 
relating "to Soviet credit to the extent of one billion 
roubles (about Rs.lOOO crores) to cover specific Indian 
projects in oil, coal, power, machine building and ferrous 
sectors and the other on original type of long range 
framework for fixing the directions of bilateral cooperation 
in economic, trade science and technology areas," were 
signed by India and the USSR in Moscow on May 22. The terms 
of the credit were very favourable to India. The process of 
repayment was spread over a period of 20 years, with a three 
year grace period. The interest rate was fixed at 2.5 per 
cent per annum. "These are known in international lending 
27 parlance as semi-grant, if not near grant terms." Gandhi 
and Gorbachev also signed two agreements outlining the basic 
guidelines for scientific and economic cooperation between 
their countries until the year 2000. On November 27, 1986, 
they signed another important economic and technolgical 
agreement about some specific projects about which the USSR 
28 pledged substantial aid." Bilateral trade was targetted to 
quadruple by 1992 to Rs.l30 billion. This would have 
required an average exponential growth rate of a staggering 
26. Asian Recorder. XXXI(25) June 18-24, 1985 pp.18370-71 
27. Ibid. 
28. The Times of India, November 28, 1986. 
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25 per cent per year, compared to the annual growth rate of 
16.8 per cent recorded for the 1970-85 period."^^ 
However, every thing was not rosy about this 
apparently thriving economic relationship. The Indo-USSR 
trade provides a good example of this. The volume of trade 
had increased about 8.5 times in the last fifteen years, but 
this had happened not because of any increase in volume nor 
through expansion in the range of goods in this bilateral 
trade. But "primarily through the increased prices of oil 
and oil products on the world market and steady growth of 
30 their share in the Soviet exports to India." It is 
because of this fact that the "fall in oil prices as well as 
prices of most of the Soviet raw materials and some of the 
Indian exports led to a sharp decline in bilateral trade 
during 1986."-^^ 
However, Mr. Rajive Ganhdi and Mr. Gorbachev agreed 
to increase bilateral trade 2.5 times in the next five to 
seven years. The Soviet Union offered to give India a credit 
29. Pronab Sen, Growth and Instability of Indian Exports 
to the USSR, Economic and Political Weekly, 24 April 
1989. pp. 688-9. 




of 1500 million roubles to support others major programme in 
32 
energy and steel sector." 
In February, 1987, the Soviet and Indian governments 
signed an agreement for long-term cooperation in Agricul-
ture. It provided for the "establishment of 10 0 per cent 
export oriented units, joint ventures and technical collabo-
33 
ration in several areas." India and the USSR also signed 
a protocol for further cooperation in the field of tele-
communications. Another protcol for long term cooperation 
was signed which covered areas like "biotechnology and immu-
nology, material sciences and technology, lassers, synchro-
„34 iron radiation and water prospecting. 
In November the same year during the visit of Soviet 
P.M. Nikolai Ryzhkov to India, an agreement on Economic and 
Technical cooperation was signed. It was decided that 
Soviet organisations would undertake the construction of an 
oil refinery in Karnal with the capacity of 6 million tonnes 
of crude oil a year. Agreement was reached for the drawing 
up of detailed plans for production cooperation between 
enterprises of India and USSR. In the services sector, the 
Indian firms were already constructing two hotels at 
32. Asian Recorder. XXXII (52) Dec.24-31, 1986, p.19237 
33. Ibid.XXXIII (9) May 7-13, 1987, p.19446. 
34. Ibid. XXCIII (23) June 4-10, 1987, p. 19489. 
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Samarkand and Bukhara and it was planned to start similar 
ventures in thirty Soviet cities. 
Under the protocol of 1988, there was a proposal to make the 
bilateral trade more broad based and versatile. Imports 
from the USSR included new items like plastic raw materials, 
jet fuel, machinery and equipment, bases of civil aviation 
aircraft, coal for energy purposes, copper metal scrap, and 
timber legs etc. 
New items of export to the USSR were paper, methilyne 
chloride, household chemicals and picture tubes for televi-
sion etc. 
During Gorbachev's visit to New Delhi in November 
1988, a massive Soviet credit of more than Rs.5300 crores 
was announced on November 20, to boost India's private 
sector. The USSR agreed to extend a 3 billion rouble conce-
ssional credit to India. An Indian official said that as a 
result of the agreement, Indian companies were likely to be 
permitted to enter into direct contact with constituent 
republics and enterprises in the USSR and allowed to open 
35 
offices there. Mr. Gandhi and Mr.Gorbachev signed agree-
ments for "cooperation in the areas of outer space and 
avoidance of double, taxation." The Soviet Union guaran-
teed supply of enriched uranium for the entire operational 
35. Victor Korneyev/ 'A New Stage of Soviet-Indian Econo-
mic Relations', Foreign Trade, USSR, No.2, 1989, p.23 
36. Asian Recorder, XXXIV (5) December 16-22, 1988, 
P.2U344. 
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life of the feactor built by it in Tamil Nadu. A specific 
credit agreement was finalised for the setting up of the 
Vindyachal Thermal Power station stage 11. A highlight of 
their cooperation was the "transfer of technology for 
37 generators with super critical parametres of steam." 
The growing pattern of Indo-USSR economic cooperation 
faced no obstacles in the year 1989 also. In June an agree-
ment was signed for wider cooperation in the aviation 
sector. Both countries agreed to participate in joint 
ventures concerning several areas of this sector. 
In August 1989, it was agreed to resolve the problems 
in the setting up of joint ventures through the system of a 
newly formed working Group. This particularly included the 
issue of repatriation of rouble profits of the joint 
ventures in the Soviet Union. 
Agreement was also reached for the expansion of 
infra- structural facilities for railways, shipping and air-
transport, including containerisation which would help in 
the further expansion of bilateral trade. 
The agreement on double taxation signed between the 
two countries in November 1988, came into force on June 5. 
It was decided that in India double taxation would be 
37. Ibid., p.20345. 
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avoided by the "ordinary credit method under which" India 
will allow its residents credit for the taxes. In the 
Soviet Union double taxation would be eliminated in accor-
38 dance with the laws of the Soviet Union." 
During all these years the share of Soviet machinery 
and manufacturers in India's imports had been dropping 
steadily, reflecting the higher degree of self-sufficiency 
39 
achieved by India in these products." Engineering goods 
for example, constitute only one percent of total Soviet 
40 
exports to India." In the 1980s, the proportion of 
individual products in total Indian imports from the USSR 
averaged as follows: diesel fuel, 40 percent; crude oil, 20 
percent; ammonia, 2 0 percent; machines and equipment, 10 
percent . On the other hand the commodity composition of 
Indian exports to the USSR has been transformed, with the 
primary goods content declining and machinery and manufac-
tures increasing, about 60 percent of Indian exports to the 
USSR by the close of the eighties were finished industrial 
goods. The Soviet market took 90 % of Indian's woolen knitwear; 065 
38. Asian Recorder XXXV (45) November 5-11, 1980, p.2084. 
39. Dilip Mukherjee, 'Indo-Soviet Economic Ties', 
Problems of Communism, No.36; Jan.-Feb., 1987, p.17. 
40. R.G. Gidadhubli, 'Economic Diplomacy of the Billion 
Rouble credit. Economic and Political Weekly. May 20, 
1985. p. 910. 
41. Vitor Korneyev, n.34, p.21. 
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per cent of jute; 60 per cent of finished leather; 50 per 
cent of shoe uppers; 50 per cent of cotton textiles; 40 per 
42 
cent of tobaco and about 30 per cent of coffee." 
Around this time there was constant speculation that the 
Soviet Union's growing ties with the West would weaken its 
ties with countries like India. It was understood that, 
"Indo-Soviet relations had cooled as a result of new 
directions in Soviet foreign policy, economic restructuring 
within the Soviet Union and the availability to India of 
43 
superior technology from Japan and the U.S.A." However, 
during P.M., V.P. Singh's visit to the USSR in July 1990, 
the Soviet P.M. Mr. Ryzhkov described such speculation as a 
44 
"wrong interpretation of current trends." 
In October 1990, the two countries took concrete 
steps for the early finalisation of an agreement on 
"repatriation of rouble profit of Indo-soviet joint ventures 
45 in the Soviet Union through the rupee-clearing mechanism." 
However, the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the 
42. Santosh Mehrotra. "The Political Economy of 
Indo-Soviet Relations in Cassen(ed) Soviet Interests 
in the Third World, p. 228.9. 
43. Keesings contemporary Archives. 26 (3) 1990. p. 37352 
44. The Times of India, 24 July 1990. 
45. Asian Recorder, XXXVI (36) September 3-9, 1990. 
p. 21325. 
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two countries acknowledged that "major structural changes in 
the economy and foreign trade of both the Soviet Union and 
India would require adjustments in Indo-Soviet economic 
-. ^ - ..46 relations." 
Cooperation with Private Sector and Joint Ventures : 
In the wake of difficulties in the promotion of its 
industrial products in the Indian market the USSR radically 
changed its earlier time-tested policy of encouraging the 
public sector in India. It started to lure the Indian 
private sector with attractive offers of credits, technology 
and an expanding market, in the early 1980s. 
In December 1983, Mr. Ivan Arkhipov, the First Deputy 
P.M. of the USSR, addressed the leading Indian businessmen 
and landed the role of the Indian private sector in the 
country's drive towards self reliance and in the cause of 
47 Indo-Soviet trade. He argued the government of India to 
involve the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry in 
matters of Indo-USSR trade. 
During his visit to India in November 1984, E.P. 
Pitronon, the President of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce 
asked the Indian private sector to step up imports from the 
48 USSR substantially, to promote Indo-Soviet trade. 
46. Ibid., pp. 21325-26. 
47. Financial Express, 11 April 1986 
48. The Telegraph, 16 November 1984. 
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As part of efforts from the Indian side, an FICCI 
delegation led by K.G. Khosla visited the USSR in May 1984, 
to identify machine tools which Indian industry in the 
private sector could profitably import from the USSR. It 
came to the conclusion that it could import machine tools of 
larger sizes and of more sophisticated nature from the 
49 Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union assured the Indian private sector 
that it would encourage long-term barter arrangement between 
its own enterprises and Indian private firms. These enter-
prises and firms would be further encouraged to enter into 
production cooperation agreements to facilitate the inflow 
of Soviet machinery and equipment to India. It was agreed 
that goods for export to the USSR would be jointly manufac-
tured in India. 
The Soviet Union decided to invite private Indian 
firms for servicing and modernising of equipment at the 
projects of Soviet-India cooperation. It expressed the 
readiness to enter into exclusive contracts for turnkey jobs 
to facilitate the implementation of intergovernment agree-
ments . 
At present several joint ventures are in the 
developmental stage. The possibility of joint ventures in 
49. K.G. Khosla, Paper on Indo-Soviet Economic Coopera-
tion in Seminar on 2-3 January 1986. In V.D.Chopra 
(ed.) Studies in Indo-Soviet Relations, Patriot, New 
Delhi, 1986, p.273. 
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such fields as soyabean processing, mango and guava canning, 
joint tea production and soft drinks etc. is being explored. 
The USSR has invited private Indian firms for the 
construction of projects such as hotels in the USSR. Tata 
Engineering and Larsen and Toubro have undertaken the cons-
truction of hotels at Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara. 
Indian firms are expected to undertake more than thirty such 
projects. 
As a positive step in this direction in 1987, the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the USSR 
Council of Ministers, decided to exempt foreign firms 
involved in joint ventures, from taxation for 2 years 
following the time that they began to receive a reported 
profit. The supply of materials to them and the sale of 
their products was made easier by the creation of favourable 
conditions. 
Economic cooperation between the two countries was 
strengthened by "53 joint venture proposals and 65 produc-
tion cooperation proposals covering leater, jute, petro-
chemicals, newsprint, synthetic rubber and processed food. 
Several more similar ventures are in the developmental stage. 
Finally, to make systematic contact with Indian pri-
vate firms and to familiarise them with the potentials of 
50. Asian Recorder, XXXV(32) August 6-12, 1989, p.20703. 
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Soviet industry, the Association for Business Cooperation 
with India has been established at the USSR Chamber of 
Commerce and industry. It is hoped that in the following 
years the lack of information at the corporate level will be 
bridged considerably through the joint ventures which will 
support expanding trade and economic relations between India 
and the Soviet Union. 
Future Trends : 
For India the Former Soviet Union (FSU) has been a 
big source of raw materials, capital and technology. It has 
provided a large and ever-expanding market for Indian 
exports. It accounts for 1/5 of India's total exports. But 
now in the of new developments India's exports would 
face greater competition in the Soviet market. The Soviet 
experts are considering "increased import of industrial 
consumer goods from newly industrialising countries because 
52 they are quality products, at a relatively lower price." 
The changing Soviet economic structure needs to be under-
stood by Indian trade and industry. "India can no longer 
take the Soviet market for granted but has to work toward 
53 the export of quality and value added products." 
51. For details see Indo-USSR Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Newsletter. Quoted in Sumitra Chisti, n. 1, 
p.153. 
52. Sumitra Chisti, n.1, p.152. 
53. Financial Express. 11 April 1986, p.153. 
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However, there is gret need of increasing Indian 
exports to repay a large amount of Soviet aid, a substan-
tial military assistance also has to be repaid. So there is 
great need to increase export to finance such repayments to 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). India has to 
make a repayment of an estimated Rs.2500 crores annually. 
The accumulated Soviet credit being a whopping Rs.35,000 
crores. Nevertheless, with increasing collaboration of 
Indian firms with foreign companies India has become a good 
source of quality products based on latest technology. 
For the CIS, India was its largest supplier in the 
Third World. Imports from India have saved a large amount 
of hard currency for them. The industrial products and 
technology of the FSU have found a convenient market in 
India. Indian market absorbs a large amount of Soviet 
equipment for coal, power metallurgic and oil industries 
which do not have a market in developed countries. However, 
in view of the latest developments in the FSU, a lot of 
uncertainty has gripped Indo-USSR economic relations. 
Commerce ministry officials feared that the rupee 
trade arrangement may end as early as December 1991, before 
the due date of December 1995. The FSU would like to 
dismantle the rupee trade system as it has been done with 
other east European nations, like Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
This would mean that India would have to pay in dollars for 
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its imports from the CIS and would in return get dollars for 
its exports there. 
Now it has to be seen that if the rupee trade system 
is scrapped, do both the countries continue to purchase the 
same goods by making payments in dollars. The termination 
of rupee trade would mean that India will have to spend a 
lot of hard currency for importing 4.5 million tonnes of 
petroleum and petroleum products from Moscow. If the govern-
ments tries to get this item from some other country it 
would lose the trade surplus, which for quite some time has 
been in its favour. 
A major problem with the Indian exporters is that 
they do not have complete information about the developments 
in that place. The details of the agreement between Russiii 
and other republics are not yet available. Exporters do not 
know whether they will have to deal with one central autho-
rity or different republics individually. 
Commerce ministry officials are of the opinion that 
trade in almost all items which India exported to the USSR 
would decline. There is expected to be a 20 to 25 percent 
fall in the demand of all export items. The Ministry is 
also thinking in terms of pruning imports from the CIS, 
because Moscow's non-payment of its trade obligations have 
led to the accumulation of technical credit worth Rs.400 
crores. 
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The textile industry is looking for other markets 
as exports to the FSU have been affected by more than Rs.400 
crores. As regards Indian jute goods Moscow appears to be 
reluctant to buy its full quota as per the 1991 trade plan 
provision. Finished and semi-finished Indian leather 
exports have dropped from Rs.l06 crore and Rs. 1.4 crore to 
Rs. 55.2 crore and Rs.0.5 crore respectively between 1980-
90 and 1990-91. Tea exports are expected to fall by 10 to 15 
percent. The political crisis in the CIS would also affect 
India's exports of rice and tobacco. 
Hence, in the words of Membhai Shah, Indo-USSR 
Chamber of Commerce Chief, "it is one of the most preca-
rious situation .... we are virtually in a soup." 
CHAPTER - V 
INDO-U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
By the late 1970s India's basic industries were 
shifting from Soviet to Western technology on a substantial 
scale. In the steel industry, Soviet technology, hitherto 
all pervasive was losing ground to US system of cold 
rolling. In the oil industry, 45 catalytic crackers were 
being added to Soviet refineries and oil rigs which were 
originally to be made with Soviet designs,which were so poor 
that US ones had taken over. 
By the start of the 1980s US was the largest source 
of bilateral assistance to India, and India was the second 
2 
largest recipient of U.S. official development assistance. 
However, there have been some irritants in the path of 
closer Indo-US economic cooperation. 
Divergences in Economic Policy; 
The US is a major trading partner of India and a 
major private foreign capital investor, India's national 
1. Financial Times, 15 November, 1979. 
2. For details see Govt, of India. Ministry of Commerce 
Report 1980-81. New Delhi, 1982. p. xv. 
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interest has always been to maintain, good economic 
relations with it. However, trade with India has been a 
small fraction of America's total foreign trade turnover. 
Similarly, the private U.S. capital invested in India is 
very small in terms of total direct capital investment 
outside the U.S. Hence, India's economic stability has 
rarely been of much importance as regards U.S. national 
interest. It is because of this that the U.S. has been less 
accommodative to India's economic interest as compared to 
those countries VN^ ere America' s financial stakes were higher. 
In the early 1980s there was much disagreement on 
strategies of economic development. The U.S. insisted that 
India should open its market to unrestricted activity by 
private foreign capital, this was stoutly resisted by the 
Indians. However, by the later part of 80s most of the 
American demands were accommodated. 
In international mutilatteral forums, India and the 
U.S. have generally found themselves ranged against each 
other, with India standing with the South and U.S. with the 
North. This has led to differences on matters of trade, 
technology, dissemination of information, patents, 
intellectual property rights and many other issues, which 
have created impediments in the path of establishing 
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mutually beneficial and genuinely collaborative ventures. 
Since these multilateral institutions are basically under 
U.S. influence and are affected by U.S. policies, it has 
further complicated India's bilateral economic relations 
with the U.S. 
The United States views economic assistance as a tool 
of diplomacy. All recepients of U.S. aid, including India, 
are subject to shifts in U.S. policy in accordance with its 
global interests. This is something which has struck most 
Indians as undue interference in the internal affairs of 
India. All such efforts on the part of the U.S. have been 
severely condemned by the Indian leadership as well as a 
the press, creating a bad image of the U.S. among the Indian 
people. 
Trade and Economic Relations; 
In the late 1970s, there were many points of view in 
the Carter administration as regards India. A major section 
of the State Department bureaucracy considered India's 
requirements to be inestable, which could not be satisfied 
by the U.S. Another school led by people like Clement 
Zablocki, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
was of the opinion that a major U.S. involvement in India's 
developmental programme was beneficial for the former. 
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As ;a result of this, "the two-way trade during 1979 
reached approximately $2 billion, virtually equal to U.S. -
PRC trade. The official U.S. assistance to India rose from 
460 million in 1970 to 100 million in 1980. But as the U.S. 
economy moved towards a recession and the Carter 
administration became more concerned with national security. 
This matter was sidelned giving the U.S. an image of being 
'unreliable' in India. 
The American business community also was not much 
interested in icvvesting in India "finding national policies 
essentially hostile, bureaucratic restrictions excessive and 
4 
political trends difficult to predict. Nevertheless, 
Mrs. Gandhi speaking at a luncheon hosted by the Foreign 
Policy Association and the Asia Society observed - "A recent 
survey by the Indo-American chamber of commerce of 30 major 
companies having US collaboration shows that between 1975-80 
their combined sales grew at an annual rate of 16 per cent, 
their profits at 27.8 per cent and dividends at 19 per cent. 
Foreign investment in India can earn its normal rate of 
return and be assured of security. 
Robert A. Scalaprino. Asia at the end of the 1970s, 
Foreign Affairs. 58 (3). 1980. p. 730. 
Ibid. 
Foreign Affairs Records, July 1982, p. 198. 
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A meeting of the Indo-U.S. Joint Business Council 
was held in New Delhi in February 1980. Mr. Orville Freeman, 
leader of the US Section expressed, "cautious optimism about 
an improvement in U.S. capital investment in, and technology 
transfer to India. Both delegations agreed that easier 
flow'of technology would be greatly helpful in improving the 
Indian investment climate. 
But as regards development assistance, India 
complained to the U.S. in May 1980 that it was "not meeting 
the Overseas Development Assistance target of 0.75 per cent 
of GNP. The U.S. side pointed to the budgetary and 
7 
recessionary constraints to the increasing of aid." However 
despite the fact that the aid was not much, India was a 
"victim of the large country problem. In arriving at their 
aid allocations all donars, including the United States, 
have tended to count flags rather than noses." In March 
1981, the U.S. proposed $85 in development assistance for 
1982, this was much lower as compared to $135 million which 
India got in 1981 in 1981 as development assitance. 
6. The Times of India. 16 February 1980. 
7. Asian Recorder, XXXVI (9) May 6-12, 1980. p.15440-41, 
8. John, P. Lewis, Reviving American Aid to India: 
Motivation, Scale, USES, Constraints, in John W. 
Milter (ed.) India; A Rising Middle Power. New Delhi 
1981. p. 304. 
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Defending this reduction, the U.S. State Department 
officials contended that the lower figure proposed for India 
"did not signify dminished US interest in India's economic 
development or a lessening of US resolve to maintain 
constructive bilateral ties. We hope the Indians understand 
9 this." Nevertheless, apart from this development 
assistance the U.S. administration proposed for fiscal 1982, 
$148 million in Title 11 of PL-480 and $20 million in 
housing and investment guarantee. "At the end of 1981, the 
total value of U.S. direct investment in India amounted to 
$425 million, and the United States had replaced Great 
Britain as its main foreign investor." 
An irritant in Indo-US economic relations was created 
by the US in November 1981, when it abstained from the IMF 
decision which approved a record loan of 5 billion in 
Special Drawing Rights, for India. The US argument was that 
it was not convinced that India's balance of payments 
problem required drawing on IMF resources to the extent 
envisaged. Such a US action amounted to directing the 
pattern of India's economic policy, and was disapproved by 
the Indian leadership. 
9. Asian Record, XXVII (21) May 21-27, 1981. p. 16046. 
10. Catherine Gwin and Lawrence A. Veit. The Indian 
Miracle. Foreign Policy. No. 58 Spring 1985. p. 83. 
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This disageement was not allowed to grow further and 
shortly afterwards, the economic and commercial subcommi-
ssion of the Indo-US joint sub-commission held its sixth 
session in February 1982 in New Delhi. It discussed a wide 
range of multilateral and bilateral economic, trade and 
investment issues. It noted with satisfaction that US-India 
trade continued to grow in 1981 reaching a record level of 3 
billion. 
Between 1980-82, the largest number of joint ventures 
approved by the Indian government were with American 
concerns, mainly in the chemical and petroleum fields. In 
1982. American exports to the US increased from about $104 
billion in 1982 to $2.2 billion in 1983."'•''• 
In the same momentum, the Indo-US business council 
meeting was held in San Francisco in May 1983. It decided to 
promote free trade and closer economic relations between the 
two countries. The council recommended that the "Government 
of India should pursue its policies and procedures towards 
liberalization to create opportunities for increased invest-
12 
ment by foreign investors. On July 1, India and the US 
11. Ibid, p. 97. 
12. Asian Recorder. XXIX (27) July. 
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signed an agreement for $6.5 million for an agricultural 
research project. This agreement represented the first 
tranche of the total assistance of $20 million which the 
13 U.S. agency for International Development would provide. 
There were great increase as well as diversification 
in bilateral trade during this time. U.S. accounted for 11 
per cent of India's total exports and 12 per cent of total 
imports. Indian imports from the U.S. which hitherto 
consisted of primary and traditional commodities now 
14 included non-traditional and manufactural items. 
Despite this thriving trade relationship, a major 
dispute between India and the U.S. arose at the 
International Development Association (IDA), over the issue 
of India's share in IDA loans, available at highly 
concessional terms. In the Seventh IDA replenishment period 
which was to start in mid 1985, India was suppos ed to share 
with China a total of about 4 0 per cent of all IDA funding, 
despite the fact that India had alone taken upto 40 per cent 
13. The Times of India. 2 July 1983. 
14. Major items of Inda's export were textiles, jute, 
goods, coir products, diamonds, precious and semi 
precious stones, engineering goods, handicrafts, 
leather and leather goods, chemicals and marine 
products. Major items of India's imports from the US 
were vegetable oils and fats, fertilizers, chemicals, 
machinery, aircraft and space-craft equipment, 
professional and scientific equipment and other 
engineering manufacturees like industrial machinery. 
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of IDA funds on an annual basis since 1968, The problem was 
complicated because of U.S. refusal to contribute more than 
$750 million per year to the IDA-7 relenishment making it 25 
per cent less in size than IDA-6. Hence, support for India 
was significantly reduced. Reacting to this Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi said in an interview with Associated Press that "the 
reduction by the US seems to be done in a way that hurts 
India." Hence, the Indian leadership considered the U.S. 
action a deliberate attempt to hurt India. 
The main U.S. argument was that India was now capable 
of borrowing more from private capital markets and from the 
world Bank's "hard loan window", hence, it should get a 
smaller IDA. However, it was argued that a "premature shift 
from public concessionaJ to private non-concessiona] 
borrowing could force India either to incur a dangerously 
high debt service burden, or more likely given India's 
fiscal conservatism, to put the brakes on the country's 
development. Neither option is in the interest of India or 
the West."""^  
Relations between the two countries were normalised 
to some extent when the US extended development assistance 
of $192 million to India during American fiscal year 
starting from October, 1984. Announcing this the Director of 
15. Catherine Gwin arid Lawrence. A. Veit, n. 10, p. 95. 
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the USAID, Owen Cylke said that he did not think that the 
"aid was in any way influenced by political stances, as 
there was no significant change in the level of assistance 
during the last several years. He reiterated that transfer 
of technology would be the important consideration in 
bilateral aid now." Emphasizing the nature of forthcoming 
US assistance. Ambassador Armacost speaking before the World 
Affairs Council in Philadelphia on December 12, 1984 said -
"our new assistance activities will be in areas of more 
sophisticated research and higher technical training than in 
4.17 
the past 
India and the U.S. concluded a Memorandum of 
understanding in November 1984 on transfer of technology 
"which may help further broaden cooperation and strengthen 
the hand of American businessmen in matching or beating 
1 Q 
European and Japanese competition for the Indian market." 
A major deal was concluded in Washington for the transfer of 
high technology on March 8, 1985. Senior diplomats saw in 
this deal the removal of a major irritant from Indo-US 
relations. As in the past the US had expressed reservations 
about exporting high technology to India. This reversal of 
policy was seen as the "Reagan Administrations desire to 
16. The Times of India, 6 July 1984. 
17. Department of„State Bulletin. February 1985. p. 27. 
18. Paul. H. Kreisberg. India after Indira, foreign 
Affairs. September 1985. p. 889. 
x^t 
initiate a period of good relations with the Gandhi 
government. 
Indo-US economic relations were given a boost by the 
unusually successful visit of Rajiv Gandhi to the U.S. in 
1985. Michel H. Armacost, under secretary of Political 
affairs, observed - "joint ventures have proliferated, and 
high technology transfers have been promoted by streamlined 
export control procedures." 
In 1982, only about 20 per cent of Indo-U.S. joint 
ventures had U.S. equity participation. But with the 
announcement of the new economic policy of the government, 
there was a sudden change. By 1985, one third of the U.S. 
firms collaborating with Indian companies had invested as 
equity partners, indicating the American businessman's long 
standing commitment to India's business and industrial 
21 
sector. Out of the 1024 foreign collaborations sanctioned 
by the government of India in 1985, the U.S. topped the list 
with 1978 collaborations, followed by FRG with 180, of the 
52 cases of collaboration with non-resident Indians, 24 were 
with NRIs in USA, followed by 5 in FRG. 
19. Asian Recorder. XXXI (17) April 23-29, 1985. p.18281. 
20. Department of State Bulletin. July 1987. p. 79. 
21. A Common Faith;40 years of Indo-US Cooperation; 
1947-87 USIS. New Delhi, p. 35. 
22. M.K.Saini, India;Undulating Policy Postures. World 
Focus. 7 (3) March 1986. p. 17. 
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At that time the U.S. was India's largest trading 
partner. It accounted for 18.6 per cent of India's exports 
and 10.4 per cent of imports in 1985-86. Between 1981-85 
India's exports to the U.S. increased at an annual rate of 
17.5 per cent, and imports registered a negative growth of 
1.7 per cent. But when compared to the total U.S. trade turn 
over, India's share in U.S. imports was quite small. "Of the 
U.S. imports amounting to $361.6 billion in 1985, India's 
share stood a meagre $2.3 billion, i.e. 0.64 per cent. On 
the other hand India accounted for 0.7 per cent of U.S. 
exports of $213.1 billion."^-^ 
The sixth session of the Indo-US Joint Commission on 
Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational 
and Cultural Cooperation held in Washington on February 6, 
1986 "recommended continued negotiation on a convention for 
24 the avoidance of double taxation." 
They further hoped that "promotional measures by both 
governments and increased business efforts would expand 
25 bilateral trade and investment." More optimism was 
23. S.P. Thakur, Dilemma of India's External Trade 
Relations. Southern Economist. 29 (1) September 1, 
1987, p. 23. 
24. Department of State Bulletin. April 1986. p. 82. 
25. Ibid. 
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expressed by Secretary of State George Shultz in his address 
before the Senate Budget Committee on February 9, 1986, he 
observed "Under Rajiv Gandhi's leadership India is moving 
into an era of advanced technological and rapid economic 
growth spurred on by liberal economic policies. It is not 
only increasingly attractive market for American exports but 
is becoming a major factor in areas as computer and software 
and light industrial goods." 
In such a positive atmosphere 40 US firms attended 
the 10th Annual meeting of Indo-US Business Council in New 
Delhi, in March 1986. This was the largest delegation till 
that time. During the same time Governors of two US states 
Oklahoma and Ohio led their respective trade missions to 
India. Oklahoma now has a permanent trade representative in 
New Delhi to encourage joint business ventures between 
27 Indian firms and Oklahoma businesses. 
The latest trend in trade between the two countries 
saw a considerable increase in non-oil exports from India, 
mainly in diamonds, pepper, cashew nuts, coffee, petroleum 
products and ready made garments. "Imports from USA declined 
26. Ibid., p. 50. 
27. A Common Faith: 40 years of Indo-US Cooperation. n.21 
p. 35. 
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from Rs.20636.8 million in 1985-86 to Rs.19610.8 million in 
28 1986-87." The main product which led to this fall was 
fertilizers. 
In September 1986, the US approved 47 million grant 
to help India develop its computer industry. The grant was 
given through the US Agency for International Development 
29 (USAID) to help India buy computers and technology from 
Control Data Corporation of Arden Hills, Minnesota. 
In January 1987, India and the US agreed to establish 
the U.S. India Fund (USIF) which would ensure 10 year 
funding for some major agricultural research and technology. 
Later in the same year Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
visited the U.S. where he had extensive talks with the U.S. 
President. After the talks he declared - "we have agreed to 
collaborate at the frontiers of technology ... I hope that 
30 the US would recognise in technological progress." 
The results of the optimism which the Indian Prime 
expressed were not far to see. On November 5, the U.S. and 
28. Source: Ministry of Commerce. Annual Report. 86/87 -
87/88. 
29. The USAID is the main vehicle for Indo-US economic 
assistance. It gives funds, commodities and technical 
assistance to a wide range of Indian government 
schemes. Its basic objective has been to relate the 
programme to India's development priorities. 
30. Asian Recorder. XXXIII (47) November 19-25, 1987. 
p. 19746. 
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India signed in New Delhi an agreement on cooperation in 
high technology. A pair of "generic agreements" were signed 
between Indian and U.S. governments in New Delhi for the 
31 purchase of a super computer from America. In December, 
three agreements were signed by the Government and the ONGC 
together with Chevron - taxaco of USA for exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum in three off shore blocks. 
A major irri tant suddenly arose in the path of 
closer Indo-US relations on December 3, 1987 on that day the 
US Senate Appropriations Committee voted not only to clear 
the way for new US military aid to Pakistan, but added a new 
clause to inhibit India 's access to American high technology 
and all World Bank loans funded by the U.S. The committee 
endorsed the Reagan administration request for waiving 
American laws against nuclear proliferation for six years, 
to facilitate the $4.02 billion military and economic aid 
programme for Pakistan. It also asked the US government to 
vote negatively on all World Bank, IMF and ADB loans for any 
South Asian country whose nuclear activities with a military 
potential were not safeguarded by international inspection. 
India was most affected by this decision, being heavily 
dependent upon international funding. Whereas, Pakistan was 
primarily dependent upon U.S. bilateral assistance. Finally, 
the Senate Appropriations committee ruled for a cut-off of 
31. Asian Recorder. XXXIII (48) Nov. 26, Dec. 2, 1987. 
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U.S. high technology on the same apparently balanced 
criteria. This action also appeared to be directed against 
India because of its latest craze for US high technology. 
Most importantly, the decision sought to isolate 
Pakistan from the combined group of US aid receivers like 
Egypt and Israel. It decided to create a special South Asian 
region in the Foreign Aid Bill. It was believed in some 
influential quarters in Washington that if high technology 
transfers to India were linked to the nuclear issue, it 
would not be able to complain about US aid to Pakistan. 
The Indian government strongly disapproved of such US 
efforts to equate India and Pakistan on the nuclear issue. 
Finally, the U.S. Senate reversed the controversial 
amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act that would have made 
an Indo-Pak agreement on nuclear non-proliferation the basic 
pre-condition for continuation of US aid to India. The 
change in U.S. posture paved the way for high technology 
transfers and defence sales to India. 
Meanwhile, President Reagan expressed his conviction 
that Indo-US relations would move toward the direction he 
and the Indian P.M. Gandhi had chosen during the latter's 
U.S. visit in October 1987. J.G. Dean, US Ambassador to 
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India expressed the desire of the United States "to work 
32 
with India in as many fields as possible." 
In 1988, the US won the maximum number of foreign 
collaboration proposals with 191, followed by FRG with 178. 
American firms invested $65 million in 1988 more than twice 
the 1987 total. In 1988, the Indo-US two way trade increased 
by 3,4 per cent reaching a level of $5.7 billion;. The US 
licenced $850 million worth of high technology exports to 
India. The most talked about being the Cray XMP-14 super 
computer for the Monsoon Research Institute. 
An agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and 
for prevention of tax evasion was signed between the two 
countries on September 12, 1989. The agreement was reached 
after nearly 30 years of negotiations and it was hoped that 
it would stimulate not only the growth of bilateral 
economic relations between the two countries, but also 
promote investments and exports and encourage the transfer 
of new technology. 
On February 27, 1989, Howard Schaffer U.S. Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South 
32. The Times of India. December 16, 1987. 
33. Source: The Financial Express. Investment Week. July 
9-15, 1990. 
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Asia requested $1024 million in foreign assistance for South 
Asia, for fiscal 1990. He requested $110.4 million for 
India. This included $ 25 million of development assistance, 
$ 85 million of PL-480 Title 11, and $ 400.000 of IMET. 
Hence, towards the close of the 1980s, Indo-US 
economic cooperation appeared to have a promising future. 
The economic reforms initiated in India appeared to break 
the old scepticism, which the Americans had about this 
country. These reforms have created a nascent interest among 
investors in the USA in India's 200 million - strong middle 
34 
class potential consumers of their products." Several 
major US companies are all set to make big investments in 
India. 
Trade Dispute; 
In keeping with its policies of strict protectionist 
measures, the U.S. imposed countervailing duties on export 
items from India like resin and foot wear in July 1979. 
Later in Jannuary 1980, the multilateral trade negotiations 
code on subsidies and countervailing duties was signed by 
the USA and India in July. The code stipulated that if any 
of the signatory countries imposed counter-vailing duties on 
its imports from another signatory country, on the ground 
34. The Sunday Observer. August 11-17, 1991. New Delhi. 
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that it was causing injury to the domestic market of the 
importing country, the country that imposed the duty will 
have to prove its charges in accordance with a set 
procedure. 
Hence, when in 1980, the US imposed countervailing 
duties on Indian exports in foot wears and industrial 
fasteners, India lodged a complaint to the GATT, At that 
time India exported footwears valued at $ 10 million and 
industrial fasteners valued at $15 million to USA every 
year. The U.S. in its unilateral decision imposed a 
countervailing duty of 18 per cent on industrial fasteners 
and 4.2 per cent on footwears on the ground that Indian 
exports were subsidised and were causing injury to the 
domestic market in America. 
After a 13 month long inconclusive discussion in GATT 
over the Indian complaint, India and the US reached an 
agreement on a procedure as regards a trade code on 
subsidies. India agreed to withdraw its complaint against 
the US in GATT. The US agreed to establish both the charges 
of subsidy and injury, and if it failed to establish either 
of them it would have to lift the countervailing duty with 
retrospective effect. 
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This issue was settled for the time being, but it 
again cropped up in Indo-US trade talks in 1986. The Indian 
side took up the issue of "damage being caused to India's 
trade interests in engineering products by repeated use of 
counter-vailing duty and anti-dumping investigations which 
constitute a major non-tariff barrier to Indias exports to 
35 USA." The government of India also felt that most 
actions taken were "not in confirmity with GATT code on 
subsidies." However, the US appeared to be ready to "go 
ahead with talks outside the GATT with nations that ' share 
37 Its objectives'. 
But in his statement before the sub-committee on 
Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee on February 20, 
1986, the U.S. trade representative Ambassador Yentler, 
observed - "GATT Procedures for addressing disputes and 
principles such as that of non-discrimination are relevant 
and important to disciplining the growth of trade distorting 
38 investment policies." On intellectual property rights, he 
35. Foreign Affairs Record. XXXII (11) Nov. 1986. p. 390. 
3 6 . I b i d . 
37. Ra iya Sabha O f f i c i a l R e p o r t . CXXXVI (18) December 12 , 
1 9 8 5 . c o l . 1 4 5 . 
38 . Department of State Bul le t in , 86 ( 2 1 1 0 ) . May 1986. p . 67 . 
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hopped that "GATT can make an important contribution by 
developing the most effective and enforeceable mechanism for 
39 disciplining government policies." 
The U.S. trade policy was explicitly explained by 
Ambassador Yentler, on September 17, 1987, in his address 
before the Graduate School of Business at the University of 
Pittsberg. It sought to (1) change the fundamental economic 
policies that have hindered US exports and excessively 
encouraged imports, (2) to attack aggressively the unfair 
trade practices of other nations and (3) to seek trad 
liberalisation agreements that will open markets abroad for 
40 U.S. exports. 
e 
In keeping with this policy, George Bush, on May 25, 
1989, singled out India, Brazil and Japan to accuse them of 
"unfair trade practices" against U.S. interests. They were 
placed on a "priority watch list." 
The implication of bracketing these countries under 
the so-called Super-301 provision of the US Trade and 
Competitiveness Act passed by the Congress was that if these 
countries did not remove identified trade barriers during 
39. Ibid. 
40. Department of State Bulletin. 87 (2129) December 1987 
p. 58. 
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talks to be completed in the next 18 months, they would face 
sanctions, such as higher tariff duties on their exports to 
USA by as much as 100% on some items. 
India was cited for restrictions on trade related 
investment, such as requirement placed on foreign investors 
to export a portion of what they produce or to sue locally 
produced inputs in their manufactures. India was also cited 
for closing its markets completely to foreign insurance 
41 
companies. 
India, on July 1, complained that the recent US 
action threatens to wreck the multilateral negotiations. Bal 
Krishan Zutshi, the Chief Indian Negotiator on the Uruguay 
Round Negotiating Group on trade related aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) said in Geneva, "we 
shall kepp a close watch on any further unilateral 
manoeuvres by US and in case we find it persisting in its 
present course, we shall have to reassess our position in 
relation to these negotiations and decide upon their 
T ,.42 
relevance." 
Since this was the first meeting of the negotiating 
group on TRIPS, it was quite important. It made it clear to 
countries having trade relations with the US that the latter 
41. Asian Recorder, XXXV (31) July 30, August 5, 1989, 
p. 20695. 
42. Asian Reordedr, XXXV (36) Sept. 3-9, 1989. p. 20750. 
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wants to change the rules of international trade by force. 
It was estimated that if the U.S. proposals to alter GATT 
rules on TRIPS succeed, it would "gain approximately $100 
million from the developing countries, double the amount 
43 these countries pay for servicing their debts." 
The US trade representative carla Hills reiterated 
the U.S. position quite precisely on July 25, 1989. She said 
"protectionism is protectionism. It makes little difference 
whether it takes the form of a high tariff or a compelled 
local working requirement. I can assure you on one thing -
44 
the United States will do what is necessary to eradicate it. 
The Indian government did not buckle under pressure, 
rather it became even more resolute in condemning the U.S. 
policy posture. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Minister of 
Commerce, Dinesh Singh, observed - "I share the serious 
concern of the members at the unilateral decision of the 
U.S. government, listing India as a priority country under 
the so called -"Super 301" .... The U.S. is seeking to 
assume jurisduction to determine whether certain aspects of 
our domestic economic policies are fair or equitable. The 
45 
step is an unwarranted encroachment on India's sovereignty. 
JT. Asian Recorder. XXXV (31) July 30, August 5, 1989. 
p. 20695. 
44. Department of State Bulletin. 89 (2152) November 
1989. p. 59. 
45, Lok Sabha Debates;Eighth Series. LII (14) Friday, 
August 4, 1989. col. 301. 
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The then Conmierce Minister Arun Nehru, speaking in 
the Rajya Sabha, gave a stronger statement - "India has no 
intention of entering into bilateral negotiations, either 
secret or open, on the super - 301 issue ... and it was 
humiliating to even think that we can have negotiations with 
46 USA." He further added that "the reason why India had been 
singled out while Japan and Brazil earlier included under 
301 but later dropped was because India had a role to play 
47 in world affairs." 
This stalemate was broken on June 14, 1990, when 
Carla Hills, despite insisting that India's insurance and 
investment policies were unreasonable and burdened or 
restricted trade, conceded that it was inappropriate at this 
time to take any action, given the ongoing negotiations on 
services and investment in the Uruguay Round of global trade 
48 talks." She, however, left the U.S. option for retaliation 
for review after the conclusion of Uruguay Round talks. A 
major irritant in Indo-U.S. trade relations was thus removed 
for the time being. 
It is understood that the reason why the U.S.changed 
its stand was the fact that a number of US companies includ-
46. The Hindu, May 11, 1990. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Asian Recorder. XXXVI (33) Aug. 13-19, 1990, p.12289. 
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ing Pepsico had pressurized the US government, to restrain 
it from taking any action against India, at a stage when 
Indo-US commercial ties were set to get a big boost. In 
addition, the Bush administration probably felt that 
retaliatory action against India at this stage when the 
multilateral trade negotiations were underway, would create 
further problems. It would also make a laige number of 
developing countries sceptical of U.S. intentions and that 
would complicate America's efforts to achieve an 
international consensus on trade. 
Whether U.S. demands are justified? 
The U.S. contends that TRIPS be brought under the 
discipline of GATT. It alleges that India has an ineffective 
and inadequate system for the protection of intellectual 
properly rights, and there is discrimination against 
foreigners and foreign goods. 
Actually, in India different types of intellectual 
properly rights are governed and protected by the copyright 
Act of 1957, the Designs Act of 1911, Patents Act 1970 and 
Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. These Acts provide 
the legal remedies which can be invoked by an aggrieved 
person in case his intellectual property rights are 
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infringed. They provide for civil remedies, but the Trade 
and Merchandise Marks Act and the copyright Act additionally 
provide for criminal remedies. These two remedies are 
distinct and independent and can be availed of together. In 
view of these provisions, the position in India meets the 
expectations.of the US to a great extent, and therefore the 
49 threat under Super-301 appears to be unjustified. 
Cooperation in Science and technology: 
Initially Indo-US cooperation in Science and 
technology concentrated on training and fundamental 
development of Indian technology. In the 1980s the focus has 
been on more challenging areas. A panel on Indo-US 
cooperation in Science and Technology after a week long 
meeting in New Delhi on January 31, 1983 identified a number 
of project areas starting from prevention of infections 
diseases to the study of decentralized power sources for 
intensive scientific collaboration between the two 
countries. 
After visiting several research institutions, the 
head of the US delegation, Bromley observed - "our 
conclusion is that the work we have seen is of world class. 
49. For details, see P.S. Sanyal, "Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Right. Justifiableness or other 
wise of Developed countriesrSuggestions/Submission in 
the context of Indian Intellectual Property Rights 
Law."Foreign Tarde Review. XXIII (2) July-September, 
1988, pp. 149-169. 
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It is, therefore, only reasonable to expect that we engage 
in collaboration as equal partner on a footing of 
complementary." 
The Indo-US Science and technology initiative 
launched by President Reagan and Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi opened new dimensions of Indo-US Scientific 
collaboration. The STI projects were to have mutually 
beneficial goals, with both countries contributing expertise 
and resources. Four basic areas were identified - health, 
solid state science, agriculture and meteorology. The 
programme was further extended for-3 years when Rajiv Gandhi 
visited the U.S. in 1985. During this visit he and President 
Reagan agreed to start Vaccine Action Programme to develop 
and produce new and improved vaccines against major 
communicable diseases. They also agreed to initiate a long 
term research and technology development programme covering 
activities in agriculture land forestry, health and 
nutrition, family welfare and biomedical research and 
industrial research and development. Reagan offered to share 
with India the U.S. experience in reducing pollution of 
large rivers systems. Since then as part of the Ganga Action 
50. Asian Recorder. XXIX (10) March 5-10, 1983, p. 17062 
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Plan, Indo-US Workshops on river pollution clean-up have 
greatly benefited scientists from both countries. 
By the mid 1980s Indo-US subcommissions were 
focussing on frontier areas like "ocean climate studies, 
studies of atmospheric chemistry, solar terrestrial physics, 
scientific data and information exchange and exploration of 
51 
satellite communication technology." At that time Indian 
and U.S. scientists were cooperating in over 35 cooperative 
projects. 
The U.S. India Fund (USIF) signed in January 1987 
helped to ensure continued fuding for Indo-US cooperative 
activities in Science and technology. It enabled scientists 
from both countries to complete their ongoing research and 
look for more prospective areas for future research. 
In the field of Agriculture, Indian and U.S. 
scientists using the latest technology are cooperating in 
complementary projects like food preservation, plant 
improvement, water resources management and reforestation. 
India and the U.S. signed in New Delhi on May 14, 
1986, four agreements under which the U.S. agreed to "give 
51. Foreign Affairs Record. XXXI (4) April 1985. p. 117. 
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$44.65 million for irrigation, social forestry, agricultural 
52 
research and technological innovation in India." 
The U.S. department of agriculture announced on 
September 9, 1988, six research grants of Rs.2.05 crores for 
53 projects to support increased food productivity m India. 
In the field of health, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Sciences has supported many Indo-US health projects. 
Indo-US scientific collaboration is making efforts towards 
eradication of diseases like malaria, blindness and prevent-
able childhood diseases. The U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion has helped in the establishment of a national 
laboratory for quality control of biological products 
including vacciness. 
In the field of Space, the first generation INSAT-lA 
was built by Ford Aerospace Corporation in California. After 
its failure to perform due to power loss its place was taken 
by INSAT-lB, which has been in operation since 1983. It is 
the first satellite of its kind, providing a national 
satellite system for domestic telecommunications, mateoro-
logy as well as broadcasting. 
52. The Times of India. 15 May 1986. 
53. Asian Recorder. XXXIV (48) November 25 - December 1, 
1988. p. 20313. 
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The U.S. approved a grant on September 29, 1986, to 
help India develop its computer industry. This helped India 
to manufacture computers, thereby "laying the foundation for 
the emergence of a new industry with substantial employment 
opportunities and wider use of computers in the public and 
54 private sector." On May 5, 1988, a contract was finally 
signed between India and the U.S. for the purchase of Cray 
XMP-14 Super computers. 
The U.S. was initially reluctant to give the Super 
computer to India, because it also carries "relevance for 
India's potential missile and warhead delivery systems and 
for early warning attack detection systems." 
By the end of 1980s, there were state of the art 
Indo-US collaborations in the broad field of natural 
sciences. Scientists were researching together, applying the 
latest developments in solid state physics to the need of 
industies from iron and steel to aerospace. 
54. Asian Recorder, XXXII (47) November 19-25, 1986, 
p. 19183. 
55. The Times of India. May 6, 1988. 
56. Raju G.C. Thomas, US Transfers of "Dual Use" Techno-
logies to India. Asian Survey. September 1990. p. 
825. 
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Prospects of Indo-US Economic Relations; 
Changes affected in India's economic policy have 
created a lot of interest about India among U.S. investors. 
The Indian Prime Minister's statement in Parliament that 
"sky is the limit" in terms of potential US investment has 
sent very positive signals to the US business community. 
For the US business, India offers a big and expanding 
market, it has a low cost, large, skilled and disciplined 
industrial labour force. India's political system is 
considered to be stable, and its economy strong, thus 
minimising long term risk. Inflation here is also 
manageable. Considering all these factors, India compares 
favourably with most developing countries. It is because of 
this that most US investors view India's market quite 
favourably. The US views India favourably, because of some 
changes in global trading blocks within the new United 
Europe and the development of new political equations in 
this region. Further the US law makers and public policy 
institutes have a bright future. The recently passeJu.S. 
Congress legislation attaching strings to China's Most 
Favoured Nation Status is a pointer in this direction. 
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In such a scenario, when the U.S wants an economic 
partner in Asia, India, because of the above mentioned 
factors presents itself as anideal choice. 
CHAPTER - VI 
INDO-SOVIET DEFENCE COOPERATION 
Introduction; 
As the start of the eighties, an important reason for 
the defence build-up in India was the threat posed to its 
security by the military modernisation of Pakistan and 
China. The acquisition of U.S. arms by Pakistan in the wake 
of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan construction of 
Chinese military bases in Tibet and the reported Chinese 
assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme were 
causes of great concern. Moreover the Indian ocean was 
witness to a bitter super power rivalry which could anytime 
take a dangerous turn. In such a scenario, for the 
qualitative upgradation of its defence forces India had to 
look towards the Soviet Union, as "Soviet arms aid ... (had) 
been forthcoming at a critical juncture when the western 
soures of supply had particularly dried up." 
The Soviet too needed India as a window in South 
Asia, a friend in the third world a counterpoise to China 
2 
and a ballast to meet the US-China-Pakistan axis." 
1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, 28 January, 1970. 
2. P.R. Chari. 'Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation, Asian 
Survey, March 1979, p. 238. 
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Economics of Arms Purchases From the USSR; 
India's continuing reliance on Soviet weaponry can be 
explained by a number of advantages to Soviet sourced 
military supplies. Soviet arms sales to India were said to 
be competitive and available on favourable terms. Arms were 
supplied through long-term credit repayable with in 17 years, 
while credits in agreements with West European countries 
were repayable in 10 years. Since the Soviet low-interest 
credit approach coupled with willingness to disseminate 
defence technology conformed perfectly with New Delhi's 
material and psychological needs, the defence relationship 
reached new heights in the 1980s to the full satisfaction of 
3 
both the partners. 
Another virtue in Soviet weaponry is its robustness 
in operation and the simplicity in maintenance. Also, the 
spare parts have been readily available. The Soviet 
equipment is rugged and durable, this has been of more 
interest to the Indian military than high-tech armaments. 
The cost of pruchasing the more sophisticated western 
systems can be relatively higher than the relative gains in 
3. Chintamani Mahapatra. 'Indo-Soviet Connection: A 
changing Paradigm of Eco-Strategic Dimension'. 
Strategic Analysis. XIII (6) September 1990. p. 602. 
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additional capability. It was these factors that led India 
in 1980 to settle for the Soviet T-72 as the main battle 
tank in preference to a western tank. Besides there were 
doubts over western particularly US willingness to permit 
India to be a strong military power. Moscow seemed to be the 
only arras supplier sympathetic to India's philosophy of a 
4 
self-sufficient military establishment. 
The Soviet Union usually moves from signing of 
contract to delivery of weapons within one year, in contrast 
to the two three year time-frame for the U.S. The USSR has 
shown itself to be willing to deliver arms in large 
quantities at short notice, which is of great importance to 
recepients when weapons are needed quickly. 
Moreover, in Westerndesigns generational changes are 
made through altogether new design concepts. However, in the 
USSR, defence technology undergoes slow and gradual advances 
Hence, substantial benefits accrue to the licenced 
4. S Nihal Singh. Why India goes to Moscow for Arms. 
Asian Survey, July 1984, p. 712. 
5. William Lewis, Emerging Choices for the Soviets in 
Third World Arms Transfer policy. World Military 
Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1985, (Washington D.C. 
U.S. Arms control and Disarmament Agency, 1985), p.30 
6. Most western suppliers tend to use supplies just when 
the weapons are most urgently needed. US arms deli-
veries to both India and Pakistan were halted during 
and after the 1965 war. Soviet arms supplies to India 
were not discontinued. 
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production agreements. Soviet military technology has a 
tendency to cumulative development so that licenced 
production facilities can be upgraded to manufacture 
systems that are still compatible with earlier generations. 
By contrast, western armaments developments take place 
independently to previous generations, so that new models 
require the construction of completely new production 
facilities. This too is an effective cost multiplier in 
7 
sourcing arms imports from the West. 
Neverthelss, there have been some irritants in the 
military supply relationship between the two countries. The 
Soviets have often shown their reluctance in the supply of 
spare parts at different stages of technology, causing groat 
concern to New Delhi. 
Inadequacy in the Soviet equipment has also been a 
cause of great concern. The performance of the US-7 bomber, 
for instance and about the price of spare parts and their 
ready availability. A Soviet aircraft costs roughly half of 
its western equivalents, but the Soviets tend to compensate 
themselves somewhat by overpricing spare parts, the most 
o 
lucrative field for aircraft manufacturers the world over. 
Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer. Soviet Relations 
with India and Vietnam, 1992. Oxford University 
press, New Delhi, 1993, p. 99. 
S. Nihal Singh, n. 4. p. 712. 
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Moreover, the Soviet penchant for secrecy results in their 
reluctance to provide technical information. 
However, these irritants were never allowed to grow 
into major bottlenecks and "that this sensitive relationship 
has continued ... is due to the firm control exercised by 
the political leadership in these two countries over their 
9 
respective military bureaucracies." 
Military Sales: 
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 caused 
a lot of embarrasment to India in the NAM. To counter her 
overdependence on the USSR, India sought to diversify her 
sources of arm.s supplies- Foreign Minister Narsimha Rao said 
in October 1983 - "I have told the Russians, we will 
continue to buy (arms) from others. We are non-aligned" 
On the other hand, India's efforts at diversification and 
her policies of economic Libezalisation caused some concern 
in Moscow. 
The Janata government signed a deal with U.K. in 
1978, for the supply of Jaguar aircrafts. This was obviously 
not liked by the USSR. However, Soviet apprehensions were 
9. P.R. Chari. n.2. p. 240. 
10. S. Nihal Singh, n.4. p. 720. 
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dispelled when India acquired 83 MIG23BN for ground attack 
from the USSR, and negotiations were initiated with it for a 
large arms deal worth about $1.6 billion. The agreement was 
signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1980. This deal 
was reported to have been at 2.5 per cent rate of interest, 
the principal repayable over 17 years, which amounted to 42 
12 per cent of grant element. 
In the year 1980, the USSR supplied India 100 T-72 
MBTS, patya class Frigates and 95 An-32 Cline transport 
13 
planes. The purchase was to be made through long-term 
Soviet credit under the most favourable terms. 
However, this cordial relationship was put to test 
when, to offset the preponderent reliance of the Indian 
submarine fleet which was entirely Soviet equipped an 
agreement was reached with West Germany in 1981 for the 
supply of two Yype-1500 submarines, and for assembling two 
14 
more of them ai: Bombay. India also opened negotiations 
with Frnace for a number of Dassualt Brequet Mirage-2000 
aircraft to match the F-16 that the US was supplying to 
11. S. Nihal Singh. The Yogi and the Bear;A study of 
Indo-Soviet Relations. New Delhi, 1986. p. 146. 
12. Dilip Mukherjee.'Indo-Soviet Economic Ties'. Problems 
of communism. January-February, 1987. p. 151. 
13. Arms Trade Register, SIPRI Publication. The Arms 
Trade with the third world, 1985. 
14. S. Nihal Singh, n.4, p. 715, 
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Pakistan India was actually on the lookout for a variety of 
weapons m western countries. 
Concerned with these developments the Soviet Union 
feared being dislodged from its dominant position as regards 
arms sales and technology transfer to India. Soviet leaders 
expressed concern over India's trend at diversification. 
There were pressing political and strategic reasons which 
compounded this concern. India accounted for 13.8 per cent 
of all arms imported by the Third World from the USSR in 
1971. However, India's share in Soviet arms exports to the 
17 Third World declined by 10 per cent by the mid 1980s. The 
USSR exported military-industrial goods to India and in 
return got the necessary consumer goods. Such an arrangement 
gave the USSR political leverage vis-a-vis India. However, 
India's deal with France to buy Mirage 2000 planes, did not 
please the Russians. They said that if India could pay hard 
cash for expensive planes like Mirage 2000, which was 
estimated to cost between $18 million to $ 20 millions, why 
should it want generous soviet credit terms of 17 years 
1 o 
payment at 2.5 per cent interest. 
16. India Today, 15 August 1983. p. 50. 
17. The Times of India. 3 July, 1983. 
18. IISS, strategic Survey. India. 1982-83. 
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Notwithstanding, India's attempts to diversify its 
arms supplies, the Soviet Union remained clearly the major 
supplier to India, providing approximately 72 per cent of 
India's total arms ($3.4 billion) from 1979-83 . India was 
20 the largest non-communist recepient of Soviet aid. 
To pre-empt any further possible strengthening of 
India's military ties with the West, the Soviet Defence 
Minister, Ustinov, came to India, with a high-powered 
delegation of Generals. The visit took place on the eve of 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi's visit to the U.S. and signing of an 
agreement with France for the purchase of Mirage 2000. More 
importantly, this was the highest ranking military 
delegation the USSR had ever sent outside the Eastern block. 
On his arrival in New Delhi, Ustinov said: "The 
successful cooperation in the field of defence between the 
two countries, serves both the material interests of India 
and the Soviet Union as well as the interest of 
21 
strengthening of universal peace and security." This dele-
19. John, D. Christmas Indo-Soviet Economics. Journal of 
Defence and Diplomacy. July 1985. p. 39. 
20. U.S. Arms control and Disarmament Agency, World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,1985(Washing 
ton-ACDA, August 1985). p. 134. 
21. The New York Times. 16 March, 1982. 
174 
gation came to India with a purpose to dissuade India from 
buying the French Mirage - 2000/ to assess the defense 
requirements of India and to rekindle interest in latest 
Soviet weaponry. The Soviet Union offered India the T-72 
tank and the MIG-27 Flogger tactical strike figerter that 
22 
was said to be equivalent to Mirage-2000. The T-72 tanks 
were fitted with a very sophisticated laser range finder and 
capable of operating with devastating effect in nuclear, 
chemical and biological warfare. They were fitted with a 125 
mm gun, the biggest and most powerful gun in the world and 
the tank had an armour which no known ammunition in the 
23 
world could pierce. Such an offer was hitherto never made 
to any country outside the eastern block this showed the 
importance the USSR attached to India. 
The Ustinov delegation also visited several defence 
establishments in India. But it did not succeed in 
preventing India from buying Mirage 2000 from France. India 
was also given the option of licence production of this 
aircraft in India. Nevertheless, the visit of this Soviet 
delegation to India did not turn out to be futile. The 
Indian Defence Minister R. Venkataraman paid a return visit 
22. The Hindu. 16 March, 1982. 
23. Asian Recorder. 10-16 Sept. 1983. XXIX (37). p.17360. 
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to Moscow in June 1983. During his visit he was shown the 
24 drawings of the futuristic planes, MIG-29 and Mig-31. 
These planes were considered to be better than F-15 and 
F-16. The USSR also offered India updated technology for 
T-80 tanks and submarines. Most importantly, the Soviet 
25 Union agreed to transfer "fully developed technolgies" 
During thisperiod India got from the USSR two hundred SA-8 
Gecko Handmob SAMS, four Foxtrot class submarines, three 
Kashin class destroyers, three Nanuchka class corvettes, Six 
Natya Class M50s, Ninety five An-32 transport planes for 
the air force, one hundred MP-1, MICVS and BRDM amphibious 
wheeled vehicles for the army. What impelled India to 
strengthen its military relationship with the USSR was the 
large scale militarization of the Indian Ocean and the 
supply of sophisticated U.S. arms to Pakistan despite 
India's repeated requests. As this time 70 percent India's 
arms imports originated from the USSR. 
Such a gesture from the USSR made India think twice 
about the economic viability of tne project to manufacture 
Mirage-2000 in India. It required re-tooling of India's air-
24. Jane's All World's Aircraft, 1983-84. (Boston, 1983). 
25. V. Longer. The Defence and Foreign Policies of India. 
Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1988. p. 286. 
26. Arms Trade Register - SIPRI Publication. The Arms 
Trade With the Third World - 1985. 
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craft factories which would have been a very costly affair. 
The Soviet offer, on the other hand, was far better. Since 
the Russians believed in modular development of new planes 
and weapons, the existing Indian production facilities only 
needed to be adopted for a new generation of MIGS. An 
additional advantage was that the Russians accepted payment 
in rupees. Hence, New Delhi decided to scrap production 
plans for Mirage-2000. This episode exposed the limits to 
which our diversification plans could stretch. 
The Soviet Defence Minister, Ustinov returned to 
India in the first week of March 1984. He met the Indian 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and the two shared concern 
over the militarization of Pakistan and stressed the need 
for further cooperation between the two countries. An 
agreement was finalised for the supply on an urgent basis a 
wide range of sophisticated military equipment advanced 
aircraft MIG-29, T-80 tanks, missiles, the latest sensing 
27 
system and submarines for the Indian Navy. The Soviet side 
also offered help in the indigenous production of some of 
the equipment to be supplied under these agreements. India 
reiterated its keenness on technology transfer in view of 
its endeavour to reduce dependence . . . The promise of new 
defence supplies reflected the soviet agreement with the 
28 Indian view of its strategic environment. 
27. The Indian Express, 10 March, 1984. 
28. Asian Recorder. XXX(2*0 May 20-26, 1984. p. 17754. 
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In April 1984, a high power delegation from India 
visited Moscow to work out delivery schedules for the supply 
of arms. During this time India was producing under licence 
various versions of the Soviet supersonic MIG-21 figaters 
including their power plant and assembling MIG-23s and 
MIG-27s; leander class frigates and indigenously modified 
and improved Godavari; and weapons including anti-tank and 
29 
anti-aircraft gunds, mortars, rockets and mines. 
About two months later, India's Minister of state for 
External Affairs, Rahim Visited Moscow, where he met the 
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. Maltsev. Both discussed 
the situation in the Indian Ocean and other regional 
problems. At the first meeting of the Indo-USSR working 
group on trade, held from 4 to 10 July, 1984, in Moscow, a 
deal was finalised with the USSR for the outright purchase 
of MIG-29 aircraft. In September, the same year. India's 
Defence Secretary S.K. Bhatnagar visited Moscow to finalise 
the delivery schedule for this aircraft. India thus became 
the first country outside the Soviet Union to acquire this 
Modern aircraft which even Moscow's socialist allies did not 
30 have. The USSR also showed interest in collaborating with 
India in the instllation of new ordinance factories in 
India. In the year 1984, the USSR supplied India 20 giant 
tactical transport aircrafts - 12-76, eighty AA-7 Apex 
29. S.Nihal Singh, n.4. p. 185. 
30. Satish Kumar. Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy. 
1984-85. 
178 
AAMs, twenty Ka-27 Helix Helicopters, one hundred, Mi-17 
Hip-H Helicopter forty MIG-29 fighters and three Tu-142 Bear 
Recce/ASWS."^"^ 
To keep up the momentum, Rajiv Gandhi visited Moscow 
in May 1985. He spoke of the Indo-Soviet cooperation as a 
very fruitful exchange. President Gorbachev revived the idea 
of Asian Security, talking of Asian States joining in this 
effort. However, Rajiv Gandhi very wisely evaded this issue 
in his press conference on May 22. "We are really for 
countries", he said, "not interfering in areas outside their 
own ... we do not want Asia to become another hotbed of 
32 tension" Hence, the message was conveyed to the Soviet 
Union that inspite of the closeness and cordiality between 
the two countries, India should not be taken for granted and 
the Soviet Union should try not to drag India in its cold 
war with the U.S. Rajiv Gandhi's mild but clear disapproval 
of Gorbachev's idea of Asian Security did not have any 
negative effects on Indo-Soviet relations when India's 
Defence Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao visited the USSR from 
April 1 to 2 in 1985, he was shown the Advanced Technology 
Combat Aircraft (ATCA) which was said to match the American 
33 E-26 Hawkeye reconaissance plane . The Soviet ATCA had not 
31. SIPRI Yearbook 1984. World Armaments and Disarmament. 
32. V. Longer, n. 25. p. 306. 
33. Indian Express. April 5, 1985. 
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been shown to anyone including the Warsaw pact countries. 
Mr. Rao's discussions with the Soviet Defence Minister 
Marshal Sergei Sokolov centered on the acquisition and 
manufacture of T-80 main battle tanks, three configurations 
of MIG-27, 29 and 31 and MI-24 helicopter gunships as well 
as long range surface to surface missiles and a fleet of 21 
naval vessels, India was said to have been offered 
exceptionally cheap credit terms, with rupee payments 
34 
staggered over two decades. All this showed the importance 
attached by the Soviet Union to its military relations with 
India. 
On January 11, 1986, the MIG-27 was inducted into the 
Indian Air Force with the hope that India would in the near 
future design and build the most advanced Jet aircraft. 
India was the only country outside the Warsaw pact that had 
35 
received the technology for this aircraft. About six 
months later, a new Soviet built guided missile destroyer 
carrying an advanced helicopter for anti-submarine warfare 
joined the Indian Navy. The first of the new kilo-class of 
Russian submarines also arrived in India. They had more 
sophisticated electronic systems than the ones supplied by 
36 the Soviet Union to its warsaw pact allies. 
34. The Statesman Weekly. May 25, 1985. 
35. Asian Recorder, XXXII (3) March 26 - April 1, 1986. 
p. 18810. 
36. Asian REcorder. XXXII (48) Nov. 26 - Dec. 2, 1986. 
p. 19198 
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The importance of India as an indispensable factor 
for the Soviet policies in Asia and the pacific was 
underlined by the fact that India was the first Asian 
country that Gorbachev visited. He arrived in New Delhi on 
25 November, 1986, to a grand welcome. In his banquet speech 
he said that, "security of one state is inconceivable 
37 
without the security of all. While Rajiv Gandhi 
38 
appreciated the Vladivostock speech of Gorbachev, he 
evaded the idea of Asian security hinted at by Gorbachev and 
called for "bilateral mechanism and regional arrangements 
39 
without outside interference." 
The intimacy of the Indo-Soviet military relationship 
was slightly dampened by the regional emphasis in India's 
defence out-look in contrast to global Soviet perspectives. 
However, it did not have any significant effect in the 
general tenor of this relationship. Prime Minister Gandhi 
who was also the Defence Minister reviewed the •Indian 
Security environment with the Sovietleader, mainly in 
relation to the acquisition of sophisticated arms by 
Pakistan. The Minister of state for Defence, Arun Singh also 
37. The Times of India. November 26, 1986. 
38. The idea of Asian Security was articulated by 
Gorbachev at a public meeting at Vladivostock on July 
28, 1986. It was aimed at countering U.S. influence 
in Asia. 
39. The Times of India. November 26, 1986. 
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had two meetings with Sergey Akhromeev, First Deputy Defence 
Minister and chief of General staff of the Soviet Armed 
Forces. Pakistan's nuclear programme and the possibility of 
Pakistan getting the U.S. AWACS was the focus of the talks. 
The possible counter measures and the progress of 
Indo-Soviet collaboration in defence production was 
deliberated upon. By this time, the "Kashin" destroyers had 
already been inducted in the Navy, as also the TV-95 and 
Tu-142 MS, the MI-26 helicopters and the IL-76 aircrafts 
had joined the transport fleet of the lAF. The USSR was 
willing to sell its version of the AWACS which India did not 
find satisfactory and was reluctant to accept as it was in 
the process of building its own such system . India had 
decided to purchase the Tupolv long-range surveillance 
aircraft. It was estimated that between 1980 and 1986 India 
41 had received more than $ 4 billion worth of Soviet arms. 
All the military hardware was obtained on deferred rupee 
payment at low interest rates. 
When A.S. Systov, the Soviet Minister of Aviation and 
Industries visited India with a 25 member delegation on 
February 4, 1987 disscussions were arranged with senior 
40. When Pakistan took offensive positions along the 
Indo-Pak border in 1987, the lAF had to hurridly 
reposition its fighter squadrons to meet any eventua-
lity of war. This task was accomplished only in 36 
hours. The credit for this Herculean task goes to the 
heavy lift lLi-76 transport squadron, nicknamed the 
"Mighty Jets". The Times of India. Sept. 29, 1993. 
41. Business Recorder. 
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officials of Ministry of Defence. The prospect and feasibi-
lity of licenced production in India, of MIG-29, multi-role 
42 
combat aircraft was explored during the discussions. 
On May 3, 1987, India received two squadrons of 
43 
MIG-29 fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union. With its 
new radar and missile combination the MIG-29 was more than a 
match for the F-16 supplied by the U.S. to Pakistan. It 
provided for the latest in avionics and according to western 
defence experts, its design was commensurate with the latest 
44 in-service U.S. fighters. Moreover, the Soviet completed 
the supply of all the MIG-29 contracted for, in a record 
time of four months. All this showed that the Soviet Union 
for all practical purposes was following an India-centric 
policy in South Asia. India's size, its political stability 
and being one of the leaders of the Third World made it 
politically prudent for the USSR to extend massive economic 
and military aid to it. A major contributing factor for such 
a more by Moscow was the partnership of Pakistan with the 
45 U.S. m multilateral and bilateral alliances. 
42. The Hindustan Times. February 5, 1987. 
43. The Hindustan Times. May 4,1987. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Pramod K. Mishra. The Soviet Union in south Asia. 
Indian Journal of Asian Affairs. (Jaipur) vol. 3. 
November-December, 1990. p. 29. 
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Antony F. Dobrynin, Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Communist part came to India on May 
20, 1987. He met India's Defence Minister, K.C. Pant, the 
Defence Minister, expressed serious concern over the massive 
U.S. arms supply to Pakistan, Islamabad's nuclear capability 
and acquisition of AWACS by it. Dobrynin assured that the 
USSR would continue to extend its cooperation to India in 
46 the field of Defence supplies, production and technology. 
In December 1987, the Soviet supplied MIG-29 ws 
formally inducted into the Indian Air Force. It was the most 
formidable all-weather multi-purpose interceptor aircraft in 
the world besides the Soviet Air Force at that 
time,with nuclear and air warning control system capability. 
The lAF beca>«xe the second Air Force in the world besides 
47 the Soviet Air Force, to operate this aircraft. 
In one of the most secret defence deals the Indian 
Navy acquired two nuclear powered submarines from the Soviet 
Union. The first of these INS chakra reached Vishakapatnam 
48 
on December 27, 1987. Its leasing from the Soviet Union 
answered the Indian Navy's search for blue water capability. 
Together with the purchase of five Kashin II destroyers from 
the Soviet Union .... India began to affect the naval 
46. Satish Kumar (ed.) Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 
1987-88. Sage New Delhi, 1988, p. 57. 
47. The Times of India. 
48. The Times of India, December 28, 1987. 
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balance among the littoral states of the Arabian Sea and Bay 
49 
of Bengal. 
Sino-U.S. friendship in the 1970s and the rift in 
Sino-Soviet relations had been the single most important 
factor which had strengthened .the Indo-Soviet military 
relationship. But fresh efforts at Sino-Soviet rapproachment 
towards the close of the 1980s alarmed the India defence 
planners. However, Defence Minister K.C. Pant's visit to 
Moscow in February 1988, where he met Prime Minister Nikolai 
Ryzhkov as well as Defence Minster Dmritri Yazor, was 
confirmation that India would continue making substantial 
50 purchases from the Soviet Union in the coming years. 
Yazov's four-day visit to India in September 1988 was 
described as triggering off a quantum leap in the continuing 
Indian purchase of Soviet arms and production of Soviet 
designed weapons. Moreover, Gorbachev during his visit to 
India in 1988, assured the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi that improvement in Sino Soviet relations "would not 
52 
adversely affect Indo Soviet relations" Moscow agreed to 
49. Raju G.C, Thomas. The Military Balance in South Asia, 
Strategic Studies Journal (Aligarh). vol. 3, Nos. 1 
and 2, 1990. p. 43. 
50. The Times of India, February 11, 1988. 
51. Salamat Ali. 'The Travelling Arms Bazar'. Far Eastern 
Economic Review, October 13, 1988. p. 35. 
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the transfer of technology for thermal imaging and reactive 
armour for the T-72 tanks. Impressed by the MI-26 helicopter 
53 
gunships, India asked for the next generation MI-28. 
India's Minister of State for Defence, Chintamani Panigrahi 
visited the USSR in October 1988 and held wide ranging 
discussions on the" proposed manufacture of MIG-29 fighter 
aircraft and on acquisition of the new MIG-35 aircraft. 
Panigrahi announced that India would be also purchasing 
MI-35 gunships, making it the first sale of the formidable 
54 gunship outside the Warsaw Pact. 
Indian fears were further dispelled, when the Govern-
ment confirmed on October 6, 1989 that an agreement was 
finalised for getting another squadron of MIG-29 fighter 
aircraft from the Soviet Union bringing its complement upto 
55 three squadrons. 
On February 22, 1990, the USSR offered its latest air 
defence fighter, the Su-27 to India. This aircraft had 
evoked interest in the West and had been code-named as "D-
Flankner" by NATO. According to aviation experts, the 
Soviets considered the Indian Air Force as the most capable 
of receiving such a sophisticated weapon system. 
53. Salamat All, n.51. 
54. Asian Defence Journal, January 1989, p.87. 
55. Keesings Contemporary Archives. XXXVI(3) 1970, 
p.37346. 
56. The Times of India. February 23, 1990. 
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This decade closedon a positive note for this rela-
tionship with the signing of a protocol agreement between 
India and the Soviet Union for the licence-manufacturing and 
upgrade programmes for some of the lAF's combat aircrft, 
57 including MIGs. 
Nuclear Issue : 
In this sub-continent the U.S. had subordinated its 
non-proliferation concern to the concern of rewarding 
Pakistan for fighting the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. In 
turn, the Soviet Union moderated its non-proliferation goals 
by not allowing India's nuclear programme to damage an 
otherwise healthy Indo-Soviet relationship. 
However, the search for nuclear self-sufficiency of 
India brought forward the basic divergence in the percep-
tions of India and the USSR on the nuclear issue. Moscow 
had always considered nuclear proliferation as inimical to 
its military and political interests. It could put the 
weapons of mass destruction at the disposal of states 
actually or potentially hostile to the Soviet Union. It 
could make a nuclear conflict statistically more probable. 
It would also undermine the position of USSR as a superpower. 
Moreover, a nuclear India could follow the lead given by 
China and move towards self-sufficiency and total indepen-
57. Asian Defence Journal, September 1990, p.109. 
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dence from the USSR. Inspite of these factors, India had 
managed to allay Soviet apprehensions about uncontrolled 
nuclear weapons acquisition by it. By the end of 1987, the 
Indian press was speculating on continuing extensive nego-
tiations for the acquisition of a nuclear propelled Soviet 
58 
submarine. In December, 1987, the first Charlie- class 
1970 model, nuclear-powered submarine, the INS Chakra, was 
leased by India from the Soviet Union for a period of three 
59 year. At this time, even Soviet allies m the Warsaw Pact 
lacked nuclear-powered submarines. The Chakra was a 
Charlie-class nuclear-propelled crusive missile launcher 
that could fire conventional or nuclear-tipped missiles with 
a range of 35 nautical miles while submerged and it gave 
unprecendented sea-denial capability to the Indian Navy. 
India entered into this submarine leasing arrangement 
to facilitate familiarisation of its naval officers with the 
working of nuclear submarines and to give its navy a hunter-
killer capability. 
For the Western defence analysts, the costs of 
setting up a nuclear facility, training and support 
infrastructure indicated that Soviet involvement would 
58. Shekhar Gupta, 'A sea change' India Today. December 
31, 1987, p.72. 
59. The Times of India, December 28, 1987. 
60. New Submarines for Navy Soon.Statesman Weekly, Decem-
ber 26, 1987, p.5. 
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extend beyond the leasing of hulls. For Indian analysts, 
the leasing of a nuclear powered submarine was a step 
towards the development of an indigenous nuclear submarine 
reactor and hull construction capabilities. Instead of a sea 
control capability, they would give a potential strike 
capability to the Indian navy. Moreover, it would also be a 
visible demonstration of engineering and technological 
skills of the highest order. 
Hitherto, no country had supplied a nuclear powered 
submarine to another, so this lease was a clear 
demonstration of the level of importance the Soviets gave to 
their relations with India. Some analysts interpreted the 
leasing arrangement to mean that neither India nor the 
Soviet Union was serious about establishing a zone of peace 
in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan responded to this Indian 
lease arrangement by entering into negotiations with China 
for the purchase of a Han-class nuclear-powered attack 
63 
submarine. 
The Chakra was returned to the Soviet Union in 
January 1991 after the expiry of its lease. As the navy had 
61. Michael Hambyn, 'India Aims to Rule the Waves in 
Soviet Ships' Australian, August 25, 1988. 
62. Brian Cloughley, And whose 'zone of peace' to it 
Going to Be, Anyway?' Far Eastern Economic Review, 
April 7, 1988, p. 25. 
63. Far Eastern Economic Review, February 21, 1991, p. 8. 
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encountered some radiation problems with the Chakra, the 
Indian government had to think twice before any future 
acquisition of nuclear - powered submarines. Politically 
also this lease arrangement did not prove to be very 
productive as it led to the raising of many an eyebrow in 
the Indian Ocean region. 
Problems And Prospects; 
The upheavals in the USSR towards the close of the 
1980s did not seem to adversely affect India's military 
relations with that part of the world, at least, in the near 
future. It was so, because S'oviet armaments accounted for 
over half the equipment with the Indian army and air force, 
and the soviet supplied on an average one billion dollars 
worth of weapons to India each year. 
64 However, shortage of spares did exist. which led to 
speculation about diversification of arms sources. But it 
was not undertaken and between 1987-91, 79 per cent of 
India's arms purchases were sourced from the USSR. 
64. The Indian Air Force had spares shortage for its 
ground attack MIG-27Ms and its landbased air-defence 
systems. The shortage was very acute as regard the 
fighter aircraft MIG-29. This was not because the 
Soviet's were reluctant in supplying spares, but as 
most of these systems were onver 20 years old they 
were being phased out by the Russians.For instance, 
Shilka had been decommissioned by the Soviets and 
SAM-6 had undergone modernization. However, after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, India was not sure 
about the independent republics ability and 
willingness to continue supplying spares. 
65. SIPRI Yearbook 1992. 
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The closeness in Indo-Soviet military relations was 
visible till the break-up of the USSR. The INS Vibhuti, 
first in a series of missile boast being fabricated in 
India, was commissioned in 1991. This warship was built in 
India under technical collaboration from the Soviet Union. 
The lAF was being offered the Yak-141 V/STOL (vertical short 
take-off and landing) to meet its requirement for a carrier-
c -J 
borne multi-role fighter. 
For India, it was almost impossible to replace the 
Soviet equipment at the combat level. India's main battle 
tank till the turn of the century is supposed to be the 1-12 
which is being indigenously manufactured at Avadi. The 
Indian Air Force was havily dependent on the Soviets. Our 
inventry includes MIG-29 fighters, IL-76 huge transport 
planes, Mi-17 helicopters, Tu-142 reconnaissance planes for 
the navy and surface-to-air missiles. The Indian navy was 
also hugely dependent on the Soviets for its submarines and 
light and middle missile latuiching ships. 
Nevertheless, the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
threw up certain significant issues. An immediate conse-
quence was the disruption of production lines and deliveries 
66. Asian Defence Journal. August 1991, p. 99, 
67. Ibid, September 1991, p. 48. 
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to foreign buyers, for instance, Indian officials spent some 
time trying to identify the estimated 3500 suppliers 
scattered along the new republics who manufactured the 
68 
military equipment that India needed. Moreover, negotiations 
were to be conducted as to how India's previous defence debt 
to the former Soviet Union was to be distributed among the 
new republics and how the value of the rouble debt was to be 
calculated with the rouble in a free-fall. 
Notwithstanding these problems Russia demonstrated 
its willingness to continue the close military ties with 
India. Russia's Economy Minster, Andrei Nechayev who was 
part of a high-powered delegation to India in May 1992, said 
that India wanted Russia to continue defence supplies, and 
these would be implemented in the traditional form of 
69 Russian credits. But, the new credits would be at double 
the existing interest rate and with one tenth of the payment 
being made in advance. 
Russia's Ambassador to India Anatoly Drukov struck a 
positive note when he revealed that Russia was prepared to 
shift units for producing frontline aircraft armoured cars. 
68. Steve Coll, 'An Arms Rush in South Asia', Inter-
national Herald Tribune, January 6, 1992. 
69. The Times of India, May 16, 1992. 
70. Ibid, May 6, 1992. 
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tanks and other military equipment for use in India and 
export as well/ to other third World countries. He said-
"the idea has been under discussion, but I think we have now 
to move from an exchange of views to the concrete deal, the 
71 
contract". 
Hence, it seems unlikely that India's defence procurement and 
military cooperation with that part of the world will 
run into obstacles. There may however, be uncertainity, at 
least, for some time to ccme. 
71. Asian Defence Journal, August 1992, p. 92 
CHAPTER - VII 
INDO-D.S. DEFENCE COOPERATION 
Introduction: 
The most of the eighties did not see any convergence 
in the strategic perceptions of India and the United States. 
The overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan induced a greater vigour in U.S. 
efforts to combat the Soviet challenge. This involved 
conclusion of bilateral and trilateral alliances with other 
countries. India, however, would or could not support this 
strategy. The Americans were still not comfortable with 
India's continued insistence on non-alignment, leavinc 
little room for any worthwhile defence cooperation between 
the two countries. The U.S. posture on the Kashmir issue and 
its military relationship with Pakistan further complicated 
any prospects. Whatsoever, of such a relationship. Further 
the U.S. refusal to concede to India's demands for licences 
that its public sector defence industries be allowed to 
manufacture items produced by private U.S. corporations was 
apparently another irritant. 
Military Sales; 
Towards the close of the seventies the Carter 
Administration seemed to be interested in establishing 
194 
closer relations with the Janata government in India. 
President Carter wrote personal letters full of "warmth and 
wisdom" to the Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai. He came 
to India in January 1978 to celebrate as he said the triumph 
of human rights. The U.S. welcomed Indian enquiries about 
sophisticated defence" equipment. Negotiations were initiated 
by India for the purchase of Tow anti-tank missile and Light 
Howitzer guns from the U.S. However, an obstacle arose and 
that was the Indian insistence on getting licence to 
manufacture the concerned equipment and assurances of 
sustained supplies of ammunition and spare parts. India's 
demands were incompatible with the U.S. approach of dealing 
with the U.S. approach of dealing with non-allied countries. 
Nevertheless, the Carter Administration finalised the sale 
of $32 million worth of Tow Anti-tank missiles to India in 
June 1980, and defended its decision before the Senate. 
2 
However, the consummation of sale fell through. 
1. Since the U.S. policy makers used to look at the 
world through cold war glasses, so any country not 
allied to it was considered to be an ally of the 
enemy. Hence, it could not be relied upon. The U.S. 
was always sceptical when dealing with such a 
country. 
2. The U.S. law provides that any weapon sold to any 
country would be supplied on the condition that (A) 
the supplies can be suspended unilaterally by the 
U.S. and (B) the money paid by the buyer company 
would not be refundable. Even though American 
negotiators of this deal had argued that the two 
conditions were built into all arms sales contracts 
but they were never implemented and there was no 
record where USA did not refund the money of the 
buyer country after the suspension of supplies.The 
Indian govt, was not convinced. As a result the 
negotiation for the purchase of U.S. Howitzers and 
Tow anti-tank missiles floundered. 
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The Carter Administration also paved the way for 
resumption of military and economic aid to Pakistan by a 
3 
waiver of the Syndngton Amendment. India's grave concern 
over the lifting of arms embargo on the supply of U.S. arms 
to Pakistan was conveyed to the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi 
on December 31, 1979. However, to counter balance this 
special favour to Pakistan and to reassure Indians Carter 
sent Clark Clifford a special emissary, to New Delhi. He 
clarified that "any new American arms for Pakistan would not 
be used against them (Indians), by offering to provide 
sophisticated electronic gear for guidance systems for 
aircrafts, missiles and so-called smart bombs that 
4 
Washington earlier refused to sell India." 
Sensing the increased importance which Pakistan 
had acquired in the U.S. strategic designs as a result of 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, President Zia rejected 
the subsequent $4-00 million U.S. aid as 'peanuts'. But 
later, in September 1981, he accepted a $3.2 billion aid 
package spread over till 1987. This package among other 
weapons included the F-16. India at that time did not have 
This Amendment of 1977 forms Section 669 of the U.S. 
Foreign Assistance Act. It prohibits assistance for 
countries receiving uranium enrichment technology, 
equipment or material but not subject to IAEA 
safeguards. 
Andrew J. Pierre. The Golden Politics of Arms Sales. 
A Council of Foreign Relations book. Princeton 
University. New Jersey. 1982. p. 224. 
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a comparable aircraft capable of neutralizing the subsequent 
threat from Pakistan. The balance of power in the sub-
continent was greatly affected. Expressing concern at a 
press conference the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
said that "the induction of F-16 represented the induction 
'into the region of a class of aircraft a generation ahead of 
5 
anything operating with the air forces of the area". But 
India's concerns did not affect much the U.S. Administration 
as to it Pakistan appeared as "an essential anchor of the 
eiatire south West Asian region." 
In February 1982, the U.S. Ambassador to India gave a 
statement that the U.S. will not guarantee the use of the 
most modern weapons like F-16s, AWACS and other 
sophisticated weapons of destruction and attack .... for 
7 
being used against India." This matter was discussed in the 
Indian Parliament. Expressing concern over this statement, 
G.C. Bhattacharya, M.P. said, "previously they used to give 
a guarantee - althoug-h those guarantees did not work - but 
there was a commitment and they did put pressure sometimes. 
But now they have made it absolutely clear that there is no 
5. The Times of India, New Delhi. July 11, 1981. 
6. James L. Buckley, Under Secretary of State, before 
the Foreign Relations Committee. September 1981. 
7. Rajya Sabha Official Records. CXXI (7) February 27, 
1982. cols. 13-14. 
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p 
guarantee." Thus, there was a relative hardening of the 
U.S. position as regards India's security concerns. When 
Mrs. Gandhi visited the U.S. in July 1982, there appeared a 
shift in the U.S. posture. In an interview with members of 
the Indian press, Walter Stoessel, American Deputy Secretary 
of State, hinted that the U.S. government will sympatheti-
cally consider the sale of F-16 combat aircraft to India if 
9 
Gandhi expresses an interest in them. It showed that 
Washington was "prepared to do a lot to placate the Indian 
Prime Minister over the transfer of these aircrafts to 
Pakistan. But more than that it was an evidence of the U.S. 
government rethinking its position on the sale of advanced 
technology to India." 
However, six proposals of arms sales which were 
cleared by the U.S. were rejected by India because of 
condition attached to them. According to press reports, 
India insisted on co-production rights which will give it 
direct access to U.S. military technology. The U.S. is 
interested in outright sale and not knowhow transfer. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Hindustan Times, New Delhi. July 24, 1982. 
10. Ibid. 
11. The Telegraph, Calcutta. July 2, 1983. 
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Moreover, inside the Pentagon and even in the State 
Department there was opposition to any unusually large 
Indo-U.S. arms relationship mainly on the Northrop proposal 
for co-production of F-20. elements inimical to India, in 
the Pentagon, argued that it could be risky to raise the 
present relationship between the two countries to a close 
co-production stage. 
The Pentagon doubt gave substance to Indian fears 
that the U.S. might be wanting to drive a wedge between New 
Delhi and Moscow. The Indian side had come to believe that 
once it made a formal request for F-16 or F-20, the 
Americans might turn it down and embarass the government of 
India. It could also adversely affect its arms relationship 
with Moscow, some past American actions had led Indians to 
this belief."^^ 
After Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India 
both India and the U.S. tried to bury the past differences 
and put the bilateral relationship on a more realistic 
footing. President Reagon signed a National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD-147) on 11 October, 1S84, instruct-
ing all U.S. government agencies to seek improved relations 
12. In the late sixties, the U.S. had agreed to sell sky 
hawk planes to India to be mounted on the aircraft 
carrier Vikrant. But when India made a formal 
request, it was turned down. 
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with India by accomodating Indian request for dual-use 
13 . . . 
(civilian and military) technology. By the mid eighties 
the U.S. had begun to recognise India's emergence as a 
regional power. An obvious indicator was the U.S. approval 
to India's large peace-keeping force in Sri Lanka in 1987. 
In 1984, the U.S. supplied 5 transducer arrays for 
hull mounted and towed sonar systems for use in the India 
Navy. During this time the Memorandum of Unders tanding (MOU) 
on Technology Transfer concluded between India and the U.S. 
in November 1984, was a watershed in the field of closer 
14 
defence cooperation. It was on the one hand a manifesta-
tion of the high priority placed on trust and goodwill by 
the two governments, and on the other an instrument facili-
tating greater future interaction in sensitive and 
specialized areas in dual-use high technology. 
13. Nayan Chanda. A New Indian Summer. Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 25 February 1988, p. 34. 
14. The MOU applied only to equipment and technologies 
within the purview of the Commerce Department, as 
distinct from those falling within the jurisdiction 
of the State Department's Ofifice of Munitions control 
However, it answered India's needs for dual-use 
technologies relevant to both civilian and military 
industries. These include computers, communication 
equipment, instrumentation, composite materials, high 
performance ferrous and non-ferrous alloys and 
optics. Because of their application to weapons manu-
facture, US selectivity in licensing technologies in 
these fields was inversely proportional to their 
newness and sophistication. Because of India's exten-
sive links with the Soviet Union, New Delhi had been 
having a hard time obtaining licences, and the MOU 
was intended to alleviate the situation.The intention 
was to put as many cases as possible through the 
200 
By the end of 1985, accomplishments under the MOU 
included significant increases in commercial licences for 
high-tech sales to India, reduced time for processing all 
licence or export requests, clearance of sale of more than 
one hundred advanced computer systems, and all but final 
touches given to the sale and manufacturing licence of a 
multi-purpose supercomputer. Manufacturing licence for the 
Indian National Silicon Facility at Baroda were approved, as 
also the transfer of some sophisticated technology in 
avionics, shipboard data, night vision, and aircraft engines 
for use by India's indigenous defence industry. 
There was a setback when Rajiv Gandhi the Indian 
Prime Minister struck a pessimistic note at the time of his 
visit to the U.S. in June 1985. He told U.S. reporters that 
India did not have sufficient confidence in the United 
States as an arms supplier because Washington could change 
its conditions retrospectively and there was no certainity 
over the supply of spare parts. But the state Department 
spokesman signalled Washington's readiness "for a more 
17 
active arms relation , if the Indians so desire. It was 
15. Department of State. 'Accomplishments under the U.S. 
India MOU on Technology Transfer'. 16 December 1985. 
16. Washington Post, 14 June, 1985. 
17. New York Times, 14 June, 1985. 
18. Warren Unna, 'Arms Technology for India'. Statesman 
Weekly, 22 June 1985. 
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reported in June 1985 that the Reagan Administration had 
decided to provide India with advanced military technology, 
subject to requests being considered on a case-by-case basis 
1 Q 
by an inter-agency panel. It was an effort to end the 20 
year hiatus in U.S. military sales to India. The U.S. 
invited India to send military officers from all three 
service wings to key U.S. defence universities in order to 
gain familiarity with American strategic concerns, war 
doctrines and battle management systems. The invitation was 
issued in the wake of pentagon officials noting the Indian 
desire to diversify its arms production and development 
base. 
However, the Washington Post clarified that "the USA 
would insist on India's acceptance of tight safeguards to 
prevent leakage of military secrets to Soviet Union or other 
20 third parties" Earlier, explaining the rationale behind 
the U.S. decision to supply advanced weapons technology to 
India, Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defence for policy 
during his visit to India, said -"the transfer of 
sophisticated U.S. military technology would not only 
reduce India's dependence on the Soviet Union, but would 
18. Warren Unna, 'Arms Technology for India'. Statesman 
Weekly, 22 June 1985. 
19. Statesman Weekly, 7 September 1985. 
20. The Tribune, 14 June, 1985. 
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give India a position of leadership in determining world 
21 
strategic goals compatible with those of the U.S. 
Later, in August 1985, a high-powered delegation led 
by V.S.Arunachalam, Scientific Adviser to the Defence 
Minister visited the U.S. This delegation received a warm 
welcome there and v/as shown "a level of U.S. military 
technology never before seen by an Indian defence 
22 
specialist" 
Another significant factor was the restoration of 
cordial exchanges between officers of the Indian and U.S. 
armed forces. A tactful redefinition of conditionalities 
banning nuclear weapons from Indian waters, facilitated 
visits by U.S. naval ships to Indian ports after a lapse of 
15 years. The Indian Navy sent its indigenously designed and 
produced frigate INS Godawari to* participate in the U.S. 
Independence Day celebrations of 1986. The army and navy 
chiefs of staff exchanged visits and for the first time 
senior officers were exchanged for the National Defence 
college course in New Delhi and the National Defence 
University course in Washington. 
21. The,Patriot. New Delhi, 6 May, 1985. 
22. Stuart Auerbach. "India to get High-Tech U.S. Goods". 
Washington Post. 15 October, 1985. 
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During Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the U.S. in June 1985, 
the U.S. agreed to sell sophisticated arms and weapons 
technologies to India on the condition that the government 
of India took necessary precautions to ensure that the 
sensitive U.S. weapons technologies were not passed on to 
the Soviet Union or its allies. India had shown interest in 
sonar systems needed for anti-submarine weapons and for 
sphisticated electronic equipment to be mounted on Indian 
made tanks. India had also expressed the desire to get 
sensitive technologies for the ambitious Light Combat 
Aircraft project. The emphasis in the Indian request being 
on weapons technologies and on coproduction and not on 
23 
actual purchase of weapons. Fortunately for India, 
"transfer for technology which (would) translate into 
military capability only after some years, does not create 
the same sense of alarm as sale of complete ready to us 
weapons would in Pakistan and among some influential 
24 
sections of U.S. OPINION." 
e 
In spite of some procedural wrangles the licences 
issued for India by the office of Munitions Control in the 
U.S. rose significantly. The value in just the first half 
of 1986 was U.S. $ 100 million/ covering some 600 cases. 
23. Satish Kumar. Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 
1984-85. Sage Publications/ New Delhi, p.64. 
24. Dilip Mukherjee/ U.S. Weaponary for India, Asian 
Survey, XXVII(6) June 1987, pp.606-606. 
204 
This comapres with the U.S. $ 142 million and 800 cases in 
1985, U.S. $ 70 million and 800 cases in 1984 and U.S. $ 61 
25 
million and 560 cases in 1983. 
In November 1986, a high-powered Pentagon delegation 
led by Secretary of State Casper Weinberger visited India. 
It was the first ever visit to India of such a high 
official. After cordial negotiations with the Indian govern-
ment, agreements were reached on the transfer of engines and 
electronics for the L.A. project, radar and telemetry 
systems for testing missiles, anti-tank weaponry, night 
vision equipment and armour piering projectiles, super 
alloys, fire control and transmission mechanism for the main 
battle tank. 
During this visit the Indian government made efforts 
to reassure the U.S. officials that they could trust India 
as the keeper of the secrets of all its collaborations. It 
also laid bare the complete picture of its defence require-
ments and acquisitions in the recent past to emphasize upon 
the point that there was no undue reliance on any one 
source and no effort was spared to ensure diversification of 
sources of supply. Immediately afterwards, Weinberger went 
to Pakistan and there he announced US willingness to supply 
AWACS. This offer angered Indian government because of the 
25. Ibid, p.606. 
26. The Hindu. October 13, 1986. 
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the qualitative escalation in the arms building in South 
Asia. It also led to resentment in Pakistan because of the 
suggestion that the aircraft would be operated by US perso-
nnel. Such a consequence highlighted the difficulty of 
American attempts to be friendly simultaneously with two 
27 
countries that have deep rooted distrust of each other. 
Hitherto, it had been the Indian governments 
suspicion of the reliability of the U.S. as an arms supplier 
and foreign policy backer that had inhibited close Indo-U.S. 
defence cooperation. But in the second half of the eighties 
the U.S. government became more enthusiastic in its offers 
of defence technology and sale of weapons including willing-
ness to collaborate in the LCA project. The traditional 
aversion to the public sector and to transfer of technology 
especially of the sophisticated and hi-tech variety, was put 
aside. This enthusiasm was probably linked to the expecta-
tion that if the Indian government's dependence on the 
Soviet Union for its arms supplies is reduced, it could 
result in a foreign policy more favourable to the U.S. It 
was in this connection that Senator Gordon Humphrey, 
Chairman of the congressional task force on Afghanistan met 
Mr. V.S. Arunachalam, the scientific adviser to the Defence 
Minister of India in April 1987 in New Delhi. Later an 
agreement on cooperation in high technology was signed on 
27. Steven R. Weisman, 'QS Plan Irriiates Pakistan, 
Angers India'. International Herald Tribune, 10 
November 1986. 
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November 5, 1987. 
In response to the U.S. initiatives, Rajiv Gandhi, 
stated on November 11, 1987 - "India was buying defence 
technology from the U.S. but no comprehensive defence treaty 
on deal with it was under consideration." He added that "A 
continuing dialogue between India and the U.S. was indis-
29 pensable." 
However, a new hindrance was created in the path of 
this growing relationship when the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee decided to recommend a ban on the transfer of 
high-technology and cuts in bilateral assistance to both 
India and Pakistan if the two failed to reduce tension in 
the region and curb the nuclear arms race. However, the 
subcommittee also recommended a six-year waiver in order to 
permit the proposed 4 billion security assistance package to 
30 Pakistan to be approved. 
The Indian Ambassador in Washington P.K. Kaul, met 
the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost at 
the State Department on December 2, 1987 to lodge India's 
vehement remonstrance at the Senate action. What basically 
hurt India most was the fact that the legislation sought to 
condition the transfer of high-technology to India on the 
28. Asian Recorder, XXXIII(48) November 26-December 2, 
1587, p.1^756. 
29. Satish Kumar (ed.). Yearbook on India's Foreign 
Policy 1987-88, Sage, New Delhi, p.72. 
30. Statesman Weekly, 5 December 1987. 
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two South Asian countries entering into an agreement on 
nuclear safeguards. 
The Indian government conveyed to the U.S. embassy in 
New Delhi on December 4, 1987, its adverse reaction to the 
U.S. Senate Panel's Amendment on nuclear proliferation. The 
then Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh 
stated categorically in the Rajya Sabha on December 7, that 
"Indo-U.S. relations would be adversely affected unless the 
clause seeking to equate India and Pakistan in the U.S. 
32 
Senate subcommittee recommendations were deleted. 
Consequent to India's protests, the U.S. Senate on 
December 12, 1987 reversed this controversial amendment to 
the U.S. Foreign Assitance Act, that would have made on 
Indo-Pak agreement on nuclear non-proliferation a pre-
condition for continued U.S. aid to India. 
Later on Washington agreed to sell India a ring-
laser gyroscope essential for the development of the 
inertial guidance system for a new Indian designed light-
weight fighter plane. U.S. Indian defence cooperation also 
included the provision of U.S. radar components for the 
Indian surface-to-surface missile that was tested in January 
31. Satish Kumar. n«29 
32. Asian Recorder. XXXIV(4) January 22-28, 1988 p.19848. 
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1988. In return the U.S. naval vessels were allowed to visit 
Indian ports and U.S. defence officials were given unusual 
access to Indian defence facilties. 
On April 4, 1988, the U.S. Defence Secretary Frank 
Calrucii visited N"ew Delhi to discuss regional issues and to 
put together a U.S. ARMS PACKAGE. This included 
sophisticated equipment and fly by wire technology to 
allow India to build the light combat Aircraft, planned as 
the principal fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force in 
the late 1990s, and for which the U.S. administration had 
already granted use of the F-404 engine from General 
Electric. When the Indian Minister of Defence, K.C. Pant, 
visited Washington in July 1989 for talks on security issues 
he clarified that the U.S. atttitude towards providing the 
34 
technology for the LA project had been positive. He, 
however, added that India had rejected a U.S. suggestion for 
joint excercises in the Indian ocean. 
The U.S. had for long desired to forge a cooperative 
relationship with the Indian Navy, the largest among the 
Indian ocean littoral states, keeping in mind the strategic 
33. The F-404 engine was offered to India when a high 
powered delegation led by V.S. Arunachalam, 
Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, visited 
the U.S. in August 1985. 
34. Asian Recorder. XXXV (4)) October 1-7, 1989. p.20793. 
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importance of the Indian Ocean, writing in the Washington 
post, two former U.S. Naval officers, Elmo Zumw&ltJr. and 
Worth Bagley, pointed out - "for decades to come, the Indian 
ocean will be a critical arena .... in the absence of an 
effective United Nations force, the Navies of the Free world 
are going to have to provide protection for their sea lanes 
and power to prevent terrorism and revolutionary accesses 
for the forseable future In a decade or two, the 
United States is going to need the support of democratically 
ruled India to maintain adequate free world control in the 
35 Indian Ocean." In such scenario, India received a 
positive items such as sea-launched missiles, deep-sea 
sensors and other related naval defence systems also figured 
in the discussions. With the approval of the U.S. 
government. General Electric sold LM - 2500 gas turbine 
engines for the Indian Navy. 
In late 1989, the U.S. offered to coproduce with 
India an advanced fighter jet engine. This offer was made as 
part of an overall U.S. presentation to India for the 
coproduction of the T.F.S. trainer jet. It was one of the 
most significant U.S. defence proposals to India as the 
trainer jet is capable of dual use and can carry upto 7200 
pounds of ordinance and can handle air-to-air side winder 
35. Washington Post. 17 November 1989. 
210 
missiles. A subsequent letter of Agreement permitted the 
Aeronautical Systems Division of the U.S. Air Force, wright 
Patterson AFB, to participate jointly with India's DRDO. 
The goal was to link the research, development, test and 
evaluation activities of the two organisations, including 
access by Indian engineers to wright patterson's testing and 
computer facilities. Hnece, the U.S. involvement with the 
Indian military in the aerospace sector appeared to be 
promising by the close of the eighties. 
On the Indian side, even before the Soviet central 
government begam to crumble, New Delhi had made it clear to 
Washington that it is ready to upgrade military ties. Help 
in military training is being welcomes and even joint 
military exercises which may contribute to this purpose are 
not excluded. The only reservation is that training should 
not create a dependence on any particular military hardware 
37 
or software. 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGIES : 
On October 11, 1994, the U.S. National Security 
Council issued Decision Directive (NSDD) 147. It was 
initially drafted by an Inter Agency Group chaired by the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South 
Asia and reviewed by a higher level group headed by the 
Under Secretary of state for political affairs. Finally it 
36. G. Jacobs, 'U.S.-South Asia Military Relations: 
Challenges for the 1990s, Asian Defence Journal, 
February 1989, p.6. 
37. Dilip Mukherjee. New Delhi and Washington: Rocky 
Road to Rapproachment. The Times of India, 3 Sept., 
1991. 
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was for formally approved by the NSC. NSDD 147 Underlined 
to all concerned parties the importance of building a better 
relationship with India, particularly by accomodating its 
request for sophisticated technology subject to export 
controls. In the same month, a team arrived in New Delhi to 
sign a Memorandum of understanding (MOU) on technology 
transfers, which was negotiated in four successive meetings 
over two years. However, bureaucrat hindrances persisted. The 
U.S. government had to affect changes in its licensing and 
export regulations to facilitate high technology transfers 
to a country not allied to the U.S. The MOU became 
operational in mid 1985. The Commerce Secretary, Malcolm 
Baldrige, came to India in May 1985 to finalise the 
collateral agreements to ensure that technology licenced to 
India would be restricted to end users specified in the 
request and utilized for purposes approved in every case and 
not be passed over to the Soviet Union. India's verbal 
assurances on these points were easily given as fully 
consistent with India's proclaimed polcies. It was more 
difficult to convince the sceptical administration of their 
validity. One efficacious tactic adopted was to allow 
appropriate Americans, including Admiral Watkins in 1985 and 
presumably Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger on his 
scheduled visit in 1986, to observe for themselves the 
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absence of Soviet special facilities, 'advisers' or 
38 privileged access. 
The effect of the MOU - which assured India's 
requirements for dual use technologies can be gauged through 
a perusal of the licenses granted in 1985 covering 4300 
cases with a total value of $1.3 billion. The figures for 
1984 and 1983 were U.S. $ 500 million and 4100 cases and 
U.S. $200,000 and 700 cases respectively. High performance 
computers were released to end users, such as Indian Militry 
Research establishments and licences were issued for the 
transfer of technology of small main frame computers to an 
Indian Public Sector company. Licences were also granted to 
General Electric for the sale and coproduction of LM-2500 
marine enginers. However, despite the MoU, occassional 
problems continued because of inter-agency disputes in the 
U.S. and fear of leakage on account of India's soviet 
connection. 
DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES: 
Despite the differences between the needs of defence 
and development, the overall technological growth of a 
country has relevance for defence capabilities. The basic 
38. Surjit Mansingh. 'New Directions in Indo-US Relations, 
in Satish Kumar, n. 29. p. 189. 
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technology of certain industries - automatic aeronautics, 
electronics, ship building, ceramics, and metallurgy, are 
common to both the civilian and military sectors. This 
observations is of particular significance in the areas of 
nuclear and space technolgies, Where nuclear energy and 
Dooster rocket programmes would privide a country with 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities. Hence, 
the growth of India's civilian technological manpower 
provides the resource base for its growing military might. 
Even where technological transfers are intended for 
development purposes many of them constitute dual use 
technologies that could benefit the defence sector of the 
rece pient. Keeping this factor into consideration the U.S. 
aid policy in the field of high technology to India has been 
closely monitered by the former. India being close to the 
USSR, U.S. civilian technology transfers to this country 
could prove to be strategically counter - productive. 
At various points of time the U.S. had put into 
operation variouspolicies to stall the transfer of sensitive 
technology to potentially adversary states. It believed that 
its security rested primarily on American ability to 
maintain technological superiority in weapons over the 
Soviet bloc and, correspondingly, that the Soviet Union 
sought to acquire advanced technology from the U.S. through 
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39 
covert means. The initial effort to guard against such 
secret transfer of sensitive technology was the formation of 
the Coordinating Committee on Export Control (COCOM) that 
included all the NATO allies and Japan. The approach of 
preventing the sale of military-related products began to be 
reconsidered when it became clear that many of the advanced 
technologies in the civilian field that were being acquired 
by the Warsaw Pact countries had uses in producing 
technologically advanced military systems. This led to the 
passage of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 and 
its Amendment (EEAA) of 1985, which required the Defence 
Department to develop and maintain a Militarily Critical 
Technologies List (MCTL). The MCTL became the central 
document that determined whether particular technology 
affected national security. the Defense Technology Security 
Administration was also established in 1985 in order "to 
ensure that international transfers of defense related 
technology, goods services and munitions are consistent with 
40 U.S. foreign Policy and national security objectives". 
39. AMC Guid to Technology Security, prepared by critical 
Technologies group. Internatinal Technology 
Di vision. Los Alamos Natinal Laboratory (Los Alamos. 
N.M. U.S. government Printing Office, 1987). 
40. U.S. Department of I>€fense, The Technology Security 
Program, A Report to the 99th Congress, Second 
Session, 1986, by Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of 
Defense, p. 2. 
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Later, in March 1989, the U.S. government declared 22 
technologies as 'critical' to U.S. national security. 
In 1987, the Critical Technologies Group in the 
International Technology Division of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory formulated certain policy guidelines and transfer 
conditions on the sale of U.S. technology. The first 
guideline stated that all potential transfers of U.S. 
technology should be subjected to a critical technology 
assessment. The second guideline permitted the transfer of 
critical technology to U.S. allies, where benefits of the 
transfer outweigh the risk of leaks to other countries. The 
third guideline called for restrictions on the transfer of 
technology to non-allied friendly nations in which case only 
end products or technology that were generally available 
from other sources were to be permitted. However, an 
exception could be made in case of a friendly non-allied 
country where the U.S. had a major security interest. The 
fourth guideline disallowed the transfer of critical 
technology to both current and potential adversaries, 
although other technologies that do not meet the critical 
criteria may be permitted. The guidelines also included a 
set of transfer conditions that needed to be met prior to a 
41. AMC Guide to Technology Security, pp. 17-29. 
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technology transfer. These included the demonstration of 
potential beneficial trade offs in risking transfer of 
technology, or a technological guid pro quo to be obtained 
for undertaking the transfer; restricting the transfer of 
critical technology to the minimum required for achieving 
national security objectives; written assurances from the 
recepient country that American technology would be 
protected; and evidence of the demonstrated capacity and 
intent to protect the technology transferred on the basis of 
past behaviour or performance on the part of the recepient 
State. It was against such a backdrop that Indo-US 
technological cooperation had to operate. Because of the 
fluctuating nature of Indo-US relations, the U.S. could 
never trust India fully, as a reliable recipient of dual use 
technologies. 
The MOU of 1984, affected significant changes in the 
nature of Indo-US relations, and led to the immediate rel^se 
of a large number of technologically advanced exports to 
India which could be put to dual use. An important agreement 
was reached between the defense establishments of India and 
the U.S. for setting up of "mission area discussions with 
the goal of increasing military cooperation and sales of 
43 
military equipment and technology" The immediate impact of 
42. Raju, G.C. Thomas. "U.S. Transfers of Dual-use 
Technologies to India". Asian Survey. XXX (9) 
September 1990. 
43. U.S. Defense Department. The Technology Security 
. Program, p. 66. 
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the MOU was the approval of sales of more than $12 billion 
of dual-use technology in 1985, constituting about 90 
percent rate of approval in the total number of proposals 
put forward. 
The growth in the U.S. technology transfers to India 
was encouraging not merely in terms of its speed and volume 
but in the nature of items being transferred to countries 
outside the COCOM group. The sale of CRAY-XMP-14 super 
computer for India's Mateorological Department and the 
General Electric F-404 engines to Hindustan Aeronautics for 
the development of the LCA project marked a major break-
through in Indo-US technological cooperation. Despite the 
fact that assurances were given that the supercomputer would 
be confined to uses in the civilian sector, it however, 
carries potential technological utility for the military 
sector as well. 
The underlying concern for the U.S. beneath all such 
technological transfers remains that technologies acquired 
for development purposes but that have also significance for 
military capabilities, may contribute to strategic desta-
bilisation in South Asia. Most importantly, in case of un-
conventional areas of technological collaboration such as 
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons and space rocket 
programmes and ballistic missile capabilities, the launching 
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of the intermediate-range Agni missile by India in 1989 
aroused an angry reaction among U.S. policy makers for 
defying the American sponsored Missile Technology Control 
Regime. Hence, India's interest in the areas of nuclear 
energy and missile programmes constitutes one of the major 
obstacles in the path of U.S.. transfers of dual-use 
technologies to India. 
The Pakistan Factor; 
The improvement in U.S.-Pakistan relations in the 
1980s and the consequent supply of sophisticated weapons to 
Pakistan,especially the F-16 resulted in a weakening of U.S. 
India relations. The Indian government was greatly concerned 
with this development. From the Indian stand point, it was 
necessary to nentralize Pakistan to do away with the 
possibility of her challenging India's role in the region. 
Pakistan on the other side, has tried to strengthen her ties 
with the U.S. to balance Indian advantages in South Asia. 
American military assistance to Pakistan was aimed 
at strengthening her against any future threat from the USSR 
in Afghanistan. However, it affected the relative balance 
between India and Pakistan. To limit the damage to Indo-US 
relations the Reagan Administration sought improved 
relations with India also. Neither was this objective 
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pursued consistently non was it easy to do so. Negotiations 
were initiated for a major arms purchase by India, but 
failed mainly because of Washington's concerns that the 
technical secrets might passon to the USSR. 
The Reagan Administration also hoped that if the 
U.S. provided security assistance to Pakistan, the latters 
interest in acquiring its own nuclear weapons would 
decrease. However, Pakistan showed little restraint. It 
continued to expand its technical ability to produce nuclear 
weapons and in an obvious violation of what the U.S. had 
assumed was a commitment not to do so, began accumulaing 
significant quantities of weapons grade material. 
Consequent to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
the U.S. dcided to arm Pakistan to the teeth in exchange of 
its support for waging a proxy war against the USSR in 
Afghanistan. This greatly worried India. In all the major 
wars fought between the two countries in the past, Pakistan 
had used all the weapons supplied to it by the U.S. All 
this despite prior U.S. assurances that U.S. security 
cooperation with Pakistan was not targetted against India. 
When Indira Gandhi visited the U.S. in 1982, Washington 
agreed to her request to refrain from giving those weapons 
to Pakistan that would be useless in fighting a war in the 
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mountainous region bordering Afghanistan, but would be 
44 
useful to fight a war on India's border. However, India 
remained unconvinced because in the past the U.S. had done 
nothing to prevent the use of such weapons by Pakistan 
against India, notwithstanding the assurances given earlier. 
To India's discomfiture, on a testimony before the 
U.S. Foreign Relations Committee on February 20, 1987, 
Arnold Raphel, the U.S. Deputy Assitant Secretary of State 
for North Eastern and South Eastern Affairs disclosed that 
the U.S. and Pakistan have conducted joint naval exercises. 
He also admitted that there was an intelligence and military 
information sharing arrangement with Pakistan. At this very 
hearing Senator Jesse Helms accused India of engaging in on 
unprecedented provocation by staging extensive military 
45 
manoeuvres on its borders with Pakistan. Such an attitude 
towards India was bound to have an adverse effect on Indo-US 
relations, the U.S. government appeared not much concerned 
about what India felt, so long as Pakistan remained 
satisfied. 
44. Chintamani Mahapatra. 'Indo-US Defence Cooperation' 
Strategic Analysis, XIV (8) November 1991, p. 976. 
45 Rajya Sabha Official Report. CXLI (3) 26 February 
1987, cols. 324-25. 
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However, by the close of the eighties, with the 
break-up of USSR, the importance of Pakistan lessened in 
U.S. strategic designs, the U.S. Pakistan military relations 
were also adversely affected. Military and economic 
assistance to Pakistan was cut off in October 1990 under the 
Pressler Amendment. Hence, U.S. overindulgence- for 
Pakistan no longer remained an obstacle in the path of 
closer Indo-US defence cooperation. 
CONCLUSION: 
Towards the later part of the eighties, decision 
makers in Washington became more mindful of Indian sensiti-
vities, expecially after the finalisation of the MOU in 
1985. However, an enduring relationship required an Indian 
willingness to take into account U.S. strategic concerns in 
South Asia and a corresponding U.S. readiness to heed 
India's regional interests. 
46. The U.S. congress had introduced the Pressler 
Amendment in 1985 to monitor Pakistan's secret 
nuclear weapon programme and abet the non-
prolif eration drive. Under this stipulation, the 
U.S. President was required to certify that Pakistan 
was not in possession of a nuclear device before any 
U.S. military or economic aid could be made 
available to Pakistan. Till 1990, due to cold war 
considerations, the U.S. Presidents ignored the 
covert efforts of Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapon 
capability and deliberately misled the U.S. Congress 
about it (for details see. The Times of India, 31 
March, 1993. 
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If certain rounds of talks between the two 
countries, as regards military sales had floundered, the 
U.S. held the Indian government responsible for it. NewDelhi 
had sought guarantees that supply will not be interrupted by 
U.S. political decisions; assured delivery of large 
quantities of spare parts; promises of technology transfer 
and indigenous production in India; relations of U.S. export 
controls; and other arrangements that the United States 
47 found objectionable. 
As regards this relationship, an important 
consideration for India was, whether it could afford U.S. 
weaponry. Most of India's purchases had hitherto been made 
from the Soviet Union against credits repayable in 17 years 
at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent implying a grant element 
of 42 per cent, according to the standard formula used by 
western donars to assess the proportion. Such concessions 
could not be given by the U.S. However, India had to decide 
if it was more important to save on costs or to diversify 
the sources from which it obtained military supplies. 
By the close of the eighties, Indian policy planners 
started expecting "a more supportive U.S. attitude in 
47. Paul H. Kriesberg. 'India after Indira'. Foreign 
Affairs. September 1985. p. 882. 
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respect of its security concerns including those stemning 
from Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. This would .... 
encourage India to offer a quid pro quo in matters of 
-• .^ ^. 48 
concern to the U.S. including nuclear non-proliferation. 
India's attitude on the proliferation question 
appeared to be clear. It showed a willingness to be a 
partner in long-term cooperation rather than a surrogate 
which is dependent on the U.S. defence aid much as Pakistan 
ws. India (was not) seeking military aid from the United 
States - it (wanted) a strategic partnership in its own 
49 
right as a regional power. 
48. J.N. Dixit in Washington post. Quoted in The Times of 
India, New Delhi, 25 March, 1992. 
49. The Times of India, 8 September, 19 91. 
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Although the first thoughts about developing closer 
military ties between India and the U.S. emerged in the late 
1980s, but the first concrete set of proposals came from the 
U.S. side when General Kickleighter visited India in April 
50 1991. The objective of the proposals was to pursue a 
common policy of gradually - strengthening ties towards 
greater cooperation and partnership of the nineties. 
50. The main points of the Kickleighter proposals were -
visits by chiefs of staff on an annual basis to 
alternating countries. 
setting up of an Indian army executive steering 
committee. 
Holding of regular strategic symposiums. 
Regular staff talks between the two armies. 
Reciprocal visits by the senior commanders. 
Staff information exchanges. 
Reciprocal training and individual training 
programmes. 
Unit training exchanges and observations of 
training exercises. 
Combined training activities. 
U.S. and Indian Army participation in pacific 
command's joint committee level meeting programmes. 
Attendance and participation in regional 
conferences. 
Indian and U.S. Army Pacific command co-hosting of 
of the Pacific Armies Management Seminar in 1993. 
Collective training information exchange °and 
cooperation. 
Personnel exchange programmes. Source: The Times 
of India, 8, September 1993. 
CONCLUSIONS 
INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS: 
With the start of the nineties certain new dimensions 
were added to India's relations with the USSR. The break-up 
of the latter further complicated matters. 
Political; 
The USSR and India maintained close political 
relations till the disintegration of the Soviet Union On 
August 8, 1991, the two countries agreed to renew the 1971 
Friendship Treaty for another twenty years. This was a 
reiteration of the close traditional ties between them. 
Immediately afterwards, political events in the USSR 
took such sharp turns that they left the Indian policy 
makers in a state of confusion and bewilderment. They could 
not anticipate the developments correctly and hence ended up 
backing the wrong side. India also refused to recognise the 
newly independent Baltic republics. However, it had to 
reverse its position only after a few weeks. 
Within a fortnight of the renewal of the 'Friendship 
Treaty' party hardners affected a coup in Moscow. 
India backed the coup plotters, but the coup 
collapsed within four days and the Indian government 
found itself on the opposite side of the victorious 
reformers. 
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Such irrational approach of the Indian government was 
criticised bitterly by the press and other informed section. 
As part of a damage limitation exercise India started 
preparations for economic, defence and technological 
2 
interactions with Russia and the eleven other RepubliQS. 
The Head of State of Ukrain, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
visited India which led to the signing of several agreements 
on trade, economy, science and technology. 
Hitherto, Moscow had keen a big supporter of India in 
the Security Council. But, in the changed scenario, since 
it was too preoccupied with its own concerns of economic 
reconstruction it could no more afford to support India on 
every issue, at the cost of antagonising the U.S. Moreover, 
India lost its value to Moscow, as a significant example of 
a Third World country having cordial relations with a 
socialist country. 
Hence, in the times to come even if India manages to 
maintain good relations with Russia and other Republics, the 
political importance of such a relatinship is bound to be 
much less as compared to that of India's relations with the 
USSR. Moreover, in the past, India needed Moscow's political 
2. Satatesman Weekly, 4 January 1992. p. 5. 
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support to counter balance the U.S. support to Pakistan. 
Now, with the rreceding of the cold war, the U.S. support 
for Pakistan has lessened significantly, and therefore, 
Indiadoes not need Moscow's political support, as it did in 
the past. 
Economic; 
In the eighties, the USSR had been one of the most 
important single country trading partners of India and the 
trade balance had generally been in India's favour. But 
changes in the socialist world by the close of the eighties 
undermined the basis of the Indo-Soviet economic 
relationship, as well. Indian exports to the former Soviet 
Union for 1991 were down by 50 per cent. By 1992, trade 
between Russia and India had virtually stopped, with Moscow 
3 
owing Rs. 32 billion in technical credits. India closed 
trading accounts with the Soviet Union on 28 December, 1991, 
and fresh accounts were opened in the name of new CIS 
republics. 
Despite several problems of trade with Russia, India 
remains a reliable and low cost supplier of some traditional 
products and a market for some selected Russian exports. The 
3. Financial Times, London. February 7, 19 92. 
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first ever rupee - payment arrangement trade protocol 
between India and Russia was signed on 22 February 1992. In 
future, Moscow could import some consumer goods and agro 
products from India, and export military spares in return. 
Military; 
The Soviet Union has been important to India for 
modernization and indegenisation of Indian defence forces 
and equipment, in keeping with India's needs. From 1987-91, 
79 per cent of India's arms purchases orignated from the 
USSR. But, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
several problems arose. The breakup disrupted defence 
production and deliveries to foreign countries. Moves by the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) towards an open economy and 
currency convertibility meant that the method of payment had 
to be renegotiated with those countries which had conducted 
barter trade with the FSU. Moreover, it was significant to 
reach to an agreement as to how India's previous defence 
debt to the FSU was to be apportioned among the new 
republics. It was also to be decided that how the value of 
the rouble debt was to be recalculated with the rouble in a 
free-fall. There was also a great amount of uncertainity 
o 
about the new republic's ability and willingness to 
countinue supplying spares to the lAF. 
4. The Times of India, February 23, 1992. 
Future Trends; 
In the times to come India would badly need military spares 
from Russia, especially for its fleet of MIG-29 fighter 
planes. An agreement on this count would form the basis of 
future military relations between the two countries. In the 
economic field, Moscow is still bound to conduct non-
convertible barter trade in four areas - defence equipment, 
power projects, coal and steel, formerly, the SovietUnion 
was the most important source of assistance to Indian public 
sector. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and economic 
problems coming in its wake, India and the successor States 
would find themselves vying for resources in the world 
capital markets. However, it would take some time before 
India would manage to build its economic relations with the 
sovereign republics. The scenario, however, is still quite 
uncertain. 
Indo-US Relations; 
In the eighties, the inconsistent nature of Indo-US 
relatins has mainly been the result of a clash of U.S. 
global strategic intersts and concerns with India's regional 
security interests and concerns. Such a disharmony in their 
perceptions and interests led to a situation where India and 
the U.S. found themselves pitted against each other in most 
of the situations. 
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Political; 
It is well known in India and the U.S. that India's 
policy towards the latter has mostly been reactive. The 
Indian word view of international developments has had a 
very short time horizon and in the past had no world view of 
its own. Usually this weakness is "sought to be hidden by 
our politicians behind platitudinous propositions and asser-
5 
tions of normative values" 
However, in the ninties, the context in which India 
conducted its foreign policy has changed. The countervailing 
power to the West has suddenly disappeared, weakening the 
Indian stand of refusing to align firmly with blocs and 
strategy of taking advantage of the divergence between the 
two. Moreover, a major premise of U.S. policy of viewing 
every thing in the cold war perspective, has been rendered 
invalid. Now, the U.S. need make no more concessions for 
non-capitalist, third world political systarB for fear of 
their joining the communist bandwagon. All this has made the 
task of Indian policy makers even more difficult. Finding 
themselves in a state of confusion, a section in the south 
bloc is of the opinion that India should fill the vacuum 
created as a result of the U.S. distancing itself from 
Pakistan. 
K. Subrahmanyam. 'Dialogue with the U.S.- Keeping 
India's Nuclear Option open'. The Times of India, 
October 25, 1994. 
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In the changed scenario India needs to make large 
scale re-adjustments in its policy towards the U.S. It has 
to make a shift from the moral high-ground it had hitherto 
been occupying, to a cynical and timid brand of political 
realism. 
Economic: 
The U.S. was India's largest trading partner in 1990, 
with the total trade amounting to $41.6 billion. With 
investments of over $ 1.7 billion in India, U.S. companies 
account for about 42 per cent of all foreign investment in 
7 
India since 1991. These investments have surpassed total 
American investments since India's independence. The Indian 
government showed eagerness as regards reduction in tariffs, 
greater intellectual property rights protection and opening 
up of the banking and insurance sections. New policy 
initiatives were taken in this regard. U.S. companies urged 
for greater equity participation, especially in insurance 
ventures . 
However, the U.S. threat of punitive measures against 
India under super 301 continued to be a perennial problem. 
Imposition of unjust countervailing duties and quota 
6. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1991. 
7. The Times of India, May 12, 1994. 
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restrictions on Indian goods to protect the domestic U.S. 
market has created frictions in this otherwise growing 
relationship. Such conflicts are bound to characterize this 
relationship in future, because while the U.S. wants better 
economic ties with India, it does not want a relationship 
which enhances India's economic capabilities to the extent 
that they pose a threat to Washington's 'vital' interests. 
Defence; 
Indo-U.S. defence cooperation goes back to 1991, when 
service to service cooperation began as a result of a set of 
proposals put forward by General Kicklighter. Though that 
cooperation made some progress it took some time for the 
Americans to realise that in India as in the U.S. the Armed 
Forces were under strong civilian control unlike in Pakistan 
and consequently service to service cooperation could not go 
far unless an ,insitutionalized consultative process was 
established between the Indian Ministry of defence and the 
office of the U.S. Secretary of defence. 
As regards the relationship in this sphere there is 
an accent not just on "cooperation" but "partnership". India 
does not want to be a surrogate which is dependent on U.S. 
defence aid, much as Pakistn was. It is desirous of a 
strategic partnership in its own right as a regional power. 
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As regards the nuclear question, by the start of the 
nineties, the U.S. appeared to have gone slow in its efforts 
to pressure India into signing the NPT. Instead, its 
interest shifted to capping the nuclear status-quo in the 
sub-continent. A nuclear restraint regime was believed to be 
more achievable and not all that dangerous, since India 
bluntly refused to sign the NPT. 
The U.S. would like India to abandon its space 
programme and place its nuclear facilities under an 
inspection regime. The reason for this is a desire to ensure 
Washington's global hegemony. 
Future Prospects; 
Apart from the points of convergence, the U.S. 
position is antagonistic to India's on subsidies, anti-
dumping, GATT treatment of Third World countries and on the 
balance of payment issue. Together with these issues, the 
much stalemated North-South negotiations are likely to cast 
a shadow on Indo-US relations,in the near term. 
Another • major concern has been one of image 
perception. A faulty image and perception of India is still 
there in the U.S. The Indian government is also guilty of 
projecting its image in a holier-than-thou fashion. It is 
high time that they shunned this habit of moral posturing 
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which the Americans find most irritating. What is called for 
is an approach devoid of hypocricy. 
Since India's relations with the U.S. have been 
characterized more by misunderstandings and misperceptions, 
it is advisable to sum up the factors which have inhibited 
closer Indo-U.S. relations in the 1980s: 
1. Difference in perceptions and interests between the 
two countries. 
2. U.S. distrust of India because of its closeness with 
the USSR. 
3. U.S. reluctance in supplying military spares and high 
technology. 
4. Irresponsible and unnecessary utterances and actions 
of U.S. officials and administration. 
5. U.S. protectionist policies. 
6. U.S. pressures on India for signing the 
Non-proliferation Treaty. 
7. Disputes over patents and Intellectual property 
rights. 
8. U.S. threats for punitive measures under Super-301. 
9. India's moral posturing which was very irritating for 
Americans. 
10. India's policy towards the U.S. was mostly reactive. 
It did not have a well defined U.S. policy. 
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New Delhi - Moscow - Washington; 
For most of the 1980s, India's relations with the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) were quite cordial, but all was 
not well as regards her relations with the U.S. The U.S. 
disapproved of India's proximity with the FSU, but could not 
do much about it. However, with the demise of the cold war, 
the U.S. reactions became more actively intolerant. It was 
not ready to allow any contact between New Delhi and Moscow 
which could go against it in any possible way. The case in 
point is the Indo-Russian rocket deal of January 1991. 
Although, India had promised to use the material for 
peaceful purposes only, the U.S. put pressure on Russia to 
cancel this deal. When it did not work, on May 11, 1992, 
Washington imposed trade sanctions on both India and Russia 
for alleged violation of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR). Interestingly, neither Russia nor India is a 
signatory of the MTCR. Such an action drew strong reactions 
from both the concerned parties. This case is a pointer to 
the things to come in the future. Washington would be eager 
to interfere in each inter-action between New Delhi and 
Moscow, if it threatens to challenge Washington's global 
hegemony. This could lead to unnecessary complications and 
problems. 
However, New Delhi, Moscow and Washington have some 
common interests. These include the promotion of pluralist 
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democracy and market economy, oppsition to religious funda-
mentalism and other separatist movements, opposition to 
terrorism and to drug trafficking. Hence, despite points of 
divergence, these issues provide broad areas of convergence. 
The need now is to further explore avenues of cooperation 
within these areas. Although, it is a difficult task, it is 
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